aatman / Buddha-nature
IN CONSTRUCTION
It is generally considered that the connection of Zen thought with aatman theory or monism is not fully evident. In fact, Jainism, the chief representative of pre-Buddhist ascetic philosophy, and the Yoga school, whose definition of "yoga" as "cessation of mental functions" has been discussed above, are based on dualism. However, it is undeniable that both Jainism and the Yoga school have evidently admitted aatman theory. Especially, Jain theory of asceticism is theoretically not possible without accepting the difference of impure body (B) and pure mind (A), i.e. aatman. This theory is indeed dualistic. But I believe that this is the simplest or the most general form of aatman theory in India. The monistic aatman theory of Sankara, although held to be the most orthodox theory, cannot be considered to be the general idea in India. Without accepting two mutually opposing existences, i.e. (A) and (B), even the theory of "liberaton"(35) (mok.sa) cannot have been established in India, because "liberation" was conceived there primarily as that of aatman (A) from impure body (B). Jain asceticism was nothing other than the endeavor to reduce impure body (B) to nothing and to liberate aatman (A) from the body.
Then, what is the meaning of "thinking" in this dualistic aatman theory? In the theory, it is evident that "thinking" and "aatman" are considered to be opposed to each other, because the former is dichotomizing function, while the latter is one and the same ontological existence (eka, sama). So it is doubtless that, among two principles, "thinking" was regarded as Principle (B), impure, false and to be reduced to nothing. Here lied the logical ground for establishing the Zen theory of "cessation of thinking."
The connection of Zen thought with aatman theory is also found in the "Atthakavagga" chapter of the Suttanipaata. We have already discussed the rejection of "samjnaa" in the chapter (SN,v.847). Besides, in the chapter, there are many passages where the existence of "aatman" is positively admitted.(36) For example, the following expression are found there:
"the abode aatman" (bhavanam attano) [Sn,v.937]
"the nirvana of aatman" (nibbaanam attano) [Sn,v.940]
"the stain of aatman" (malam attano) [Sn,v.962]
"possessing aatman uncovered" (abhinibbutatta) [Sn,v.783]
The strong aversion to "thinking"(B) and the positive acceptance of "aatman"(A) are not mutually incompatible in the chapter, because the leading idea there was the dualistic aatman theory explained above. Thus it goes without saying that we cannot directly reconstruct the fundamental ideas of the earliest form of Buddhism, simply relying on the accounts of Atthakavagga or the Suttanipaata, which principally was but a Buddhist version of the ascetic literature quite popular and prevalent in those days of India.(37)
Moreover, as for the two masters, from whom the Buddha studied two kinds of dhyaana, the accounts in the twelfth chapter of the Buddhacarita are not to be ignored. In fact, the master AAlaara, who taught aakincanna-aayatana-samaadhi, was there described as a Saamkhya phlosopher, and the master Uddaka also was there stated to have admitted the existence of "aatman." It goes without saying that we cannot simply accept the accounts in the Buddhacarita as representing historical facts. But I think they are improtant because they seem to indicate that the two samaadhis in question were of non-Buddhist origin. It is also to be noted that Saamkhya philosophy was the basis for the fundamental ideas of the Yoga school. Moreover, "aakincanna" (possessionlessness, Ùíá¶êó) was one of the five chief virtues of Jainism, and theoretically presupposed the distinction between "aatman" (A) and "non-aatman" (B), because "aakincanna" was the theory enjoining people from possessing and adhering to "non-aatman," being impure and transient.
In early Buddhism, "dhyaana" was placed at the second level of "three studies" (tisso sikkhaa, ß²ùÊ). In other words, "dhyaana" was merely the means to attain "prajnaa"(right cognition). The final goal of Buddhism was considered to be "prajnaa," or the right cognition of Buddhist philosophy. It seems clear that this evaluation of "dhyaana" contradicts the general "dhyaana" theory of "cessation of thinking," because right cognitions cannot be produced from "cessation of thinking." However, I do not think that the "dhyaana" theory of "cessation of thinking" has never been preached in the whole history of Buddhism. On the contrary, the theory has been taught quite often within Buddhism, as is shown by the arguments above.
Then, why was Buddhist evaluation of "dhyaana" as the means to attain "prajnaa" altered into the general theory of "cessation of thinking"? I think it was due to the influence of monism or "aatman" theory. For instance, is is generally believed that Buddha's cognition (jnaana) is "distinctionless congnition"(nirvikalpa-jnaana ÙíÝÂܬòª).(38) But the concept of "distinctionless cognition" is not so old in Buddhist philosophy. I do not think that the term "distinctionless cognition" (nirvikalpa-jnaana) was used before the rise of Mahaayaana Buddhism. At the second century A.D., when the oldest form of the Astasaahasrikaa-prajnaapaaramitaa-suutra was translated into Chinese for the first time (179), it seems that the term "distinctionless"(nirvikalpa) was found in the text, and not the term "distinctionless cognition"(nirvikalpa-jnaana). The same can be said about the Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa of Naagaarjuna(c.150-250), where only one example of the term "distinctionless" can be found (¥¹¥·,9). However, the Yogaacara philosophers of the fifth century used the term "distinctionless cognition" (nirvikalpa-jnaana) quite often. These facts seems to indicate that the concept of "distinctionless cognition" was preceded by the concept of "distinctionless" in Buddhist tradition, and that the term "nirvikalpa-jnaana" (distinctionless cognition) originally meant "the cognition of what is distinctionless." It goes without saying that what is distinctionless means the single substance or the highest reality, postulated by monism.
Thus we can understand how the concept of "distinctionless cognition" was formed under the influence of Hindu monism. At around the latter half of the fourth century A.D., the theory of Buddha-nature (buddha-dhaatu) was formed in the Mahaa-parinirvaa.na-suutra. The sutra is well known for its accepting "aatman" theory openly. The following statement is found in the first Chinese translation (418):
The [term] "Buddha" means" aatman.(39)" [ù¨ÝÖíºãÀä²ëù].
According to my understanding, the theory of Buddha-nature or the theory of Tathaagatagarbha was nothing other than a Buddhist version of "aatman" theory in Hinduism. When the theory of Buddha-nature was introduced into China, there were some cases where the theory was modified under the influence of Taoist philosophy. Thus, two types of Buddha-nature theory(40) was formed in China.
One is Buddha-nature Immanence theory ÝÖàõÒ®î¤Öå, and the other is Buddha-nature Manifestation theory ÝÖàõúéî¤Öå. the former is the original type, or Indian type, according to which Buddha-nature is considered to exist in one's body, like "aatman." In fact, it is stated in the Mahaaparinirvaana-suutra as follows:
All sentient beings possess Buddha-nature, which is in their bodies.
[ìéôîñëßæËËêóÝÖàõ, î¤åÚãóñé.]
(Taisho,12,881b)
The latter, Buddha-nature Manifestation theory, is the developed or the extreme type, according to which Buddha-nature is wholly manifested on all phenomenal existences, including insentient beings such as trees and stones. In other words, the phenomenal things (ÞÀ), as such, are regarded as Buddha-nature itself, and thus absolutized totally, according to the theory.
Without correctly making distinction between these two theories of Buddha-nature, it seems difficult to understand the philosophical meaning of Chan Buddhism. Of these two theories, we will at first discuss Buddha-nature Immanence theory in Chan Buddhism. This theory is found in the writings or the analects of Tao-hsin Ô³ãá, Hung-jen ûðìÛ, Shen-hsiu ãêâ³, Hui-neng û´Òö, Shen-hui ãêüå, Ma-tsu Ø©ðÓ, Pai-chang ÛÝíÛ, Ta-chu ÓÞñÁ, Huang-po üÜÛü, Lin-chi ×üð, Tsung-mi ðóÚË and so on.(41) For example, the Hsiu-hsin yao-lun áóãýé©Öå(42) and the Kuan-hsin lun κãýÖå(43) have the following passage:
Sentient beings have diamond-like Buddha-nature in their bodies.
[ñëßæãóñé, êóÐÝ˧ÝÖàõ]
It is clear that Hui-neng's central position was Buddha-nature Immanence theory, because he stated in his commentary on the Diamond Sutra, i.e. the Chin-kang ching chieh-i ÐÝ˧Ìèú°ëù,(44) as follows:
There is Buddha-nature, originally pure, in one's own body (í»ãóñé).(45)
In the commentary, he also admitted that Buddha-nature is identical with "aatman" as follows:
"Aatman" is [Buddha-]nature, and [Buddha-]nature is "aatman."(46)
[ä²íºàõå¥, àõíºä²å¥]
As is stated above, Buddha-nature Immanence theory is not other than Indian Tathaagatagarbha theory, which in turn is a Buddhist version of "aatman" theory in Hinduism. So, because the theoretical structure of Buddha-nature Immanence theory is nothing other than "aatman" theory, Huineng's identification of Buddha-nature with "aatman" was correct.
It is needless to say that Buddha-nature Immanence theory is stated in the following passage of Shenhui's Platform Speech:
Everyone has Buddha-nature in one's body.(47)
[ìéìéãóÎýêóÝÖàõ]
The connection of Buddha-nature Immanence theory with "aatman" theory seems evident in the case of Lin-chi. In the Lin-chi lu ×üðÖâ, his famous teaching is found as follows:
On your lump of red flesh, there is a true man of no rank, always going in and out of the face-gate of every one of you.(48)
[îåë¿Ó¥ß¾, êóìéÙíêÈòØìÑ, ßÈðôæ£Ôõð³ìÑØüÚ¦õóìý]
As I argued before,(49) I consider the word "lump of red flesh" (îåë¿Ó¥), or the corresponding word "heart of flesh-lump"( ë¿Ó¥ãý) in the Sung version of the Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu ÌØÓìîîÔóÖâ, to mean "heart" (hridaya) and think that the "true man of no rank" means "aatman," because, in Indian "aatman" theory from the times of the Atharva Veda, it has been considered that "aatman" exists in "heart" (hridaya). Moreover, Sankara (c.700-750), the chief representative of the Vedaanta school, explained the word "heart" found in the Brhadaaranyaka Upanisad as follows:
The term "heart" (hridaya) means a lump of flesh (maamsa-pinda) possessing the shape of lotus (pundariika).(50)
The Sanskrit word "maamsa-pinda" (lump of flesh) was translated by Hsüan-tsang as "jou-t'uan" (ë¿Ó¥). So it is clear that the "lump of red flesh" (îåë¿Ó¥) means "heart" (hridaya) and that "true man" (òØìÑ) means "aatman."
It does not seem so inappropriate to say that the mainstream of Chinese Chan Buddhism has lied in Buddha-nature Immanence theory. But if we ignore the fact that the other stream of Buddha-nature manifestation theory(51) was definitely found in the history of Chan Buddhism, we cannot reach the correct understanding.
The theoretical founder of Buddha-nature Manifestation theory may have been Chi-tsang ÑÎíú (549-623), because he admitted, in his Ta-ch'eng hsüan-lun ÓÞã«úÜÖå (taisho,45,40b) that grasses and trees also have Buddha-nature, and that they can attain Buddhahood.(52) The attainment of Buddhahood by grasses and trees (õ®ÙÊà÷ÝÖ) thereafter had become the central tenet of Buddha-nature Manifestation theory, because the attainment of Buddhahood by insentient beings cannot be established in Buddha-nature Immanence theory.
In Chan Buddhaism the attainment of Buddhahood by grasses and trees was admitted in Chüeh-kuan lun ï¾ÎºÖå as follows:
Not only human beings but also grasses and trees have been predicted [by the Buddha to attain Buddhahood(53)].
[ÞªÔ¼ÑÀìÑ, îåÑÀõ®ÙÊ]
However, the most confident advocator of Buddha-nature manifestation theory was Hui-chung û´õ÷ ( -776), because he not only advocated the theory but also denied Buddha-nature Immanence theory. In the Tsu-t'ang chi ðÓÓÑó¢, he stated as follows:
The insentient things such as walls and tiles are the mind of the old Buddha.(54)
[ííÛúÛíÕø, Ùíï×ñýÚª, ÜÅãÀͯÝÖãý]
Here "the mind of the old Buddha" means Buddha-nature or something regarded as absolute. Therefore, because phenomenal things including insentient beings are here considered to be Buddha-nature, it is evident that Buddha-nature manifestation theory is stated here. Moreover, in the same text Hui-chung stated as follows:
My [theory of] Buddha-nature is that body and soul are identical ---, while the southern [theory of] Buddha-nature is that body is impermanent and that soul is permanent.(55)
[ä²ñýÝÖàõ, ãóãýìéåý, ÑõÛ°ÝÖàõ, ãóãÀÙíßÈ, ãýàõãÀßÈ]
Here the second theory is Buddha-nature Immanence theory, because in the theory the dualistic contraposition between Buddha-nature(A) and body (B) is indispensable. For instance, it is considered that Buddha-nature (A) is permanent and pure, while body (B) is impermanent and impure. Moreover, it goes without saying that, according to the theory, Buddha-nature is considered to be pure mind or soul, because Buddha-nature is but a Buddhist version of "aatman." Therefore, it is quite evident that Hui-chung criticised Buddha-nature Immanence theory in the passage above.
It is to be noted that Buddha-nature Immanence theory is obliged to have the dualistic structure, like the general idea of "aatman" theory which we have discussed above. On the contrary, Buddha-nature Manifestation theory has the structure of extreme monism, where all distinctions, including that between body and soul, are not admitted. Because phenomenal existences or things are, as such, absolutized by the theory, it seems clear that the theory is an ultimate form or an extremity of the theory of "affirming the realities"(56)(úÞãùÐéïÒ).
Anyway, after Hui-ching, the advocators of Buddha-nature Manifestation theory repeatedly criticised Buddha-nature Immanence theory. For example, it is well known that the criticism on Lin-chi's theory by Hsüan-sha úÜÞÞ (835-908) is found in the Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu (Taisho,51.345a). But it is not correctly recognized that Hsüan-sha's philosophical standpoint was Buddha nature Manifestation theory. In the Hsüan-sha kuang-lu úÜÞÞÎÆÖâ, he states as follows:
Mountain is mountain. River is River.---
There is no place, in the whole world of ten quarters, that is not true.(57)
[ߣãÀߣ, â©ãÀâ©...ò×ä¨Û°á¦Í£, Ú±êóÝÕãÀô¥]
Here every phenomenal existence, especially insentient being, is affirmed as absolute.(58) So it is doubtless that Buddha-nature Manifestation theory is stated here.
In Japanese Zen Buddhism, Dogen, before his visit to Kamakura (1247-1248), was an ardent advocator of Buddha-nature Manifestation theory. Based on the theory, he criticised Buddha-nature Immanence theory in his Bend
wa(59) ܧԳü¥ (1231). It is evident that his criticism there was strongly influenced by Hui-chung's criticism on Buddha-nature Immanence theory, because Dogen mentioned there Hui-chung as his authority and expressed his own position by the words "body and soul are identical"(ãóãýìéåý). But of course Dogen's criticism was not actually directed to the upholders of Buddha-nature Immanence theory in China. His criticism there, the criticism of the so-called "shin-j
s-metsu"(ãýßÈßÓØþ) theory, was directed to the followers of the Nihon-daruma-shuu ìíÜâӹبðó, because its position was Buddha-nature Immanence theory.(60)
Therefore, because Dogen's own position in the Bendwa was Buddha-nature manifestation theory, the extreme type of Buddha-nature theory, I cannot approve of Hakamaya Noriaki's interpretation that Dogen criticised "original enlightenment thought" (ÜâÊÆÞÖßÌ) in the Bend
wa.(61) I am rather sceptical of the validity of the term "original enlightenment." Hakamaya's definition of the term seems indistinct. My opinion is the following. If we do not make distinction between the two types of Buddha-nature theory, and if we do not recognize that Dogen's own position in his early days was also one type of Buddha-nature theory, we cannot stop praising Dogen as the excellent philosopher who denied the general interpretation of Buddha-nature as something substantial and permanent.(62)
It is quite noteworthy that Dogen criticiced his former position, i.e. Buddha-nature Manifestation theory, after his return from Kamakura. In fact, in the "Shizen-biku" ÞÌàÉÝïÎø volume of the Twelve-fascicle Shobogenzo, ä¨ì£ÏéÜâ ïáÛöäÑíú, he criticised Buddha-nature manifestation theory as follows:
Some people say that -----to see mountains and rivers is to see Tathaagatas.
They do not know the way of Buddhas and Patriarchs.(63)
I do not think that Dogen's criticism here is not fully logical. Nevertheless, it is evident that he tried to criticise Buddha-nature manifestation theory without declaring that the object of his criticism was nothing other than his own position in his former period.(64)
In the Twelve-fascicle Shobogenzo, the word "bussh" (ÝÖàõ) was never used. On the contrary, he stressed the theory of "inga" (ì×Íý), meaning Dependent-arising, according to my interpretation. Although it goes without saying that Dogen was not freed from the way of thinking influenced by Tathaagatagrabha thought, it cannot be denied that his philosophical position was gradually changed from Tathaagatagarbha thought to the theory of Dependent-arising (pratiityasamutpaada), which I consider to be the essence of Buddhism.
(from "Critical Considerations on Zen Thought" by Shiro Masumoto)