The Birth of Buddhism Unit MBI 101
LESSON 12
Materialism: the Carvakas
The recommended minimum study time for this lesson is 60 minutes with a 5-minute break of quiet introspection after each twenty minutes. Relax and read without ponderous thought but with internal understanding. It is a lesson that is more academic and philosophical than those presented before, but we are interested in you understanding the ways in which we can look at the ancient Indian materialism, considering perhaps that the critics at the time may have been too harsh.
Therefore, look to the essence of what is presented by ancient materialism and see how it is different from materialism today.
If you approach this and other lessons with an academic approach your study time will be much longer and the return less, therefore, relax and open yourself to the true learning experience. If you wish to study the lesson more, then do so for fun not for achievement.
Lesson 12
Materialism (ucchedavada ) and Modern Humanism
Materialism
The Carvaka materialism is very old and, as we saw, predated both the arrival of the Buddha Dharma and Mahavira’s Jainism.
It arose as formalized philosophy in reaction to the excesses of Brahmin over-emphasis on rituals. A Brahmin, Braspati is considered as the founder of this philosophy.
The original founder, Braspati, was followed eventually by one of the six great masters we spoke about in the last lesson, Ajita Keśakambala, but sometimes those who followed the philosophy are referred to as Barhaspatyas.
You will remember in the last lesson that it was the Carvakas, sometimes called Lokayatas (pertaining to the material world), who declared that there was only one possible Pramana and that was Pratyaksha, Perception.
Inference and Testimony of any variety were considered unreliable. They claimed also (which appears to be quite true) that many hypotheses may explain the same observation and that inference sometimes leads to truth, sometimes to error and should then be rejected as a means of advancing knowledge of truth.
The soul, of which all were so concerned, they considered to be nothing more than the conscious body and was without any form of independent existence. They said that when the body disintegrated, both consciousness and the apparent soul disappears.
There was a great difference between the ontological position of the Cārvākas and all the other major streams of thought in ancient India, and it is precisely this position which Buddha rejected.
Remember that the Cārvākas rejected absolutely the concept of an afterlife in any shape or form, and believed that there was no karmic law of reward and retribution that could influence the destiny of a human being whatsoever.
Since only what is perceived is real, God, spirits, heaven, hell, life after death or before death are all unreal. Enjoyment was then considered to be the only viable objective of human life and death the only liberation.
In this school, the four elements are the original principles from which are transformed the body. The body, the senses and objects are the result of different combinations of elements, as is intelligence. It is declared that Consciousness arises from matter like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast.
The soul is only the body distinguished in a different way by intelligence, and since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as such, the Soul has no separate existence. From this it follows that fate does not exist, since it can only be proved by inference.
Opponents argue that if you do not allow *adrishta, there can be no cause.
In return, Carvakas argue that all change is produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things transformed.
It is clear then that the ONLY end of man is death and life is best then devoted to sensual pleasures.
In Indian texts, one almost invariably finds basic hostility towards the Cārvākas that is not supported by a fair and critical analysis of their doctrines and they are invariably disparaged, not on argument alone, but on an emotional rejection. It seems that those who heard the ideas then, and indeed hear them now, feel somehow intuitively that it is incorrect that pleasure should be the only objective of life.
Why is this intuition present? Think about that as we continue.
Let us look now at how this philosophy arose. We can trace this materialism right back to the Rigveda, where the sacrifices and rituals are performed with the express intention of receiving some earthly benefit, so probably its roots were in the actual Vedas themselves. In about 1900 BC we actually find the word Lokayata used to describe a branch of Brahmic study, conceived as nature lore, passed on as rhymes and sayings and transmitted orally, about the elements, the stars, the weather, astronomy, elementary physics, anatomy, knowledge of the nature of precious stones, and of birds and of beasts and of plants, all probably in relation to the human needs of the times. It is clear that all this folklore was related to practical matters, not spiritual ones, and that they were considered to be a valid source of knowledge.
The Arthaśāstra 1, 3, 10, 12
…1.The branches of learning are: Logic, the three Vedas (trayī), agriculture, cattle-raising and trade (collectively called vārtā) and the technique of ruling (dandanīti)…
3. For, logic is only a branch of Vedic lore…
10. Logic-based philosophy (anvīkshikī) (is represented by the following three): Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata…
12. Logic is ever accepted to be the lamp of all branches of learning, the means for all kinds of activities and the basis of all virtues (dharmas).
We can note that what we would consider as “folk ideas”, -which are now making a great comeback as “integral alternatives”-, were considered as part of the logic system, which eventually degenerated slowly into a theory based upon a populist doctrine that concentrated purely on the means of self gratification. In simple form, without elaboration, it is the practical unformalized pursuit of wealth and desire.
The Masses
Early in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Madhava, an important teacher of Vedanta, states the following:
The mass of men, in accordance with the Śastras of policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Cārvāka.
Do you note the use of the phrase "The mass of men"? Can it be that in one moment in Indian history there was a large population who denied the concept of rebirth, or were they really only indifferent to the philosophical idea, but captured by the concept of pursuing a life in which wealth and desire was the objective?
We do not have at our disposal evidence of the speculations of those castes that were outside of the Brāhmana-Kshatriya control. Remember that within the castes there was freedom of belief, and intelligence was not an attribute confined to Brahmins. It is logical then to assume that there were intelligent men who devised their own philosophical systems and that this type of Carvaka philosophy may have arisen in a natural protest against the spiritual ideas that kept the lower caste members in slavery. Indeed, materialism may have arisen from a Vedic philosophy-oriented Spartacus.
So there is no reason to believe that the lower castes in Indian society did not have a similar oral tradition over the same period, or at the least have leaders or teachers who shaped these traditions, it could be argued that materialism, with common support, was a reaction against the perceived deterioration in common conditions and the perceived exploitation of the masses.
If we reflect for a moment, perhaps there is a corollary in our present philosophical and cultural position, for certainly the modern day Brahmins, the world religions, and Kshatriyas, the military, scientific and political castes of today, have provided no valid answers to the problems of the human condition, and we are, without doubt, at a root level, a materialist society.
The Greater Good
But were these early materialists only interested in their own individual benefit? Perhaps, but in fact, the individual benefit is sometimes bound up in ideas relative to the whole society, as is the case today.
In fact, there seems to exist a global materialism, which we like to call simply a consumer society. Within this global materialism, there are two great fears. First, will we get our share? This is disguised in the phrase, “Let’s make sure that all get their share. Second, a fear of death through global conflict and war.
Look at this interesting quotation. In the Mahābhārata, within the Bhagavad Gita, we find an episode involving Carvaka, probably a warrior.
The Mahābhārata 12. 1. 414
When the Brahmins were now once again standing silent, Cārvāka the Rāxasa, in the disguise of a Brahmin, addressed the King. This friend of Duryodhana, concealed under the garb of a mendicant with a rosary, a lock of hair on his crown, and a triple staff, impudent and fearless, surrounded by all the Brahmins exceeding a thousand in number, who were anxious to utter their benedictions - men who practised austerity and self-restraint –
This wretch, wishing evil to the magnanimous Pāndavas, without saluting those Brahmins, thus addressed the King: "All these Brahmins, falsely imputing the malediction to me, themselves exclaim, woe to you, wicked king, the son of Kuntī? Since you have slaughtered your kinsmen and elders, death is desirable for you, and not life."
Hearing this speech of the wicked Rāxasa the Brahmins were pained and indignant, being maligned by his words. But they, as well as King Yudhishtira, all remained silent, being ashamed and cut to the heart.
Then Yudhishtira said: "Let all your reverences be reconciled to me, who bows down and supplicates you: you ought not to curse me who has recently undergone such great misfortunes."
All the Brahmins then exclaimed: "We never uttered the words imputed to us; may your Majesty enjoy prosperity."
Then these noble-minded Brahmins, versed in the Vedas and purified by austerities, recognised (Carvaka) by the eye of knowledge, and exclaimed: "This Rāxasa called Cārvāka, friend of Duryodhana; in the garb of a vagrant he seeks to accomplish the purposes of your enemy; we speak not so, righteous King; let all such fears be dissipated; may prosperity attend you and your brothers."
Then all these Brahmins, infuriated with anger, uttering menaces, slew with, with muttered curses, the wicked Rāxasa; who fell down consumed by the might of utterers of Vedic incantations, burnt up by the bolt of Indra, like a tree covered with leaves.
Why did Cārvāka denounce the King, declaring : "Since you have slaughtered your kinsmen and elders, death is desirable for you."
Here there is a clear denouncement of fratricide. From such beginnings have great movements sprung. This denouncement is stronger and actually less worldly than the repulsion felt by Ajita in being forced into battle against kin, and certainly less worldly than the present civilization’s denouncement of war, which appears to be somehow more mental or emotional than a genuine understanding that it is not the true nature of man to kill.
Thus it is easy to imagine that the materialism of the Carvakas, so condemned and criticised by all, did contain a subtle morality. Or was the reaction of Carvaka in the tale simply a pragmatic statement? That does not seem possible, because defying the king can hardly be considered as leading to greater personal happiness. In fact, we see it did not for Carvaka. It is possible of course that this Carvaka had no part to play in the development of the philosophy, but it is an interesting idea.
Sankara’s commentary
The theory of consciousness that the Cārvākas developed is referred to as dehātmavāda or bhūtacaitanyavāda in the philosophical texts of classical India. The bhūtacaitanyavādin is described as "one who admits the consciousness of material elements." In his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, Sankara, another Vedic commentator, gives this view of dehātmavāda:
The existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the bode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence be a mere attribute of the body. Hence, activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.
The same statement could also be made with respect to the concept of human consciousness (caitanya).
The ancient Sāmkhya philosophers constructed an elaborate explanatory system whereby all the features of the mind, except for what we would be later called atman by the Advaita Vedānta school, could be produced from insentient matter.
This is a position similar to that held by the Carvakas, and it is possible that this theory may have been influential in the development of *Lokāyata, although it must be remembered that the Carvakas apparently saw NO DIFFERNCE between intelligence, other mind attributes and consciousness, (which Sāmkhya, an ancient philosophical system that pre-dates the composition of the Upanishads, refers to as Purusha.)
This Sāmkhya system viewed Purusha (consciousness) as imprisoned in the material world.
Primal nature was considered to be the physical phenomenon through which everything, except Purusha, comes into being. In the unevolved avyakta state, it consists of three gunas (literally ropes or strands): sattva, rajas and tamas. Prakriti, primordial matter, arose in order to liberate consciousness. Here we see almost a divine intervention. It is almost as though Purusha, in an imprisoned state, elicited this *Prakriti.
So Prakriti, it is said, unfolds, and the intellect, mahat, comes into being. Following on from that is the ego, ahamkara, and from that emerges the mind-organ, manas. At each stage of this development, the products of Prakriti are in contact with the organs of sense and action and the potentialities inherent within them.
Thus the idea may be considered in this light that consciousness is a dormant potential that can be liberated through correct practice.
Perhaps now you can see the similarity between this idea and that of the Carvakas. They do not posit an unawakened state of a potentially separate consciousness and say instead that consciousness is just a natural product of the material state. It is thus indeed possible that the Carvaka idea developed from the Samkhya system.
This negation of anything outside of the material elements of the body, Dehātmavāda, leaves us with a question about that body. If the Carvakas rejected the use of the Pramānas in establishing the existence of a world outside of our sense-data, then how were they to account for the existence of the empirical world and its causal relations?
A Svabhāvavādin argument says that it is the "essential nature" (svabhāva) of a thing that undergoes transformation by itself (svatah). All entities are born due to the influence of svabhāva. Thus, for example, from clay a jar is produced and not cloth, and from yarn a cloth is produced and not a jar. But this production according to a fixed rule cannot be explained to take place without it being characterised by such specific svabhāva. Therefore, it is to be concluded that all this is due to svabhāva. Thus it has been said: "Who produces sharpness in thorns? (Who creates) different dispositions in animals and birds? All this has proceeded from svabhāva. There is no scope for action according to one's will. What is the use of effort?"
But there is indeed another alternative view:
According to the view of the Yadricchāvādins, the word yadricchā means the attainment of objects without any prior deliberation (abhisandhi) (accidentally). But who are these Yadricchāvādins? The Yadricchāvādins are those who, in this world, do not admit to any fixed cause-effect relation in respect to objects, but maintain (such relation to be due) to yadricchā (accident).
It is very difficult to distinguish between Svabhāva and Yadricchā, as both are identical as far as the rejection of the causal principle is concerned. However, the distinction may be taken to lie in that in the Svabhāvavāda system a true nature is formally admitted that is technically known as svabhāvāniyama.
For the Svabhāvavādin, the nature of a thing is unchangeable; everything has its true unchangeable nature. There need be then no becoming or birth of anything, just constant change.
But the answer of the Yadricchāvādin would be a flat denial of any such natural principle. The observed order and regularity in our experience is due to mere chance, they would say.
It is possible that some Cārvākas held the view that the world was caused merely by accident. A sceptic such as Jayarāśi Bhatta might agree with that idea, but the element of chance in the causal process also opens up the possibility that there is something outside of our sense-data that has an influence on the physical realm.
Thus it is to the Svabhavavadin idea that we look to in order to explain the Carvaka position. And they probably fully accepted svabhāvavāda. It could be consistent with their materialistic outlook by virtue of the fact that even if the creation of an entity or object could not be directly experienced, then it could be inferred that it contained within itself the potentiality for that origination.
But modern scholars claim that there is an inherent inescapable flaw in the Cārvāka's philosophy that today renders it inadequate. If we cannot believe in anything that is not presented before our very eyes, then we have ceased to be rational human beings and our ability to function as such in the world is practically nil. That is said by some to be the epistemology of the Cārvākas followed to its logical conclusion.
But an interesting question now is brought forward. Perhaps being a rational creature is not our natural, or correct state. Perhaps the natural state is to respond correctly to all things and to permit a natural intelligence below the level of consciousness do everything for us. Perhaps we have overreached ourselves with our faith in both our own consciousness and our reason. Perhaps our intelligence and consciousness are simply characteristics of s system which has run amuck.
Perhaps…. Perhaps not.
Perhaps the selfish impulse of self gratification is the only error in the system. Perhaps the natural intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast is happiness, compassion, benevolent love and equanimity that direct human behaviour to the bodhisattva ideal, and not selfishness.
Perhaps…. Perhaps not.
Although Buddha rejected both ucchedavada (materialism) and sassatavada (eternalism), as we shall see in the next lesson, he was more condemnatory towards ucchedavada. In his first sermon, he refers to the ucchedavada extreme as hina (inferior), gamma (vulgar) and pothujjanika (worldly).
His reasons were that ucchedavada leads to the collapse of a just and correct society. This, of course, is what we see today in modern materialism, and the fact that it has appended to it a humanistic tag, does not change its essential inadequacy.
A further implied criticism is that the materialist position reduces moral responsibility in this world. We must be aware that we are talking here of the exceedingly high tendency of the human creature to fall into the traps of total materialism. At the same time, we must allow the ideal position in which there is a materialism that melds with a natural higher consciousness that is man’s true nature.
We now have an idea of the materialist position which faced Buddha in his day. Perhaps it did not have such a great force among the intellectuals of the time, but it appeared to be the norm among the people, probably with little idea intellectually, but with practical force, no doubt mixed with the Bramanic forms of sacrifice.
We can see that Buddha’s answer was relevant against the materialists of his times, but would his answers be equally applicable today, now that materialism has a different coat of many colors?
Humanism and Agnosticism
Humanism
The concept " Humanism" first entered into Western thought during the Renaissance, when it was used to denote the revival of interest in the ancient writings of the Greek and Roman philosophers. After the conversion of Constantine to Christianity, there was a severe repression of all alternative views, and this extended to the ancient classics. Many humanists, for the most part, were chained to Christian concepts.
By the nineteenth century, the humanists were able to adopt a secular form, completely freed from religion, and indeed fought the principal dogmas of Christianity. This was greatly assisted by the growth of science both in the physical and biological spheres. It was the triumph of Darwinism in the nineteenth century which clinched for many of them the issue between theistic religion and science.
Today secular humanism stands in sharp contrast to supernatural religion, which is based on the existence of a supreme power.
Without any coercion, individuals are clearly free to practice any form of religion that they wish, but in principle, the humanist position is the engine which runs the world, whether we agree with its tenets or not.
This is a scientific age, and it is generally assumed that we have adopted and practice a kind of humanism that adapts its credence to scientific method and, at least theoretically, emphasizes the dignity and worth of the individual. This, again theoretically, is the perfect materialism. Rationality, which is highly prized, is supposed to give man a capacity for truth and love. This Utopia, which started with the medieval writers in Europe, sounds marvellous, but because it is an idea and not a movement in itself, the reality is somewhat different.
According to Aristotle, reason sets humans apart from animals. Indeed it appears that it does. We think logically and analytically and because the mind of reason only sees itself, and it assumes that its own power is capable of solving both academic and spiritual problems that are beyond the present capacity of the adulterated human mind to solve.
When applied to academics or knowledge, we achieve excellence, though not necessarily good judgement, and when applied to the moral sphere, we are supposed to achieve correct behavior, but we achieve neither excellence nor good judgement. There is complete reliance upon the cognitive mind and no confidence at all in the mind of insight, which is beyond the reach of reason.
This attitude is applied to the fields of education, psychology, sociology, politics, and even religion. Thus humanism is a reliance on reason and the power of observation (empirical verification), which is apparently in the hands of the new priesthood.
Humanism subscribes to a naturalistic metaphysics that considers all forms of the supernatural as myths. While in theory it considers nature as the province of the human creature, it exploits and abuses.
By virtue of reason, humans are masters of their destiny. The highest goal of humanism is this-worldly happiness, freedom, and progress of all mankind irrespective of color, creed, race, ethnicity or nationality. In the American constitution it is called the pursuit of happiness. How strange it is that we are always pursuing and never seem to reach it.
A natural and harmonious life is a combination of personal and communal (universal) welfare and an appreciation of nature in all its forms, with the understanding that human intelligence used as a tool can build a cooperative world of balance harmony and tranquillity. This sounds like the Buddhist Dharma, and it is. It sounds like the Hindu objective, and it is. It sounds like the Taoist idea, and it is. Then are these humanists?
Not really, because in the above two paragraphs, there two small words that make a wealth of difference. Do you see them?
The words “master” and “tool”.
Modern humanism in reality, though not admitting to it, applies the “master” not the “tool”; that is the difference. What we have managed to do as a society is create a new God to replace Indra, called the human Mind, called also Perusha, and then we have created three minor Gods called Id, Ego, and Superego, called Tamas, Raja, and Sattva and put them in command of human behaviour. Then, with our blessing, we have added science and called ourselves humanists, because then we can speak about fine ideals.
What we have not realized is that although philosophies may be introduced and understood by the mind, they are of little use unless they are applied to every day living.
The apparent objectives of this modern humanism can only be realized by replacing the Godship of the mind with an understanding of what is beyond the mind, and by dissolving the illusory nature of the cognitive mind and the Gunas with understanding, meditation and daily practice.
The modern goal is not to realize the transcendental nor to discover the true nature of man, but to be happy. But the happiness that we seek is the fruit of error. True happiness lies far beyond mental clinging and craving.
In modern groups, everyone listens, shares thoughts, emotions, and sensations but seldom questions basic beliefs. Socially learned affection and socially learned compassion and respect for each other dominates these interactions. Each person, in almost every group, is working within the social idea with his own selfishness predominant. Yet each person DOES have a unique perspective to offer and CAN make a contribution to the path, if they forget the goal which is personal and instead look towards the collective happiness.
This humanism which we have developed and called the “new age of humanism” is not new. We have seen it before in these lessons. It is called materialism.
It is no wonder then that a form of materialism has developed as the common basic philosophy of the human creature, disguised in many ways, of course, but clearly surfacing much too often.
Remember that the belief of the Carvakas was that there was no self apart from the body. Is that not really the common street belief now? Is there a real consciousness in most people of something greater than what appears to be? We can say, yes there is, but is it really a belief founded in individual consciousness or is it simply an accepted given that few think about and do not wish to deny?
As an ideal, humanism is politically committed to the continuous progress of society. Is not the presence of humanism as it is today nothing more than an extension of the same ideas that the Carvakas developed? The greater happiness in a material world is clearly in the best interest of the individual. That all do not run at the same pace is a social problem, not a philosophical one for the materialist and it appears that in this society, the devil must take the hindmost. That is the law of the concrete jungle.
Agnosticism
The limits of knowledge presented by agnosticism needs to be understood historically. Since it arose in the West, which is now our focus, we can examine the philosophical milieu at the time of Plutarch (first century A.D.). He offered six positions. On one hand he presented a dogmatic Idealism and Materialism and on the other, Scepticism, Pragmatism, Eclecticism, and Fideism. The case for each of these positions was naturally presented verbally, as it was thousands of years before in India.
Plato, in his work “The Sophist”, discussed the almost irresolvable conflict between idealists and materialists that we saw in India as a battle between Gods and Giants. But Plato assumed that the theoretical differences were not irreconcilable because knowledge could probably be obtained by other means. His belief was in the immortality of the rational soul and in the real existence of the objects of the soul’s knowledge, which were intelligible, independent of sense perceptions.
For Plato this attainable intuitional knowledge (pure reason) was called "phronesis" (the idea of Wisdom) which was to focus correct attitudes, intentions and actions within both one’s personal life and public affairs.
Socrates argued strongly against such knowledge, claiming that it was insufficient in all situations to cover the facts. He maintained the radical idea that truth could only be obtained through the cultivation of the art of discourse upon any idea, large or small, which was concerned with the life of man. The art of rhetoric and the art of thought for him were the same. He provided a framework for debate that was much more profound than the simple acceptance or rejection of acceptable pramanas.
Protagoras had already echoed the ancient Indian idea of scepticism when he declared, "As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either that they exist or that they do not exist." In a way very similar to that of Buddha and Mahavira, he always laid down all the viable alternatives on each side of the question, and since he was not interested in the outcome, he taught how to attack and refute any proposition, introducing the first Socratic method of dialogue.
But all these debate techniques remained only theory and resolved nothing.
In the second half of the sixteenth century, Montaigne showed the interminable inconclusiveness of the argument of verbal philosophy, and returned to the ultimate doubt of scepticism: Que sais-je? Thus all returned as it had always been, showing clearly the inadequacy of verbal answers to free inquiry, a point which Buddha was himself very clear to make.
Buddha declared clearly that nothing should be believed if it is not supported by direct experience. But that direct experience must be clearly divorced from the illusory components of the thinking mind and visions provoked by a clinging consciousness to a specific idea. Seeing the soul or God does not support the truth of the soul or God, it merely presents the truth that the event had been experienced. This Direct experience of which Buddha spoke will be discussed later in this course, because it becomes central to the perception of any truth which can be experienced.
The Naked truth
Science progressed, but it became abundantly clear that science was capable of dealing ONLY with questions that were formulated in a way that could be tested. Metaphysical questions were, without any doubt, not a kind with which science was, or would ever be, competent to deal with. Science could not prove nor disprove the existence of God.
Auguste Comte ironically declared in 1851 that he was not an atheist because that would be to take theology seriously, and that the ages of theology and metaphysics were past and done with. The future appeared then to lay with the sciences.
The initial idea that science offered models of harmony and design eminently attributable to a supreme intelligence fell unsubstantiated, for biological studies were soon to encounter doubts and difficulties antagonistic to a teleological view. Eventually Darwin showed that order in nature that was not purposive. The ambiguity of "reason" in the interpretation of nature became apparent.
It was at this point that T.H. Huxley, Darwin's advocate, invented the word "agnosticism" (1869) to reinstate the position of Protagoras. Once more scepticism took centre stage.
The onus was shifted from the shoulders of the unbeliever to justify his perversity, to the shoulders of the believer to justify his belief and to show why he should be taken seriously.
Agnosticism was not exactly like scepticism, because it did not infer suspension of judgment. It was an advocation of an intellectual disregard of theological matters. Huxley describes how he came to originate the term 'agnostic', which explains better this position.
“When I reached intellectual maturity, and began to ask myself whether I was an atheist, a theist, or a pantheist; a materialist or an idealist; a Christian or a freethinker; I found that the more I learned and reflected, the less ready was the answer; until at last I came to the conclusion that I had neither art nor part with any of these denominations, except the last. (freethinker).
The one thing in which most of these good people were agreed was the one thing in which I differed from them. They were quite sure that they had attained a certain "gnosis" -- had more or less successfully solved the problem of existence; while I was quite sure I had not, and had a pretty strong conviction that the problem was insoluble. And, with Hume and Kant on my side, I could not think myself presumptuous in holding fast by that opinion. [...]
So I took thought, and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of "agnostic". It came into my head as suggestively antithetic to the "Gnostic" of Church history, who professed to know so much about the very things of which I was ignorant; and I took the earliest opportunity of parading it at our Society, to show that I, too, had a tail, like the other foxes.”
Huxley, with delight, once his term found acceptance, expanded upon what he meant by it.
. " Agnosticism" 1889
“Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle. That principle is of great antiquity; it is as old as Socrates; as old as the writer who said, 'Try all things, hold fast by that which is good'; … it is the foundation of the Reformation, which simply illustrated the axiom that every man should be able to give a reason for the faith that is in him, it is the great principle of Descartes; it is the fundamental axiom of modern science.
In matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In matters of the intellect, do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable.
That I take to be the agnostic faith, which if a man keep whole and undefiled, he shall not be ashamed to look the universe in the face, whatever the future may have in store for him.
The results of the working out of the agnostic principle will vary according to individual knowledge and capacity, and according to the general condition of science. That which is unproved today may be proved, by the help of new discoveries, tomorrow. The only negative fixed points will be those negations which flow from the demonstrable limitation of our faculties. And the only obligation accepted is to have the mind always open to conviction]
That it is wrong for a man to say he is certain of the objective truth of a proposition unless he can provide evidence which logically justifies that certainty. This is what agnosticism asserts and in my opinion, is all that is essential to agnosticism.
"Agnosticism and Christianity", 1889
Understanding this to be the correct description of agnosticism, NOT the idea that “there is some controlling essence out there which is unknowable”, the interesting question then is, could Buddha and his followers be considered agnostics, or were they atheists?
Note Buddha’s sermon to Kaccana.
”When the arising of the world is seen as it truly is or as it has become with Samma’ (coherent citta or mind) wisdom there is no notion of ‘being’ or ‘nonbeing’; the same holds true as to the subjugation of the world.
This world is entirely bound to dogmas, cravings and beliefs Kaccana. When ones mind is not engaged in either dogmas, cravings or beliefs then there is no arising of speculative views such as ‘this is my Soul’; for he has gnosis and neither doubt or wavering (of mind) that it is merely suffering which has come to arise and merely the cessation of suffering which ceases. Herein Kaccana one possesses envisionment of Samma’. ‘The all (sabba) is’, and ‘the all is not’ are both dead ends (speculative views)…
Without involvement in either of these (heretical) views the Tathagata teaches the dhamma by the Means (majjhena, suchness, Tat, Brahma). Because-of-this, namely agnosis (anana) or nescience (avijja) there is suchness, and when suchness is present, so is that and etc.” The Tathagata teaches that both dogmas of being (sat) and non being (asat) are fruitless; so the Tathagata, the Sammasambuddha teaches suchness , which is achieved by means of wisdom which destroys nescience (avijja); before “thou art being (sat)” and “thou art unbecoming (asat)”, there is Suchness, “thou art Suchness”.
Given the absence of avijja which occludes ones Self (attan) or Soul from direct discernment of things as they are or have become (yathabhuta) there is no need to speak of or become involved in either speculation or dogmas relative to being (sat) or non-being (asat) when only action is required to wipe away agnosis with wisdom and the jhanas, whereupon the refulgent glory and magnitude of one’s Self-nature or Atman which is identical with Brahma becomes suchness (Tat, Brahma) without antinomy or duality (dvayanissito), or speculative dogmatic beliefs regarding one’s Soul (attanuditthi).
Like two monkeys in a tree top, one argues that in the fall the fruit will drop off the tree and rot, and then he will surely starve (ucchedavadin) and die so he should and can do as he likes here-and-now for ultimately all will end at winters arrival (death); whereas the other equally ignorant monkey (sassatavadin) says assuredly that there will be a new batch of fruit next year (another life) and if they take care of the tree top (merit-making), there might even be better or more fruit to eat next year (better reincarnation).
Both of these heretical howler monkeys in this analogy (which spend their entire lives in the tree canopy which is the wheel or round of rebirth) are ignorant of the grounds or being, the means, the mid-most, the con-centric (majjha), or root (of the tree itself which is Truth), like two fools arguing over whether a vessel is half full or half empty instead of pondering where the water fountain is which filled the vessel to begin with. That very “water faucet” or the source and root of mind is the fixed and unchanging mast or post of true-being (Svabhava), or the “unseen productivity (fruit)” which the ignorant howler monkeys are unaware of.
This “unseen Seer”, which is suchness (Tat, Brahma), which makes things become, but itself is unbecome (ajata), and unoriginated is for the adept imbued with wisdom, to be “fixed in the Soul” for him who finds it, that rare few, that sage, the Arahant or worthy, has “crossed beyond birth and death” both, and either being (sat) or nonbeing (asat) are without meaning for suchness which does not partake of spacio-temporality, is “unbecome, unborn, unmade, and unseen”.
The Notion of Change in Buddhism
We have seen in Eternalism a clinging to an unchanging essence which is linked with constant change in life. We have seen in Materialism/Annihilism the non existence of any essence, but with identification with the constant changes in life ending in death. The former works selfishly for gradual spiritual evolution and the latter works selfishly for greater benefits and pleasure in the temporary here and now.
Contrary to both these ideas, the notion of change in Buddhism is not simply one of clinging to changes, for example, to spiritual progress or increasing personal benefit. Change is the arising of something which previously did not exist and will cease to exist in the next moment and thus cannot be craved or clung to.
One moment becomes another moment; one thought or mental image suddenly turns into a different kind of thought or image. Nothing is moved from one location to another. Nothing actually goes through a gradual metamorphosis. There is only a sudden change from one state to another. It is our minds which provide the apparent continuity.
Actually these impressions, which Buddha called “mind moments”, are no different than apparent external images, for they too are actually just creations of the mind. In Mahayana Buddhism, they are products of a stained mind, for it is this stained mind (Identity bound) that is the root of clinging and craving.
The change of generation and degeneration, or what in Buddhism we call birth and death, is the last change. It is in birth and death of the mundane kind of Dependent Origination in which we find that every moment a new Identity is discriminated (becoming) and converted into Duality (birth).
When one first identifies oneself as existing after the becoming stage of being, the change from the previous state to the present one is radical. At first there is a discriminating state without cognitive awareness of oneself. This is a potentially ignorant (avidya) state, but subsequently, one identifies with the apparently changing world in a state of bewilderment.
Thus there arises the inherent desire not to change, partly from the fear of not being. This evolves from a natural impulse for the survival of consciousness without the concept of auto identification. The impetus for survival of the consciousness is simply without an awareness of the illusion of personal existence.
One may believe that there is an essence which will always be in its present state (Eternalism) or that one will be nothing after death (Materialism or Annihilism).
If one considers oneself from from the standpoint of Eternalism one believes that the essence is also the experiencer who will not change even when the body putrefies and no longer exists. If, by contrast, upon looking at all of one’s experiences which give identity, one can find nothing in them which will remain after these experiences have long passed away, then one can accept Materialism.
In both Eternalism and Materialism there is one common problem: in
trying to grasp who we really are, we don’t go far enough. For the Eternalist, he is eternal as an unending continuum of changing experiences in which he is the immediate participant. He is essentially saying, “I, the essence, am eternal and changing, but the essence never changes.”
The view of the Materialist/Annihilist, is the opposite; he is the flip side of the eternalist. “What I shall be is nothing; in becoming nothing I cannot be again”. Essentially, one worships the changing essence, the other simply sees only the process of passing-away.
Buddha broke through this seeming invincible barrier by claiming that both are caught up in the world of attributes (in Buddhism called the twelvefold cycle of Dependent Origination) consisting of: the sense bases; sensation (contact); emotion; craving; clinging; becoming; birth; aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; ignorance; volition; consciousness; and perception.
The Eternalist identifies himself with each and every attribute and believes that this cycle will never end, thus becoming a participant in the life of phenomena. The Materialist/Annihilist believes the attributes which is his present way of being are going to cease at death. Thus for him, there is no cycle, only a wheel which starts with ignorance and ends with death.
Where Buddhism succeeds in its siege against such errant views….*
This cycle belongs to the unchanging dynamic ground of all…..*
The coming-to-be and the passing-away are nothing without an identification of the unchanging and a letting go of the concept of changing. What needs to be seen is “that from which things arise and fall back into”, for this is truly the core of our being. In Pali, “that from which things arise and fall back into” is referred to as majjhatta, translated as middlemost substance, which is best now translated as our true nature.
The Natural Law: the Buddha Nature
It is this true nature that we call our Buddha Nature, our Wise Nature which follows the Natural Law. We, as Buddhists, can begin to view the natural law as a viable means for addressing moral issues in the often hostile modern humanist, agnostic and externalist environment of today as we are faced with the incapacity of religious belief and the impoverishment of normal human conduct to provide the backdrop against which the renewed interest in natural law can be seen.
The natural law tradition supplies an antidote to these cultural trends because according to it, there is a universal moral law to which people of all races, cultures, and religions can have access through their rational capacities and which can liberate their identification with Dependent Origination once it is awakened by correct practice. Natural law thus provides moral standards that all persons can grasp without the aid of special or divine revelation or pure cognitive intellect.
We see then that the Indian evolution of the eternalist position contrasted with both the Indian materialist position and the modern humanist and agnostic positions do not provide answers for the impasse of this modern life.
The question is, does Buddhism, as the Middle Path, provide this answer?
EXERCISE 12
The eleventh exercise for this unit 101 is a little more difficult, but do not be dismayed. There is no correct answer to the question we propose. There are only answers that reflect your personal understanding. Thus your own answer is part of your own learning process.
See if you can develop a basic philosophical idea that combines the Carvaka philosophy with your own spiritual approach, without conflicting with the Carvaka ideas. One page is sufficient.
If you find that difficult, then give me a critical comparison of ancient and modern materialism.
Sassatavada and Ucchedavada:
The Key to a proper Understanding of the Origin and the Doctrines of early Buddhism
by Y Karunadasa
(Volume 74: 2).August 1999
The early Buddhist discourses often refer to the mutual opposition between two views. One is the view of permanence or eternalism (sassatavada). The other is the view of annihilation (ucchedavada). The former is sometimes referred to as bhava-ditthi, the belief in being, and the latter as vibhava-ditthi, the belief in non-being. The world at large has a general tendency to lean upon one of these two views. Thus, addressing Kaccayana, the Buddha says: 'This world, O Kaccayana, generally proceeds on a duality, of (the belief in) existence and (the belief in) non-existence.' What interests us here is the fact that it is against these two views that Buddhist polemics are continually directed. What is more, all the fundamental doctrines of early Buddhism are presented in such a way as to unfold themselves, or to follow as a logical sequence, from a sustained criticism of sassatavada and ucchedavada. This particular context is sometimes explicitly stated; at other times it is taken for granted. Therefore, it is within the framework of the Buddhist critique of sassatavada and ucchedavada that the Buddhist doctrines seem to assume their significance. For it is through the demolition of these two world-views that Buddhism seeks to construct its own world-view. The conclusion is that it was as a critical response to the mutual opposition between these two views that Buddhism emerged as a new faith amidst many other faiths.
This should become clear if we examine briefly the religious and intellectual milieu in which Buddhism originated. In fact, the prevailing mood of the time is very well reflected in the early Buddhist discourses themselves. The first sutta of the first nikaya (section or 'basket') in the tipitaka (the 'Three Baskets' of the Buddhist canon) begins with an enumeration, and a refutation from the Buddhist point of view, of 62 other views. This and many other suttas in the first four nikayas show that there prevailed a wide variety of mutually exclusive speculations on the nature and destiny of man and his place in the cosmos. Despite their wide variety, we can classify them into three main groups. The first includes all the religions current at the time; the second comprises materialist theories which arose in direct opposition to religion; and the third consists of all forms of scepticism which arose as a reaction against both.
Among the many religions of the day, some were a linear development of Vedic thought while others seem to have emerged either in isolation from or in opposition to it. In the former, the trend was more towards theism, monism and orthodoxy; in the latter, it was more towards non-theism, pluralism and heterodoxy. Between the two groups there were a variety of religious teachings which were based on epistemological grounds such as scriptural authority (pitaka-sampada), revelation (anussava), the omniscience of the teacher (sabbaññuta), knowledge gained through extrasensory perception and arguments based on pure reasoning (takka-vimamsa). Although they represented a wide spectrum of religious views and practices, they all appear to have subscribed to a belief in a soul or self-entity. This common belief, though it had many variations, is represented in the early Buddhist discourses as a general statement: aññam jivam aññam sariram (the jiva or soul is one thing and the sarira or body is another). This distinction seems to emphasize the fact that while the soul is something permanent, the body is something perishable. This distinction is also one between the physical body and the metaphysical self. There seems to have been general agreement among all religions that, since this self-entity is something immutable, it survives death and that it is in this self-entity (soul) that man's true essence is to be found. This religious or spiritual view of the human personality is the theory of the metaphysical self. It was this belief in a permanent spiritual substance within man that came to be represented in the Pali suttas as sassatavada. Accordingly, from the Buddhist point of view, all the religions of the day which subscribed to an eternal self-subsisting spiritual entity were but different kinds of sassatavada.
The materialist tradition which emerged in direct opposition to religion also seems to have had more than one school of thought. These took their stand on the epistemological ground that sense-perception was the only valid means of knowledge. Hence they questioned the validity of theological and metaphysical theories which do not come within the ambit of sense-experience. This explains why they rejected the religious version of atmavada, the belief in a metaphysical self, and gave it a new interpretation. This new interpretation is expressed in the Pali suttas by the words tam jivam tam sariram (the self is the same as the body). This is quite in contrast to the religious view which emphasizes their duality rather than their identity. The line of argument which seems to have led to this conclusion may be stated as follows: there is no observable self-entity apart from the body, and since only the observable exists, this self-entity must be identical with the physical body. Therefore, for materialism the soul is a product of the four primary elements of matter (ayam atta rupi catummahabhutiko). This materialist view of the human personality is the theory of the physical self. Because materialism identifies the self with the physical body, it necessarily follows that at death, with the break-up of the body, the self too is annihilated (ucchindati, vinassati), without any prospect of post-mortal existence. In view of this inevitable conclusion to which the materialist view of life leads, it came to be represented in the Buddhist texts as ucchedavada (annihilationism).
There is a general belief among some modern scholars that materialism (ucchedavada) rejects in toto what is called atmavada or the belief in a soul or self-entity. Generally speaking this may be true, but from the Buddhist point of view it is not valid. According to the Buddhist understanding of atmavada, any kind of thing, whether it is material, mental or spiritual, could become an åtman if it becomes an object of self-identification. This process of self-identification is said to manifest itself in three ways: this is mine (etam mama); this I am (esoham asmi); and this is my self (eso me atta). As materialism takes the body to be the self, to be an object of self-identification, it is also a variety of atmavada. One objection that may be raised here is that what materialists identify as the self is not a metaphysical entity but the perishable physical body. In the context of Buddhist teachings, however, what matters is not the permanence or impermanence of the object of self-identification but the very fact of self-identification. Thus Buddhists view both sassatavada and ucchedavada as two varieties of atmavada.
Because sassatavada emphasizes the duality between the soul and the body, its theory of man's emancipation is based on this notion of duality. Between the soul and the body, it is the soul that is in bondage. Hence if anything is to be saved, it must be the soul. What prevents its upward journey is the gravitational pull of the body, that is gratification in sensuality. Thus deliverance of the soul, its perpetuation in a state of eternal bliss, requires the mortification of the flesh. This is what came to be represented in the Buddhist texts as attakilamathanuyoga (self-mortification). It is very likely that it was this belief that led to a variety of ascetic practices during the time of the Buddha. A case in point was Jainism, which advocated rigid austerities to liberate the soul.
For ucchedavada (materialism), on the other hand, man 'is a pure product of the earth' awaiting annihilation at death. His aim in this temporary life thus cannot be the rejection of sense-pleasures in the pursuit of a higher spiritual ideal. If anything, it should be just the opposite. This is what came to be described in the Buddhist texts as kamasukhallikanuyoga (sensual gratification). Hence self mortification and sensual gratification represent the practical aspects of the two theories of sasssatavada and ucchedavada.
It is very likely that it was this polarization of intellectual thought into sasssatavada and ucchedavada, with a number of sects and subsects within each tradition, that paved the way for the emergence of scepticism. It is of course true that, as K N Jayatilake observes, there had been sceptical hints and agnostic trends even in pre-Buddhistic Indian thought. However, as he further observes, the actual 'impetus and the occasion for their arising seem to have been provided by the presence of diverse, conflicting and irreconcilable theories pertaining to moral, metaphysical and religious beliefs'. In the Indian context, however, scepticism does not necessarily mean complete dissociation from any ideal of salvation. For there is evidence to suggest that some adopted scepticism on the grounds that knowledge was not only impossible but also a danger to moral development and salvation.
The polarization of religious and intellectual thought into sassatavada and ucchedavada paved the way for the birth of scepticism, and it seems very likely that this very same circumstance led to the emergence of Buddhism as well. This conclusion is, in fact, very much suggested by the Buddha's first sermon, the Sermon on the Setting in Motion of the Wheel of the Dhamma (the Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta). It is against the background of sassatavada and ucchedavada that the Buddha sets out in it his newly discovered path to emancipation, the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya-atthangikamagga). The Buddha himself calls it majjhima patipada (the Middle Path) because it avoids the two extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification. The avoidance of these two extremes also means the avoidance of the two theories which serve as their background, namely sassatavada and ucchedavada, in other words the physical and the metaphysical theories of the nature of the human personality. Thus the use of the two words Middle Path brings into focus the religious and intellectual background against which Buddhism originated. That the Middle Path is not a compromise between the two extremes or an admixture of them is indicated by its definition in the same sermon as ubho ante anupagamma (without entering into either extreme). This shows that it is called the Middle Path because it transcends the mutual opposition between the two extremes.
In point of fact, the Buddha's life itself delineates the perennial conflict between sassatavada and ucchedavada and its transcendence by the Middle Path. The Buddha's lay life as a prince exemplifies one extreme; his life as an ascetic practising severe austerities exemplifies the other. And his attainment of enlightenment by giving up both extremes shows the efficacy of the Middle Path for deliverance from all suffering.
The Buddhist critique of views, it may be noted here, is not confined to arguments based on logic, epistemology and ontology. It also takes into consideration their psychological motivation, that is the mental dispositions which serve as their causative factors. The theory behind this is that our desires and expectations have an impact on what we tend to believe in. According to the Buddhist diagnosis of the 'psychology' of sassatavada (=bhava-ditthi) and ucchedavada (=vibhava-ditthi), the former is due to craving for being (bhava-tanha), the desire to perpetuate individuality, and the latter is due to craving for non-being (vibhava-tanha), the desire to be completely annihilated at death. From the Buddhist point of view the reasoning for this may be conjectured as follows: because ucchedavada rejects survival, it tends to encourage man to lead a life without being burdened by a sense of moral responsibility or tormented by moral inhibitions. Therefore it abhors any prospect of after-death existence, as it implies the possibility of moral retribution. It is this psychological resistance on the part of the one who believes in ucchedavada that leads to the desire for annihilation at death. Thus, the mutual conflict between sassatavada and ucchedavada represents not only the perennial conflict between the spiritual and the materialist theories of existence but also the human mind's oscillation between two deep-seated desires.
From what we have observed so far, two things should be clear. The first is that sassatavada is the Buddhist term for all religions other than Buddhism which were current at the time of the Buddha. The second is that ucchedavada is the Buddhist term for all forms of materialism which reject all religions, including Buddhism. Thus the Buddhist critique of sassatavada and ucchedavada identifies Buddhism's position in relation to other world-views which were contemporaneous with it.
It must also be mentioned here that, although Buddhism rejects both sassatavada and ucchedavada, it does so after making a critical assessment of them. According to this assessment, the Buddha was more sympathetic towards sassatavada and more critical of ucchedavada. This too is clear from the Buddha's first sermon, where he refers to the two extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification. Three of the terms used here in criticizing the former, which represents ucchedavada, are hina (inferior), gamma (rustic or vulgar) and pothujjanika (worldly). However, these three terms are conspicuously absent in the Buddha's assessment of self-mortification, which represents sassatavada. The implication seems to be that although sassatavada does not lead to the realization of the ideal of emancipation (anattha-samhita), nevertheless it does not lead to the collapse of the moral life. It is not subversive of the moral foundation of human society. As it recognizes a spiritual source in man, it also recognizes moral distinctions. In point of fact, according to Buddhism's assessment, all religions are different forms of kammavada, because they all advocate the supremacy of the moral life. On the other hand, ucchedavada, which represents the materialist theory, encourages a pattern of life which takes gratification in sensuality as the ultimate purpose in life. It takes for granted that man's present existence is entirely due to fortuitous circumstances and thus that he is not morally responsible for what he does during his temporary sojourn in this world.
We observed earlier that it was on the basis of the Noble Eightfold Path that Buddhism transcends the mutual opposition between sensual indulgence and self-mortification. On what basis, then, does Buddhism transcend the mutual opposition between sassatavada and ucchedavada? The answer is provided by the Kaccayanagotta Sutta of the Samyutta Nikaya, where the Buddha addresses Kaccayana thus:
This world, O Kaccayana, generally proceeds on a duality, of (the view of) existence and (the view of) non-existence. But he who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it really is does not hold with the non-existence of the world. But he who with right insight sees the passing away of the world as it really is does not hold with the existence of the world. Everything exists - this is one extreme. Nothing exists - this is another extreme. Not approaching either extreme the Tathagata (the Buddha) teaches you a doctrine by the middle (Tathagato majjhena dhammam deseti).
That the words 'a doctrine by the middle' are a reference to the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (paticcasamuppada) is clear not only from the context but also from what follows it. For immediately after this the Buddha refers to it specifically, implying thereby that it is through this particular doctrine that Buddhism avoids both sassatavada and ucchedavada. It will thus be seen that just as the Noble Eightfold Path is called the Middle Path, because it avoids the two extremes of sensual gratification and self-mortification, the doctrine of dependent origination is called the doctrine by the middle (majjhima-dhamma), because it avoids in the self-same manner their theoretical background.
The central position assigned to this particular doctrine is seen by the Buddha's statement that one who discerns dependent origination discerns the Dhamma (Yo paticcasamuppadam passati so dhammam passati). This statement has often been understood as a reference to the well-known twelve-linked causal formula. However, it is very likely that the reference here is to the causal principle, that is the very fact of dependent origination, and not to its application. The causal principle, as stated in the Pali suttas, is as follows: whenever A is present, B is present (imasmim sati idam hoti); whenever A is absent, B is absent (imasmim asati idam na hoti). Therefore, 'from the arising of A, B arises (imass'uppada idam uppajjati); from the cessation of A, B ceases (imassa nirodha idam nirujjhati). This principle should be distinguished from its application, as it has many applications. In fact, it is on the basis of this principle that Buddhism seeks to explain all its fundamental doctrines, such as the analysis of mind and the theory of perception, karma and the moral order and the nature of the empirical individuality and its samsaric dimension. This explains why, as the above quotation shows, an insight into the principle of dependent origination is said to constitute an insight into the very heart of the Dhamma. Stated otherwise, this means that it is the foundation of the Buddhist world-view, and it is through this doctrine that Buddhism transcends the other two world-views represented by sassatavada and ucchedavada.
If Buddhism avoids sassatavada, this means that there is no self-entity within man which is impervious to change. This may also be interpreted as the denial of any kind of spiritual substance within man which relates him to some kind of transcendental reality serving as the ultimate ground of existence. If Buddhism avoids ucchedavada, this means that the human personality is not a pure product of matter but is an uninterrupted and interconnected process of psycho-physical phenomena which does not terminate at death. Although Buddhism does not agree completely with sassatavada, it does not deny survival (punabbhava) and moral responsibility (kammavada).