6. "CHI TSANG'S TEACHING OF THE TWO TRUTHS"

An examination of Chi-tsang's theory of truth would not be complete without some discussion of his interpretation of the important Buddhist concept of "two truths," an interpretation so innovative that it is commonly regarded as Chi-tsang's most important achievement as a Buddhist thinker.

A. Theories of Two Truths before Chi-tsang. The Sanskrit original of the term "two truths, " satyadvaya, suggests the existence of two levels of Reality and their corresponding states of knowledge: the first, pertaining to the common world of everyday discourse, is named "mundane truth" (sa.mv.rti-satya, su-ti, shih-ti) ; the second, understandable only to the transcendental wisdom of the enlightened, is called "supreme truth" (paramaartha-satya, chen-ti, ti-i-i ti).(35) The notion of two levels of Being and knowledge, one inferior and one superior, was already present in Early Buddhist writings.(36) It later found its way into various Hiinayaana texts, such as the Abhidharmamahaavibhaa.saa-`saastra and the Abhidharmako`sa-`saastra,(37) and was touched upon in such early Mahaayaana works as the Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutras.(38) We find in early Madhyamaka writings constant reference to the concept. The best-known case by far is the following, in chapter 24 of Naagaarjuna's famous Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa:

The Buddhas have recourse to the two truths on preaching the Dharma for sentient beings: first, the mundane truth, second, the supreme truth.

If a person does not know how to distinguish between the two truths,

He will not know the real meaning of the profound Buddha Dharma.(39)

The Madhyamaka-`saastra, the earliest extant exegesis on the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa, comments thus on these verses:

With respect to the "mundane truth," all dharmas are in nature empty. Yet, [the opinion of] the world is fallacious, and hence there arise false dharmas which are [regarded as] real "from the standpoint of the world" (yu shih-ch'ien). The sages and the holy men truly know the fallacious nature [of the opinions of the world], and hence they know that all dharmas are empty and nonoriginating. [This knowledge] is the "supreme truth" [seen] "from the standpoint of the holy men" (yu sheng-jen) and is called "real." The Buddhas have recourse to these two truths on preaching the Dharma for sentient beings. If a person cannot correctly distinguish between the two truths, then he will not know the real meaning of the very profound Buddha Dharma.(40)

The "mundane truth" is truth by the standard of the world. For example, ordinary people do not realize that dharmas are conditioned in nature, and erroneously look upon them as real. This view of the real existence of dharmas is a "mundane truth." The "supreme truth" is truth as known to the saints. For example, recognizing the conventional belief of real existence to be erroneous, the saints deem all dharmas to be in essence empty and nonoriginating. This view of the emptiness of dharmas is a "supreme truth." According to the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa and Madhyamaka-`saastra, the distinction between "mundane truth" and "supreme truth" is postulated by the Buddhas in order to instruct sentient beings, and we can never come to see the true meaning of the Buddha Dharma without first comprehending its real significance.

It is important to note that the Madhyamaka does not dismiss the "mundane truth" offhandedly as worthless, despite the intimation of its being the truth of the worldly realm. This can be seen from the next stanza of the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa and the Madhyamaka-`saastra's exposition of it:

Without having recourse to the two truths, the supreme [truth] cannot be obtained.

Without obtaining the supreme [truth], nirvaa.na can not be obtained.(41)

The supreme [truth] is [made known] entirely through speech, and speech is [a kind of] mundane [object]. Hence, [it is said that] without having recourse to the mundane [truth], the supreme [truth] cannot be taught. And without obtaining the supreme [truth], how can nirvaa.na be attained? Hence, although dharmas are nonoriginating, there are [two forms of] truth.(42)

Here, the Madhyamaka-`saastra goes further to identify the "mundane truth" with speech, which is generally considered in Buddhism as an outgrowth of the worldly belief in the real existence of dharmas. Now, although the "supreme truth, " being the negation of the belief of real existence, has basically nothing to do with speech, it cannot be communicated to the noninitiated without the aid of speech. Hence, it is said that without the "mundane truth" (now understood as "speech"), people cannot obtain the "supreme truth." And without obtaining the "supreme truth," people naturally cannot realize nirvaa.na.(43)

The translation of the Madhyamaka-`saastra, as well as of the Davaada`samukha-`saastra, the `Sata-`saastra, and the Mahaapraj~naapaaramitaa-`saastra, into Chinese by Kumaarajiiva in the first decade of the fifth century marked the beginning of the Chinese Madhyamaka movement. Since most of the aforementioned texts contain remarks about the two truths,(44) it was not surprising that the attention of Kumaarajiiva's followers would become drawn to the concept. Both Seng-tao and Chu Tao-sheng (ca. 360-434) had written special treatises on the two truths,(45) and T'an-ying and Seng-chao (374-414) cited the terms "supreme truth" and "mundane truth" a number of times in their Writings.(46) While the influence of Madhyamaka texts was on the wane by the mid-fifth century with the ascendancy of the Satyasiddhi-`saastra and the Mahaayaana Mahaaparinirvaa.na-suutra, the interest of Chinese Buddhists in the two truths did not subside, since discussions about the two truths also figure prominently in these two newly revered scriptures.(47)

By the early sixth century, the "two truths" had established itself as a cardinal Buddhist theme in the minds of most Chinese Buddhist thinkers A considerable amount of information about the various interpretations of the two truths in circulation at that time, mostly of a piecemeal, secondary nature, has been passed down to us, from which we learn that the idea had been analyzed from a variety of perspectives and had been correlated with other currently popular Buddhist ideas, such as the "misddle path, " "Buddha-nature," and so forth. However, since most of the presently known exponents of the idea of two truths of that period had left behind no comprehensive, systematic philosophical writing,it is impossible for us today to place their fragmentary observations about the two truths in the context of their overall teachings in order to apprehend their precise import. On the whole, it is safe to assume that with respect to the two main Chinese Buddhist doctrinal traditions of the sixth century, commonly referred to as the Ch'eng-shih School and Ti-lun School, the former, basing its teaching upon the Satyasiddhi-`saastra (Ch'eng-shih lun) , took over the `Saastra's interpretation, considering the notion of the real existence of everyday objects and dharmas to be the "mundane truth," and regarding the knowledge of the nonexistence of all forms of beings to be the "supreme truth."(48) As for the latter, we shall take the opinion of Ching-ying Hui-yuan (523-592), a leading Ti-lun master of Chi-tsang's time, as representative.

In his monumental work, the Ta-cheng I-chang, Hui-yuan devotes a special section to the topic of the two truths, where he considers the relation between the "mundane truth" and the "supreme truth" from the two aspects of "dependence" (i-ch'ih) and "origination" (yuan-ch'i):

When the two [truths] are explained from [the perspective of] "dependence, " the false phenomena are taken as the dependent [objects] and the true [consciousness] is [considered as the subject] being depended on. The false phenomena which are dependent are said to be the "mundane truth''; the true [consciousness] being depended on is classified as the "supreme truth." When the two [truths] are explained from [the perspective of] "origination," the pure Dharmadhaatu, [that is,] the tathaagatagarbha, [engages in the activities of] origination and gives birth to [the realms of] sa.msaara and nirvaa.na. The true nature [of the tathaagatagarbha] itself is said to be the "supreme truth"; the function of "origination" is classified as the "mundane truth."(49)

In this passage, the "supreme truth" is equated with the true consciousness, which constitutes the ontological ground of both sa.msaaric and nirvaa.nic existence in the Ti-lun picture of Reality; and the "mundane truth" is identified with false phenomena which arise from the true consciousness, also known as the tathaagatagarbha, when the latter comes under the influence of ignorance. The aspect "origination" indicates that the false phenomenal order originates from the true consciousness; the aspect "dependence" indicates that the false phenomenal order is sustained by the true consciousness. All in all, in the Ta-cheng I-chang, the concept of "two truths" has been assimilated into the Ti-lun metaphysical framework, and is used to illustrate the teaching of consciousness-only 'espoused by the School.(50)

B. The Two Truths qua Instruction (Chiao-ti). The preceding sketch of the early Chinese interpretations of the "two truths" has shown that there existed a general tendency to associate the "supreme truth'' and the "mundane truth" with two ontological levels of Reality, one actual and the other illusory. Chi-tsang devotes a large part of his exposition of the two truths to demonstrating the untenability of this approach. Quoting Naagaarjuna's statement that "the Buddhas have recourse to the two truths on preaching the Dharma for sentient beings, " he asserts that the distinction between "supreme truth" and "mundane truth" is postulated by the Buddhas as a "means of instruction," and that the two truths do not stand for two objective "realms" and "principles":

[Naagaarjuna] explains that the Tathaagatas always have recourse to the two truths on preaching the Dharma: first, the mundane truth, second, the supreme truth. Hence, the two truths are just means of instruction and are not concerned with objects and principles.(51)

To take the two truths as indicating two separate realms and principles is an instance of dualistic thinking; and dualistic thinking is synonymous with attachment in Madhyamaka thought. Being a Maadhyamika and strongly opposed to attachment of any form, Chi-tsang naturally deems it impossible that the Buddhas would conceive the two truths as referring to two separate realms and principles:

Further, if [we take] the two truths as two principles, that would constitute "acquisitiveness."... Sentient beings already have the error of [harboring] dualistic views. If the Buddhas further teach that the true principle is dual, then not only is their old error not got rid of, but new delusions would also be added. For this reason, the Buddhas, [with a view to] adapting to [the understanding of] sentient beings, say that there are two truths. Actually, the true principle is not dual.(52)

Pivotal to Chi-tsang's teaching of the two truths is the concept of "two truths qua instruction," which is defined as follows:

By [the two truths qua] "instruction" [we mean that] the true [principle] is originally nondual, and it is for the sake of the objects [of instruction] that it is spoken of as dual. Hence, [the two truths] are called "instruction."(53)

Given the centrality of the precept of nonattachment in Chi-tsang's teaching, the "true principle" mentioned here should be none other than the principle of nonattachment. As nonattachment is the abolition of all thoughts of duality, it is said that "the true principle is originally nondual." However, sentient beings cling to all sorts of beliefs, and to make them abandon their clingings, the Buddhas disparage the beliefs they cherish as "mundane" and extol the opposite beliefs as "supreme." Hence, it is said that "it is for the sake of the objects of instruction that the true principle is spoken of as dual." In Chi-tsang's opinion, the duality of "mundane" and "supreme" is invented by the Buddhas purely as a pedagogical device to uproot attachments, and does not reflect the Buddha's true state of knowledge, which is absolutely nondiscriminating. This opinion is reflected in Chi-tsang's rejection or the popular understanding of the "mundane" as "void and fleeting" and of the "supreme" as "real and solid." It is also implied in the following remarks, which assert that "mundane" has "nonmundane" and "supreme" has "nonsupreme" as meaning:'"

The two truths are also like that. As "supreme" signifies "nonsupreme" and "mundane" signifies "nonmundane, " "supreme'" and "mundane" are provisional expressions. Being provisional expressions, [the two] terms do not have the effect of acquiring things, and things do not have the substances corresponding to [the two] terms.(55)

According to Chi-tsang, only when one gives up the idea that the terms "supreme" and "mundane" indicate specific "supreme" and "mundane" objects will one truly come to comprehend the real significance of the Buddhas' usage of the terms "supreme" and "mundane."

C. The Two Truths qua Standpoints (Yu-ti). If "supreme truth" and "mundane truth" do not denote two distinct levels of Reality, the question then arises as to why the Madhyamaka-`saastra cites the popular belief in the real existence of dharmas as a case of "mundane truth" and gives the holy man's perception of the emptiness of dharmas as an instance of "supreme truth." Are "real existence" and "emptiness" not two levels 'of Reality? Are their cognitions not two levels of knowledge? Chi-tsang answers these queries by postulating another form of "two truths," the "two truths qua standpoints." The concept "two truths qua standpoints" is derived from the Madhyamaka-`saastra, which, as we have seen, says that everyday objects are considered as real "from the standpoint of the world" but are recognized as empty "from the standpoint of the holy man":(56)

The `Saastra itself explains: dharmas are empty in nature. [Yet, the opinion of] the world is fallacious, and maintains that they are existent. From the standpoint of the people of the world, [the view of existence] is true to the fact and is called a "truth." The sages and holy men truly know the fallacious nature [of worldly opinions] and the empty nature [of dharmas]. From the standpoint of the holy men, [the view of emptiness] is true to the fact and is called a "truth." These [views of "existence" and "emptiness"] are the "two truths qua standpoints." What the Buddhas preach having recourse to these [views] are called the "[two] truths qua instruction."(57)

As Chi-tsang sees it, when the Madhyamaka-`saastra puts forward the idea of real existence as the "mundane truth" and the idea of emptiness as the "supreme truth, " it is relating two opposite "standpoints" concerning the nature of Reality, standpoints which the Buddhas bring up on preaching the Dharma without actually endorsing either of them. Thus, in order to counteract the everyday man's realistic standpoint, the Buddhas have recourse to the contrary standpoint of emptiness, disparaging the former as "worldly" and "mundane," and praising the latter as "holy" and "supreme."

However, it should be remembered that the standpoint of emptiness is brought in by the Buddhas solely as an antidote to the standpoint of real existence. When the Buddhas picture "real existence" as a "mundane" concept and "emptiness" as a "supreme" concept, they are not asking their audiences to exchange "real existence" for "emptiness" as the true ontological idea. When the role of "truths qua standpoints" to eliminate attachment to every standpoint is properly comprehended, it would be perceived that the "truths qua standpoints" actually function in the Buddhas' teaching as "truths gua instruction."

The term "two truths qua standpoints" is coined for the sake of sentient beings. it is for the sake of sentient beings that [the Buddhas] say that [the view of] "existence" [represents] the standpoint of the ordinary [people and] is the mundane truth; it is for the sake of sentient beings that [the Buddhas] say that [the view of] "emptiness" [represents] the standpoint of the holy men [and] is the supreme truth. Since it is for the sake of sentient beings that [the Buddhas] talk about "emptiness" and "existence," which are the "two truths qua standpoints," the "two truths' qua standpoints" are also "[truths qua] instruction."(58)

Judging from the fact that "existence" and "emptiness" are two conflicting opinions about the nature of Reality, they are "truths qua standpoints." Judging from the fact that "existence" and "emptiness" are propounded by the Buddhas for the sake of guiding sentient beings and not for the sake of establishing a specific metaphysical position, they are "truths qua instruction." To perceive that "truths qua standpoints" serve in the teaching of the Buddhas mainly as tentative devices to negate standpoints is highly important, for failing to do so has resulted in the erroneous identification of some metaphysical standpoints as the Buddhas' standpoints. It is in order to guard against misunderstanding of this sort that Chi-tsang differentiates between two types of "truth qua standpoints": "truths qua standpoints [the Buddhas] have recourse to" (so-i yu-ti) and "truths qua standpoints missing the heuristic [intent] (mi-chiao yu-ti) [of the Buddhas]":(59)

If it is so, then there are two forms of "truths qua standpoints": first, "truths qua standpoints [the Buddhas] have recourse to," second, "truths qua standpoints missing the heuristic [intent]."...

The "truths qua standpoints [the Buddhas] have recourse to" are "original"; the "truths qua standpoints missing the heuristic [intent]" are "derivative."

The "truths qua standpoints [the Buddhas] have recourse to" being original, let us discuss this by referring to `Saakyamuni's life work. Before the appearance of Saakyamuni, there were already these "two truths qua standpoint s." `Saakyamuni had recourse to these two truths on preaching the Dharma for sentient beings. For what reason? [It is because] all Buddhas without exception preach the Dharma by having recourse to the two truths. Hence, [`Saakyamuni] had recourse to the two truths from the very start on preaching [the Dharma. Thus,] it should be known that the "truths qua standpoints [the Buddhas] have recourse to" are "original."

The "truths qua standpoints missing the heuristic [intent]" are derivative because they are "[truths qua] standpoins" formed when sentient beings entertain the opinions of "existence" and "nonexistence" after receiving the Tathaagata's teaching of the two truths of "existence" and "nonexistence." These ["truths qua standpoints"] come later [and so are known as "derivative"].(60)

According to Chi-tsang, the two ideas of "existence" and "emptiness" were already a part of the popular conceptual apparatus before `Saakyamuni's appearance in the world,(61) and they were adopted by `Saakyamuni as expedient teaching devices from the very beginning of his preaching career. So they are called "truths qua standpoints the Buddhas have recourse to," Those practitioners of dull faculties could not discern the soteriological intent behind `Saakyamuni's discourses on "existence" and "emptiness, " and regarded `Saakyamuni's references to the former notion as "mundane" and to the latter notion as "supreme" as judgments about ontological primacy. They mistook provisional ideas for definite opinions, and so their definite opinions of "existence" and "emptiness" are called "truths qua standpoints missing the heuristic intent of the Buddhas."

Since the "truths qua standpoints the Buddhas have recourse to" inaugurated `Saakyamuni's mission of universal salvation, they are said to be "original." Since the "truths qua standpoints missing the heuristic intent" came about due to the misconceiving of the real purpose of the "truths qua standpoints the Buddhas have recourse to," they are said to be "derivative." Chi-tsang goes further to distinguish "three alternatives" (san-chu) in connection with the correct comprehension and the incorrect comprehension of the "two truths qua standpoints":

There are three alternative [judgments] with respect to the "[two] truths qua standpoints": first, they are both correct, second, they are both incorrect, third, they are [one] correct and [one] incorrect.

[1] [The two truths qua standpoints are one] correct and [one] incorrect: from the standpoint of the ordinary [people, things] are existent. This [view of] existence is incorrect. The sages and the holy men truly know that [things are] in nature empty. This [view of] emptiness is correct.

[2] The two [truths qua standpoints] are both incorrect: since the two [views of "existence" and "emptiness"] are both standpoints, both are incorrect.

[3] The two [truths qua standpoints] are both correct: on knowing the two standpoints [of "existence" and "emptiness"], one knows right away [the truth of] "nonduality." Seeing neither "duality" nor "nonduality," one transcends all the five alternatives.(62)

Now, of these alternatives, the first two alternatives are equivalent to "truths qua standpoints," while the last alternative is equivalent to "truth pua instruction."(63)

The alternative of "one correct and one incorrect" is exemplified by the initial propagation of the two truths by `Saakyamuni, when the standpoint of existence was dismissed as "mundane" and "incorrect" and the opposite standpoint of emptiness was proffered as "supreme" and "correct." It is the same as the "truth qua standpoint the Buddhas have recourse to." The alternative of "both incorrect" points to the fallacious interpretation of `Saakyamuni's reference to the standpoint of existence as "correct" and to the standpoint of emptiness as "incorrect" as an injunction to discard one ontological standpoint in favor of another ontological standpoint. It is none other than the "truths qua standpoints missing the heuristic intent of the Buddhas." Lastly, the alternative of "both correct" is the correct knowledge of `Saakyamuni's method of making use of one standpoint to undermine another standpoint, the final goal being the transcending of all specific standpoints, that is, the realization of the truth of nonduality. It rightly recognizes the role which the standpoints of existence and emptiness play in `Saakyamuni's teaching, that is, as "truth qua instruction."

D. The Three forms and Four Forms of Two Truths. The foregoing discussion of the "two truths qua instruction" and the "two truths qua standpoints" underscores Chi-tsang's pragmatic view of truth. To be sure, pragmatism had already played a significant part in discussions of the two truths before Chi-tsang, in the form of affirming the necessity of resorting to the mundane truths in order to reveal the supreme truth. But pragmatism had seldom been extended to the reading of the very distinction between mundane truth and supreme truth. White the remark of the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa that "the Buddhas have recourse to the two truths on preaching the Dharma for sentient beings" does suggest that the duality of "mundane truth" and "supreme truth" is adopted by the Buddhas to cater to the needs of ordinary sentient beings, this meaning is hinted at and is not directly expressed. The same is true of the reference to the duality of "existence" and "emptiness" to throw light upon. the relation between the two truths in the Madhyamaka-`saastra. Chi-tsang's ability to make explicit the implicit, thereby turning the theory of two truths into a powerful illustration of his conception of truth as nonattachment, bespeaks keen intellectual acumen.

In conclusion, we shall take a brief look at Chi-tsang's schemes of three forms and of four forms of two truths. They are good illustrations of Chi-tsang's idea of two truths as means of instruction. The three forms of two truths are:

The first [form of two truths] takes "existence" as the mundane truth and "emptiness" as the supreme truth. The next [form of two truths] takes "existence" and "emptiness" as both mundane [truths] and [considers] "neither existence nor emptiness" as the supreme [truth]. The third [form of two truths] takes the "duality" and the "nonduality" [of existence and emptiness] as mundane [truths] and [considers] "neither duality nor nonduality" as the supreme [truth].(64)

The passage above can be summed up in a table (Table 1).

Chi-tsang gives the following explanation of how teaching the three forms of two truths helps to free the minds of sentient beings from clinging to determinate ideas:

From the beginningless past, [sentient beings] cherish their bodily forms, their minds, external objects, and so forth, and maintain that they are real. Hence, the Buddhas appear in the world and preach for them as follows: "These [things] are real [at the level of] the mundane [truth] only, and are not real [in the eyes of] the holy [man]. lust [the knowledge that] all dharmas are empty in their original nature is called the supreme truth...." Then sentient beings maintain that "existence" is not the real [truth] and that "emptiness" is the real [truth]. They abandon [the idea of] "existence" [only] to grasp at [the idea of] "emptiness." Hence, [the Buddhas go on to] tell them, "Regarding `emptiness' and 'existence,' these are two extremes and are both mundane truths. [Only the idea of] 'neither emptiness nor existence,' [that is] the truth of the middle way, is the supreme truth."

Although the deluded ones [on hearing the second form of two truths] abandon the two extreme [ideas of "existence" and "emptiness"], they in turn get bogged down in [the idea of] the "middle way." Hence, [the Buddhas address them] the third time land] explain that not to become attached to the "middle way" after leaving far behind the two extremes [of "existence" and "emptiness"] is the supreme truth, and that the two extremes and the "middle way" are all mundane truths.(65)

Seeing that sentient beings cherish their bodily forms, their minds, and the objects of the external world, the Buddhas teach the first form of two truths, upholding "emptiness" as the supreme truth in order to refute the mundane belief in real "existence." On hearing the Buddhas' words, those sentient beings of sharp faculties see right away the Buddhas' real objective to cultivate nonattachment, and would give up the standpoint of "existence" without retaining the standpoint of "emptiness." The majority of listeners, however, being of dull intelligence, are prompted by their ingrained habit of discriminative thinking to consider the ideas of "existence" and "emptiness" as two opposite ontological standpoints, the former to be discarded and the latter to be accepted. They abandon the standpoint of "existence," only to grasp at the standpoint of "emptiness.'' Noticing this, the Buddhas go on to bring in the second form of two truths, pointing out that their dualistic conception of "existence" and "emptiness" is still a case of mundane truth, and that the supreme truth is the foregoing of the standpoint of "emptiness" as well a; the standpoint of "existence" ("neither being nor emptiness").

Yet, the listeners' proclivity for grasping at standpoints persists. Although they forsake the "duality" of existence and emptiness following the instruction of the second form of two truths, they take up the "nonduality" of existence and emptiness as the standpoint to be endorsed. Consequently, the Buddhas preach the third form of two truths, which tells that to oppose "nonduality" to "duality" is itself a form of dualistic thinking pertaining to the realm of mundane truth, and that only the abolition of the duality of "duality" and "nonduality" ("neither duality nor nonduality") is the true nonduality characteristic of the supreme truth. Theoretically, this negative dialectic of successive cancellation and production of contradictions could go on ad infinitum;(66) practically it would stop once the roots of attachment of the listeners have been eradicated.

The scheme of four forms of two truths brings into focus the heuristic function of the teaching of three forms of two truths by introducing an additional form of two truths, in which the three forms of two truths are bracketed together as "mundane":

[1] They (the Ch'eng-shih masters) merely take "existence" as the mundane truth and "emptiness" as the supreme truth.

[2] Now, we explain that "existence" and "emptiness" are both mundane truths and only "neither emptiness nor existence" is the supreme truth.

[3] "Emptiness" and "existence" are a [form of] duality; "neither emptiness nor existence" is a [form of] nonduality. "Duality" and "nonduality" are both mundane truths; "neither duality not nonduality" is called the supreme truth. [4] These three forms of two truths are all means of instruction. We speak about these three categories [of two truths] in order to make [people] realize [the] non[difference of the] three [categories of two truths]. Only nondependence and nonacquisitiveness are called [the true] principles.

QUESTION: [Do you mean that] the first three [forms of two truths] are all mundane truths and the non [difference of the] three [forms of two truths] is the supreme truth?

REPLY: It is so.(67)

The thesis of each of the four forms of two truths is illustrated in Table 2. Comparing Table 2 with Table 1, we can see right away that the first three of the four forms of two truths correspond to the three forms of two truths. The adding of the fourth form makes it clear that the three forms of two truths are "all means of instruction," that is, they are distinctions invented for the purpose of eliminating distinctions. Hence, they belong to the group of mundane truths to be transcended. The supreme truth is the "nondifference of the three forms of two truths," that is, it is the true principle of nonattachment which rises above all distinctions, including the distinction between three forms of two truths.