2. THE AWAKENING OF FAITH SASTRA
The Awakening of Faith is one of the most concise works on Mahayana Buddhism. This translation is by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki.
It was originally considered to ba a work by Ashvaghosa, but modern scholars believe it is an original Chinese work.
I. INTRODUCTION.
There are eight inducements [to write this Discourse]:
1. A general object, i.e., that the author might induce all beings to liberate themselves from misery and to enjoy blessing, and not that he might gain thereby some worldly advantages, etc.
2. That he might unfold the fundamental truth of the Tathâgata and let all beings have a right comprehension of it.
3. That he might enable those who have brought their root of merit (kuçalamûla) to maturity and obtained immovable faith, to have a philosophical grasp of the doctrine of the Mahâyâna.
4. That he might enable those whose root of merit is weak and insignificant, to acquire faith and to advance to the stage of immovable firmness (avaivartikatva). 1
5. That he might induce all beings to obliterate the previously acquired evils (durgati or karmâvarana), to restrain their own thoughts, and to free themselves from the three venomous passions.
6. That he might induce all beings to practise the orthodox method of cessation [or tranquilisation çamatha] and of intellectual insight (vidarçana) to be fortified against the commission of mental trespasses due to inferiority of mind.
7. That he might induce all beings in the right way to ponder on the doctrine of the Mahâyâna, for thus they will be born in the presence of Buddhas, and acquire the absolutely immovable Mahâyâna faith.
8. That he might, by disclosing those benefits which are produced by joyfully believing in the Mahâyâna, let sentient beings become acquainted with the final aim of their efforts.
Though all these doctrines are sufficiently set forth in the Mahâyâna Sûtras, yet as the predispositions and inclinations of the people 2 are not the same, and the conditions for obtaining enlightenment vary, I now write this Discourse.
There is another reason for doing so. At the time of the Tathâgata the people were unusually gifted, and the Buddha's presence, majestic both in mind and body, served to unfold the infinite significances of the Dharma with simplicity and yet in perfection. Accordingly there was no need for a philosophical discourse (çâstra).
After the Nirvâna of the Buddha there were men who possessed in themselves the intellectual power to understand the many-sided meanings of the Sûtras, 2 even if they read only a few of them. There were others who by their own intellectual powers could understand the meanings of the Sûtras only after an extensive reading of many of them.
Still others lacking in intellectual powers of their own could understand the meanings of the Sûtras only through the assistance of elaborate commentaries.
But there are some who, lacking in intellectual powers of their own, shun the perusal of elaborate commentaries and take delight in studying and cultivating inquiries which present the many-sidedness and universality of the doctrine in a concise form.
For the sake of the people of the last class I write this Discourse, in which the most excellent, the deepest, and the most inexhaustible Doctrine of the Tathâgata will be treated in comprehensive brevity.
Footnotes
1 Avaivartikatva means literally "never retreat." Faith is said to become immovably firm when one enters into the group of those who cannot be shaken in the possession of absolute truth (samyaktvaniyataraçi). For a further explanation see the reference in the Index to samyaktvaniyataraçi.
2 There are twelve divisions called Angas in the Mahâyânist writings, while in the Pâli only nine are counted.
The twelve angas are:
(1) sûtra (aphorisms);
(2) geya (verses in which the same thing is repeated as in the prose part);
(3) vyâkarana (Buddha's prophecy about Bodhisattva's attainment of Buddhahood in the future);
(4) gâthâ (independent verses);
(5) udâna (sermons on Buddha's own account);
(6) nidâna (sermons as the occasion required);
(7) avadâna (legends, but according to Chinese interpretation parables);
(8) ityukta (speeches relating to the former deeds of Bodhisattvas);
(9) jâtaka (accounts of Buddha's own former lives);
(10) vaipulya (doctrines of deep significance);
(11) adbhutadharma (extraordinary phenomena);
(12) upadeça (expositions).
II. GENERAL STATEMENT.
In what does the general statement consist?
The Mahâyâna can be briefly treated as to two aspects, namely, What it is, and What it signifies.
What is the Mahâyâna?
It is the kernal of all sentient beings (sarvasattva) , that constitutes all things in the world, phenomenal and supra-phenomenal; and through this kernal we can disclose what the Mahâyâna signifies.
(kernal: absolute aspect of suchness, and mind is its relative aspect, wherever this distinction is noticeable.)
Because the kernal in itself, involving the quintessence of the Mahâyâna, is suchness (bhûtatathatâ), it becomes [in its relative or transitory aspect, through the law of causation] birth-and-death (samsâra) in which are revealed the quintessence, the attributes, and the activity of the Mahâyâna.
The Mahâyâna has a triple significance.
The first is the greatness of quintessence. Because the quintessence of the Mahâyâna as suchness exists in all things, remains unchanged in the pure as well as in the defiled, is always one and the same (samatâ), neither increases nor decreases, and is void of distinction.
The second is the greatness of attributes. Here we have the Tathâgata's womb (tathâgatagarbha) which in exuberance contains immeasurable and innumerable merits (punya) as its characteristics.
The third is the greatness of activity, for it [ Mahâyâna] produces all kinds of good work in the world, phenomenal and supra-phenomenal. [Hence the name Mahâyâna (great vehicle).]
[Again this Dharma is called the Mahâyâna;] because it is the vehicle} (yâna) in which all Buddhas from the beginning have been riding, and Bodhisattvas when riding in it will enter into the state of Buddhahood.
III. THE EXPLANATION.
In what does the explanation of the general statement consist?
This part consists of three subdivisions:
1. The Revelation of the True Doctrine.
2. The Refutation of False Doctrines.
3. The Practice of the Right Path.
1. The Revelation of the True Doctrine.
In the one kernal we may distinguish two aspects.
The one is the Kernal as suchness (bhûtatathatâ), the other is the kernal as birth-and-death (samsâra). Each in itself constitutes all things, and both are so closely interrelated that one cannot be separated from the other.
A. The Kernal as Suchness.
What is meant by the kernal as suchness (bhûtatathatâ), is the oneness of the totality of things (dharmadhâtu), the great all-including whole, the quintessence of the Doctrine. For the essential nature of the soul is uncreate and eternal.
All things, simply on account of our confused subjectivity (smrti), appear under the forms of individuation. If we could overcome our confused subjectivity, the signs of individuation would disappear, and there would be no trace of a world of [individual and isolated] objects
Therefore all things in their fundamental nature are not namable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They are without the range of appearance. [They are universals.]
They [things in their fundamental nature] have no signs of distinction. [They are not particulars.] They possess absolute sameness (samatâ). [They are universals.] They are subject neither to transformation, nor to destruction. They are nothing but the one soul, for which suchness is another designation. Therefore they cannot be [fully] explained by words or exhausted by reasoning
While all words and expressions are nothing but representations and not realities, and their existence depends simply on our confused subjectivity, suchness has no attribute [of particularity] to speak of.
But the term suchness is all that can be expressed in language, and through this term all other terms may be disposed of.
In the essence of suchness, there is neither anything which has to be excluded, nor anything which has to be added.
Now the question arises: If that be so, how can all beings conform to and have an insight into [suchness]?
The answer is: As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of, or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of; then you conform to suchness; and when your subjectivity is thus completely obliterated, it is said to have the insight.
Again there is a twofold aspect in suchness if viewed from the point of its explicability. The first is trueness as negation (çûnyatâ), 1 in the sense that it is completely set apart from the attributes of all things unreal, that it is the real reality. The second is trueness as affirmation (açûnyatâ), in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent.
And again by trueness as negation we mean that in its [metaphysical] origin it has nothing to do with things defiled [i.e., conditional], that it is free from all signs of distinction existing among phenomenal objects, that it is independent of unreal, particularising consciousness.
Thus we understand that suchness (bhûtatathatâ) is neither that which is existence, nor that which is non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence; that it is neither that which is unity, nor that which is plurality, nor that which is at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality.
In a word, as suchness cannot be comprehended by the particularising consciousness of all beings, we call it the negation [or nothingness, çûnyatâ].
The truth is that subjectivity does not exist by itself, that the negation (çûnyatâ) is also void (çûnya) in its nature, that neither that which is negated [viz., the external world] nor that which negates [viz., the mind] is an independent entity.
By the so-called trueness as affirmation, we mean that [as soon as we understand] subjectivity is empty and unreal, we perceive the pure soul manifesting itself as eternal, permanent, immutable and completely comprising all things that are pure. On that account we call it affirmation [or reality, or nonemptiness, açûnyatâ]. Nevertheless, there is no trace of affirmation in it, because it is not the product of a confused subjectivity, because only by transcending subjectivity (smrti) can it be grasped.
B. The Kernal as Birth-and-Death.
The kernal as birth-and-death (samsâra) comes forth [as the law of causation] from the Tathâgata's womb (Tathâgatagarbha). But the immortal [ such-ness] and the mortal [ birth-and-death] coincide with each other.
Though they are not identical, they are not a duality. [Thus when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation] it is called the all-conserving mind (âlaya-vijñâna).
The same mind has a twofold significance as the organiser and the producer of all things.
Again it embraces two principles: (1) Awakening; (2) Non-awakening.
Awakening is the highest quality of the mind; it is free from all [the limiting] attributes of subjectivity (smrti). As it is free from all [limiting] attribute of subjectivity, it is like unto space (âkâça), penetrating everywhere, as the unity of all (dharmadhâtu). That is to say, it is the universal Dharmakâya of all Tathâgatas.
On account of this Dharmakâya, all Tathâgatas are spoken of as abiding in awakening a priori.
Awakening a priori is contrasted with awakeninga posteriori. Through awakeninga posteriori is gained no more than awakeningt a priori.
Now we speak of awakening a posteriori; because there is awakening a priori, there is non-awakening and because there is non-awakening we can speak of awakening a posteriori.
Again, when the mind is awakened as to its own ultimate nature, it is called perfect awakening; when it is not awakened as to its ultimate nature, it is not perfect awakening.
Common people 1 (prthagjana), who, becoming conscious of errors that occur in a succession of their mental states, abstain from making conclusions, may be spoken of as awakened; but in reality theirs is non-awakening.
Çrâvakas, 2 Pratyekabuddhas, and those Bodhisattvas who have just entered their course, recognising the difference between subjectivity and the transcending of subjectivity both in essence and attributes, have become emancipated from the coarse form of particularisation. This is called awakening in appearance.
Bodhisattvas of the Dharmakâya, having recognised that subjectivity and the transcending of subjectivity have no reality of their own [i.e., are relative], have become emancipated from the intermediate form of particularisation. This is called approximate awakening
Those who have transcended the stage of Bodhisattvahood and attained the ultimate goal, possess a consciousness which is consistent and harmonious; they have recognized the origin from which consciousness [or mentation] starts. This will truly be called awakening
Having transcended the attributes of awakening and the subtlest form of particularisation, they [i.e., Buddhas] have gained a perfect and eternal insight into the very nature of the the kernal [ suchness], because the latter now presents itself to them in its absolute and immutable form.
Therefore they are called Tathâgatas, and theirs is perfect awakening; and therefore it is said in the Sûtra that those who have an insight into the non-reality of all subjectivity, attain to the wisdom of the Tathâgata.
In the preceding statement we referred to the origin from which consciousness [or mentation] starts according to the popular expression. In truth there is no such thing as the origin of consciousness [or mentation]; for consciousness [being purely subjective] has no absolute [but only a phenomenal] existence. How can we then speak of its origin?
The multitude of people (bahujana) are said to belacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (avidya) prevails there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of confused subjective states (smrti) from which they have never been emancipated.
But when they transcend their subjectivity, they can then recognize that all states of mentation, viz., their appearance, presence, change, and disappearance [in the field of consciousness] have no [genuine] reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation with the one kernal for they are not self-existent.
When you understand this, you also understand that awakening a posteriori cannot be manufactured, for it is no other thing than awakening a priori [which is uncreate and must be discovered]. 3
And again enlightenment a priori, when implicated in the domain of defilement [i.e., relativity], is differentiated into two kinds of attributes:
(1) Pure wisdom (prajñâ?); (2) Incomprehensible activity (karma?). 4
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By pure wisdom we understand that when one, by virtue of the perfuming 1 power of the Dharma, disciplines himself truthfully [i.e., according to the Dharma], and accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind [i.e., âlaya-vijñâna] which implicates itself with birth-and-death will be broken down, and the modes of the evolving-consciousness 2 will be annulled; while the pure and genuine wisdom of the Dharmakâya manifests itself. 3
Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is identical and not-identical 4 with enlightenment a priori; and therefore ignorance in one sense is destructible, while in the other sense it is indestructible.
This may be illustrated by [the simile of] the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be identical [in one sense] and not-identical [in the other sense] 5 with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases, the motion of the waves subsides; but the water remains the same.
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Likewise, when the mind of all creatures which in, its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidya), the waves of mentality (vijñâna) make their appearance. These three [i.e., the mind, ignorance, and mentality], however, have no [absolute] existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality. 1
But the mind though pure in its essence is the source of the awakened [or disturbed] mentality. When ignorance is annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquilised, whilst the essence of the wisdom remains unmolested. 2
Incomprehensible activity which we know proceeds from pure wisdom, uninterruptedly produces all excellent spiritual states. That is to say, the personality (kâya) of the Tathâgata, 3 which in exuberance contains immeasurable and ever-growing merits, reveals itself to all beings according to their various predispositions [or characters], and accomplishes for them innumerable [spiritual] benefits.
Further there is a fourfold significance in the nature
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of enlightenment whose purity may be likened unto space or a bright mirror.
The first great significance which may be likened unto space and a bright mirror, is trueness as negation (çûnyatâ), in the sense that enlightenment is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity or by any outward signs of enlightenment.
The second great significance which may be likened unto space and a bright mirror, is trueness as affirmation (açûnyatâ), in the sense that all things [in their ultimate nature] are perfect and complete, and not subject to destruction; in the sense that all events in the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and that they neither disappear nor are destroyed; that they are in one eternal and immutable soul which by none of the defiled things can be defiled and whose wisdom-essence enveloping immeasurable and innumerable merits, becomes the cause of perfuming the minds of all beings.
The third great significance which may be likened unto space and a bright mirror, is the affirmation as free from the hindrances (âvarana), in the sense that enlightenment is forever cut off from the hindrances both affectional (kleçâvarana) and intellectual (jñeyâ-varana), as well as from the mind [i.e., âlaya-vijñâna] which implicates itself with birth-and-death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal, calm, and immutable.
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The fourth great significance which may be likened unto space and a bright mirror, is the affirmation as unfolding itself, in the sense that on account of a liberation from the hindrances, it transforms and unfolds itself, wherever conditions are favorable, in the form of a Tathâgata or in some other forms' in order that all beings might be induced thereby to bring their root 1 of merit (kuçalamûla) to maturity. 2
By the so-called non-enlightenment, we mean that as the true Dharma [i.e., suchness] is from all eternity not truthfully recognised in its oneness, there issues forth an unenlightened mind and then subjectivity (smrti). But this subjectivity has no self-existence independent of enlightenment a priori.
To illustrate: a man who is lost goes astray because he is bent on pursuing a certain direction; and his confusion has no valid foundation other than that he is bent on a certain direction.
It is even the same with all beings. They become
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unenlightened, foster their subjectivity and go astray, because they are bent on enlightenment. But non-enlightenment has no existence of its own, aside from its relation with enlightenment a priori. And as enlightenment a priori is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as non-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses its significance too. [That is to say, they are simply relative.]
In blindness 1 there arose non-enlightenment of which three aspects are to be noted. These three are not independent.
The first aspect is ignorant action (avidyakarma?). 2 A disturbance 3 of the mind [i.e., âlaya-vijñâna] caused by non-enlightenment characterises the beginning of karma. When enlightened, the mind is no more disturbed.
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[paragraph continues] But by its disturbance misery (duhkha) is produced according to the law of causation.
The second aspect is that which perceives [i.e., the ego or subject]. In consequence of the disturbance of the mind there originates that which perceives an external world. When the mind is not disturbed, perception does not take place.
The third aspect is the external world. Through perception an unreal external world originates. Independent of that which perceives [i.e., the ego or subject], there is no surrounding world [or the object]. 1
Conditioned by the unreal external world, six kinds of phenomena arise in succession.
The first phenomenon is intelligence [i.e., sensation]. Being affected by the external world the mind becomes conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable.
The second phenomenon is succession [i.e., memory]. Following upon intelligence, memory retains the sensations agreeable as well as disagreeable in a continuous succession of subjective states.
The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and succession of sensations agreeable as well as disagreeable, there arises the desire of clinging.
The fourth phenomenon is an attachment to names
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[paragraph continues] [or ideas, samjñâ], etc. 1 By clinging the mind hypostasises all names whereby to give definitions to all things.
The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (karma). On account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations of deeds, productive of individuality.
The sixth phenomenon is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of its freedom.
Be it therefore known that all defiled things do not exist by themselves, for all of them have arisen from ignorance.
Now there is a twofold relation between enlightenment and non-enlightenment: (1) identity; (2) nonidentity.
The relation of identity may be illustrated by the
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simile of all kinds of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay. Likewise the undefiled (anâçrava) 1 and ignorance (avidya) and their various transient forms come all from one and the same entity. Therefore Buddha teaches 2 that all beings are from all eternity ever abiding in Nirvâna. 3 In truth enlightenment cannot be manufactured, nor can it be created; it is absolutely intangible; it is no material existence that is an object of sensation.
The reason why enlightenment nevertheless assumes tangible material form is that it suffers defilement 4 which is the source of all transient forms of manifestation. Wisdom itself has nothing to do with material phenomena whose characteristic feature is
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extension in space, and there are no attributes there by which wisdom can become tangible. This is the meaning of Buddha's brief statement just referred to.
The relation of non-identity may be illustrated by the difference that obtains among the various kinds of pottery. The relation among the undefiled and ignorance and their various transient forms of manifestation is similar to it.
And again, by the law of causation (hetupratyaya) in the domain of birth-and-death (samsâra) we mean that depending on the mind [i.e., âlaya-vijñâna] an evolution of the ego (manas) and consciousness (vijñâna) 1 takes place in all beings.
What is meant by this?
In the all-conserving mind (âlaya-vijñâna) ignorance obtains; and from the non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularises. This is called the ego (manas).
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Five different names are given to the ego [according to its different modes of operation].
The first name is activity-consciousness (Karma-vijñâna?) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed [or awakened].
The second name is evolving-consciousness [pravrtti-vijñâna, i.e., the subject], in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world.
The third name is representation-consciousness, in the sense that the ego (manas) represents [or reflects] an external world. As a clean mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the five objects of sense, it represents them at once, instantaneously, and without any effort.
The fourth name is particularisation-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled as well as pure.
The fifth name is succession-consciousness [i.e., memory], in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness [or attention, manaskara] it [manas] retains and never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful as well as agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future; and also in the
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sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by, and in imagination anticipates things to come.
Therefore the three domains 1 (triloka) are nothing but the self-manifestation of the mind [i.e., âlaya-vijñâna which is practically identical with suchness, bhûtatathatâ]. 2 Separated from the mind, there would be no such things as the six objects of sense.
Why?
Since all things, owing the principle of their existence to the mind (âlaya-vijñâna), are produced by subjectivity (smrti), all the modes of particularisation are the self-particularisation of the mind. The mind in itself [or the soul] being, however, free from all attributes, is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostasised and established only through ignorance (avidya) and subjectivity (smrti) on the part of all beings, have no more reality than the images in a mirror 3 They evolve simply from
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the ideality of a particularising mind. When the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears.
By ego-consciousness (manovijñâna) we mean that all ignorant minds through their succession-consciousness cling to the conception of I and not-I [i.e., a separate objective world] and misapprehend the nature of the six objects of sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, or phenomena-particularising-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming 1 influence of the prejudices (âçrava), intellectual as well as affectional.
The mind [or consciousness, vijñâna] that starts from the perfuming influence of ignorance which has no beginning cannot be comprehended by the intellect of common people (prthagjana), Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.
It is partially comprehended by those Bodhisattvas at the stage of knowledge-and-practice, who discipline themselves., practise contemplation and become the Bodhisattvas of the Dharmakâya; while even those who have reached the highest stage of Bodhisattvahood cannot thoroughly comprehend it.
The only one who can have a clear and consummate knowledge of it is the Tathâgata. 2
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Why?
While the essence of the mind is eternally clean and pure, the influence of ignorance makes possible the existence of a defiled mind. But in spite of the defiled mind, the mind [itself] is eternal, clear, pure, and not subject to transformation.
Further as its original nature is free from particularisation, it knows in itself no change whatever, though it produces everywhere the various modes of existence.
When the oneness of the totality of things (dharmadhâtu) is not recognised, then ignorance as well as particularisation arises, and all phases of the defiled mind are thus developed. But the significance of this doctrine is so extremely deep and unfathomable that
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it can be fully comprehended by Buddhas and by no others. Now there are six different phases of the defiled 1 mind thus developed:
1. Interrelated [or secondary] defilement by attachment, from which Çrâvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and those Bodhisattvas at the stage of faith-adaptation can be freed.
2. Interrelated [or secondary] defilement by succession, from which Bodhisattvas with strenuous efforts at the stage of faith, can partially be freed, and at the stage of pure-heartedness, completely.
3. Interrelated [or secondary] defilement by the particularising intelligence, from which Bodhisattvas are gradually freed during their advancement from the stage of morality to the stage of wisdom, while upon reaching the stage of spirituality, they are eternally freed from it.
4. Non-interrelated [or primary] defilement by belief
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in an external world, which can be exterminated at the stage of matter-emancipation.
5. Non-interrelated [or primary] defilement by belief in a perceiving mind, which can be exterminated at the stage of mind-emancipation.
6. Non-interrelated [or primary] defilement by the fundamental activity, which can be exterminated in entering upon the stage of Tathâgatahood, passing through the highest stage of Bodhisattvahood.
From not recognising the oneness of the totality of things (dharmadhâtu), Bodhisattvas can partially be liberated by passing first from the stage of faith and the stage of contemplation to the stage of pure-heartedness; while when they enter upon the stage of Tathâgatahood, they can once for all put an end [to the illusion].
By "interrelated" we mean that there is [in this case] a distinction [or consciousness of a duality] between the mind in itself and particularisation, that there is [here] a distinction [or consciousness of a duality] between the defiled and the pure, [and therefore] that there is [here] an interrelation between that which perceives and that which determines.
By "non-interrelated" we mean that the mind [in this case] is perfectly identified with non-enlightenment, so that there is no distinction [or consciousness of a duality] between these two, [and therefore] that there is no consciousness of interrelation between that which perceives and that which determines.
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The defiled mind is called affectional hindrance (kleçâvarana), because it obscures the fundamental wisdom of suchness (bhûtatathatâ). Ignorance is called intellectual hindrance (jñeyâvarana), because it obscures the spontaneous exercise of wisdom from which evolve all modes of activity in the world.
What is meant by this?
On account of the defiled mind attachment affirms itself in innumerable ways; and there arises a distinction [or consciousness] between that which apprehends and that which is apprehended. Thus believing in the external world produced by subjectivity, the mind becomes oblivious of the principle of sameness (samatâ) that underlies all things.
The essence of all things is one and the same, perfectly calm and tranquil, and shows no sign of becoming; ignorance, however, is in its blindness and delusion oblivious of enlightenment, and, on that account, cannot recognise truthfully all those conditions, differences, and activities which characterise the phenomena of the universe.
Further we distinguish two phases of the self-manifestation of the mind [i.e., âlaya-vijñâna, under the law of causation] as birth-and-death (samsâra). The first is the cruder phase, being the state of an interrelated mind; the second is the more refined phase, being the state of a non-interrelated mind. The crudest phase is the subjective condition of common people (prthagjana); the more refined of the crude or
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the cruder of the refined is the subjective state of a Bodhisattva. 1 These two phases [of the âlaya-vijñâna as the principle of birth-and-death] originate through the perfuming power of ignorance.
The birth-and-death (samsâra) has its raison d’être (hetu) and its cause [or condition, pratyaya]. Non-enlightenment is the raison d’être, and the external world as produced by subjectivity is the condition. When the raison d’être is annihilated, the condition is annihilated [i.e., loses its conditioning power]. When the condition is annihilated, the state of an interrelated mind is annihilated. When the raison d’être is annihilated, the state of a non-interrelated mind [too] is annihilated.
It may be asked: If the mind be annihilated, how can there be mentation? If mentation really occurs, how can there be annihilation?
In reply we say that while the objection is well founded, we understand by the annihilation, not that of the mind itself, but of its modes [only].
To illustrate: the water shows the symptoms of disturbance when stirred up by the wind. Have the wind annihilated, and the symptoms of disturbance on the water will also be annihilated, the water itself remaining the same. Let the water itself, however, be annihilated, the symptoms of disturbance would no more be perceptible; because there is nothing
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there through which it can show itself. Only so long as the water is not annihilated, the symptoms of disturbance may continue.
It is even the same with all beings. Through ignorance their minds become disturbed. Let ignorance be annihilated, and the symptom of disturbance will also be annihilated, while the essence of the mind [i.e., suchness] remains the same. Only if the mind itself were annihilated, then all beings would cease to exist, because there would be nothing there by which they could manifest themselves. But so long as the mind be not annihilated, its disturbance may continue.
A constant production of things defiled and pure is taking place on account of the inter-perfuming of the four different powers which are as follows: the first is the pure dharma, that is, suchness (bhûatathatâ); the second is the principle of defilement, that is, ignorance (avidya); the third is the subjective mind, that is, activity-consciousness (karmavijñâna?); the fourth is the external world (vishaya) of subjectivity, that is, the six objects of sense.
By "perfuming" we mean that while our worldly clothes [viz., those which we wear] have no odor of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they acquire one or the other according to the nature of the substance with which they are perfumed.
Now suchness is a pure dharma free from defilement. It acquires, however, a quality of defilement owing to the perfuming power of ignorance. On the
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other hand, ignorance has nothing to do with purity. Nevertheless, we speak of its being able to do the work of purity, because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness.
How are defiled things continually produced by perfuming?
Determined by suchness [in its relative aspect], ignorance becomes the raison d’être of all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness, and, by perfuming suchness, it produces subjectivity (smrti). This subjectivity in its turn perfumes ignorance. On account of this [reciprocal] perfuming, the truth is misunderstood. On account of its being misunderstood, an external world of subjectivity appears [viz., a conception of particulars as particulars]. Further, on account of the perfuming power of subjectivity, various modes of individuation are produced. And by clinging to them, various deeds are done, and we suffer as the result miseries, mentally as well as bodily.
There are two senses in what we call the perfuming power of the external world of subjectivity": (1) that which strengthens particularisation; 1 (2) that which strengthens attachment.
There are again two senses in what we call-the perfuming power of the subjective mind": (1) that
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which strengthens the fundamental activity-consciousness, whereby Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas are subject to the miseries of birth and death; (2) that which strengthens the phenomena-particularising-consciousness, whereby all common people (prthagjana) are subject to the miseries of being fettered by prior deeds (karma).
There are also two senses in what we call "the perfuming power of ignorance": (1) a fundamental perfuming, in the sense that the activity-consciousness is thereby actualised; (2) a perfuming of intellect and affection, in the sense that the phenomena-particularising-consciousness is thereby actualised.
How are pure things constantly produced by perfuming?
Suchness perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming the mind involved in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death 1 and to seek after the blessing of Nirvâna. This longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and we also recognise that all phenomena in the world are nothing but the illusory manifestation of the mind (âlaya-vijñâna) and have no reality of their own. Since we
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thus rightly understand the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform those actions which are in accordance [with the Dharma]. Neither do we particularise, nor cling to. By virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable asamkhyeyakalpas, 1 we have ignorance annihilated.
As ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind [i.e., âlaya-vijñâna] is no more disturbed so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no more disturbed, the particularisation of the surrounding world is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all annihilated, it is said that we attain to Nirvâna and that various spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished. 2
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There are two senses in what we call "the perfuming of the subjective mind": (1) the perfuming of the phenomena-particularising-consciousness, whereby all common people (prthagjana), Çrâvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas are induced to loathe the misery of birth and death, and, each according to his own capacity, to step towards the most excellent knowledge (bodhiparinishpatti); (2) the perfuming of the ego (manas), whereby courageously making up their minds, Bodhisattvas unhesitatingly step towards and enter into Nirvâna, that has no fixed abode.
There are also two senses in what we call "the perfuming of suchness": (1) essence-perfuming, and (2) activity-perfuming.
The Essence-Perfuming.--Embracing in full from all eternity infinite spotless virtues (anâçrava) and incomprehensibly excellent spiritual states that can efficiently exercise an eternal and incessant influence upon all beings, suchness thereby perfumes the minds of all beings. 1
In consequence of this perfuming power, they are caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, and to long for the blessing of Nirvâna, and believing that they are in possession within themselves of the true,
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valid Dharma, to call forth their aspiration (cittotpâda) 1 and to discipline themselves.
Here a question arises: If all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do; and that there are such immeasurable stages and inequalities among them, which divide the path from the first stage of aspiration up to the last stage of Nirvâna, while according to the Doctrine all these differences should be equalised?
In reply we say this: Though all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness, the intensity [of the influence] of ignorance, the principle of individuation, that works from all eternity, varies in such manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges. And it is even so with such entangling prejudices (kleça or âçrava) as the ego-conception, intellectual and affectional prejudices, etc. [whose perfuming efficiency varies according to the karma previously accumulated by each individual],--all these things being comprehended only by the Tathâgata. Hence such immeasurable degrees of difference as regards belief, etc. 2
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Further, there is made in the doctrine of all Buddhas a distinction between raison d’être (hetu) and cause (pratyaya). When both are fully satisfied, the final goal [of Buddhism] is attained and actualised.
To illustrate: the combustible nature of the wood is the raison d’être of a fire. But if a man is not acquainted with the fact, or, though acquainted with it, does not apply any method [whereby the potential principle can be actualised], how could he produce a fire and burn the wood?
It is even so with all beings. Although they are in possession of suchness as the perfuming raison d’être, yet how could they attain to Nirvâna, if they do not happen, as the cause, to see Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, or good sages, or even if they see them, do not practise good deeds (caryâ), do not exercise wisdom (prajñâ), do not destroy prejudices (kleça)?
Conversely, by the cause alone, i.e., by their mere happening to see all good sages, it is not sure for them that they will be induced to loathe the misery
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of birth and death and to long for the blessing of Nirvâna, unless indeed they were in possession within themselves of the intrinsic perfuming principle as the raison d’être. It is, therefore, only when both the raison d’être and the cause are fully actualised that they can do so.
How are the raison d’être and the cause to be fully actualised?
Now, there is an inherent perfuming principle in one's own being, which, embraced and protected by the love (maitrî) and compassion (karunâ) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe in Nirvâna, to cultivate their root of merit (kuçalamûla), to habituate oneself to it, and to bring it to maturity.
In consequence of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and, receiving instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened, induced to practise good deeds, etc., till one attain to Buddhahood and enter into Nirvâna.
The Activity-Perfuming.--By this is meant nothing else than the perfuming influence of the external cause over all beings. It asserts itself in innumerable ways. Briefly speaking we may distinguish two kinds of it: (1) individual; and (2) universal.
The Individual Cause.--All beings since their first aspiration (cittotpâda) till the attainment of Buddhahood are sheltered under the guardianship of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who, responding to the requirements
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of the occasion, transform themselves and assume the actual forms of personality.
Thus for the sake of all beings Buddhas and Bodhisattvas become sometimes their parents, sometimes their wives and children, sometimes their kinsmen, sometimes their servants, sometimes their friends, sometimes their enemies, sometimes reveal themselves as devas or in some other forms.
Again Buddhas and Bodhisattvas treat all beings sometimes with the four methods of entertainment, 1 sometimes with the six pâramitâs, 2 or with some other deeds, all of which are the inducement for them to make their knowledge (bodhi) perfect.
Thus embracing all beings with their deep compassion (mahâkarunâ), with their meek and tender heart, as well as their immense treasure of blissful wisdom, Buddhas convert them in such a way as to suit their [all beings’] needs and conditions; while all beings thereby are enabled to hear or to see Buddhas, and, thinking of Tathâgatas or some other personages, to increase their root of merit (kuçalamûla.).
This individual cause is divided into two kinds: (1) that which takes effect immediately, enabling one without delay to attain to Buddhahood; that which takes effect gradually, enabling one to attain to Buddhahood only after a long interval.
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Each of these two is further divided into two kinds: that which increases one's root of merit; (2) that which induces one to enter into the path (mârga).
The Universal Cause.--With universal wisdom (samatâjñâna?) and universal wishes (samatâpranidhâna?) all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas desire to achieve a universal emancipation of all beings. This desire is eternal and spontaneous on their part. And now as this wisdom and these wishes have the perfuming power over all beings, the latter are caused to think of or to recollect all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, so that sometimes hearing them, sometimes seeing them, all beings thereby acquire [spiritual] benefits (hitatâ). That is, entering into the samâdhi of purity, they destroy hindrances wherever they are met with, and obtain all-penetrating insight, that enables one to become conscious of the absolute oneness (samatâ) of the universe (sarvaloka) and to see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.
Again, this perfuming of the essence and the activity may be divided into two categories: (1) that which is not yet in unison [with suchness]; (2) that which is already in unison [with suchness].
By that perfuming which is not yet in unison [with suchness] we understand the religious discipline of common people (prthagjana), Çrâvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and novice Bodhisattvas. While their strength of faith (çraddhâbala) perfumed by the ego (manas) and the ego-consciousness (manovijñâna) enables them to continue their religious discipline, they have not yet attained to the state of non-particularisation, because their discipline is not yet in unison with the essence of suchness; nor have they yet attained to the spontaneity of action (svayamkarma?) 1, because their discipline is not yet in unison with the activity of suchness.
By that perfuming which is already in unison [with suchness], we understand the religious discipline of Bodhisattvas of the Dharmakâya. They have attended to the state of non-particularisation, because their discipline is in unison with the self-essence of all Tathâgatas; they have attained to the spontaneity of action, because their discipline is in unison with the wisdom and activity of all Tathâgatas. Allowing themselves to be influenced only by the power of the Dharma, their discipline acquires a nature of spontaneity and thereby perfumes suchness and destroys ignorance.
Again the incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma [ignorance] from all eternity works on; but when one attains to Buddhahood, one at once puts an end to it.
The perfuming of the pure dharma [suchness] works on to eternity, and there is no interruption of it. Because by virtue of the perfuming of the Dharma, that is, suchness, subjectivity is on the one hand annihilated, and the Dharmakâya is on the other hand revealed, and the perfuming process of the activity [of suchness] thus originated forever goes on.
Footnotes
61:2 Âlaya or Alaya comes from the root lî, which means: adhere; melt, dissolve; sit upon, dwell in, stay in, etc.; while its nominal form laya means: act of clinging; melting, fusion, solution, dissolution; rest, repose; place of rest, residence, house, dwelling. According to Paramârtha, who belongs to the so-called "Older Translators," the original Sanskrit equivalent of the "all-conserving mind" seems to be alaya or aliya, for he translates it by Wu mo shih, not-disappearing mind, in the sense that this mind retains everything in it.
But Hsüan-tsang, the leader of the "New Translators," renders it by tsang shih, that is, the mind that hoards or preserves, or dwelling-mind or receptacle-mind, according to which the original seems to be âlaya, or laya with the prefix â instead of its negative form with the particle a. The ultimate significance of the term in question, however, does not materially differ, whether it is wu mo, not-disappearing, or tsang, house, place of keeping things. My translation of the same is rather liberal, in order to make it more intelligible to the general reader. Some other names given to the âlaya-vijñâna are citta, mind; âdâna, the supporting; âçraya, foundation or seeds.
62:1 There seems to be a general misconception about the exact significance of the term Dharmakâya which constitutes the central point of the Mahâyâna system. Most Western Buddhist scholars render it the Body or Personality of the Law, understanding by law the doctrine of Buddha. This may be correct in the Southern Buddhism as well as in its historical sense, because after the Nirvâna of Buddha it was quite natural for his disciples to personify the doctrine of their teacher, as their now only living spiritual leader. But in the course of time it acquired entirely different significance and ceased to mean the personification of the Doctrine. Now dharma, as aforesaid, does not only mean law or doctrine, but also it means an individual object, an idea, a substance, or, when it is used in its broadest sense, existence in general. Kâya means a body or person, but not in the sense of an animated, sentient being; it denotes a system in which parts are connected, a unified whole, that which forms a basis, etc. Dharmakâya therefore signifies that which constitutes the ultimate foundation of existence, one great whole in which all forms of individuation are obliterated, in a word, the Absolute. This objective absolute being meanwhile has been idealised by Mahâyânists so that that which knows is now identical with that which is known, because they say that the essence of existence is nothing but intelligence pure, perfect, and free from all possible worries and evils.
63:1 Prthagjana has a technical sense in Buddhism, for any one that is ignorant of the doctrine of non-Atman and commits all those actions which lead one to a constant transmigration, is counted among the profanum vulgus, to distinguish him from the Çrâvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva.
63:2 The Saddharmapundarîka-Sûtra contains an explanation of these terms generally adopted by Mahâyânists, which read as follows (see Kern's English translation of the same, Chap. III., p. 80): "Now, Çâriputra, the beings who have become wise have faith in the Tathâgata, the father of the world, and consequently apply themselves to his commandments. Amongst them there are some who, wishing to follow the dictates of an authoritative voice, apply themselves to the commandment of the Tathâgata to acquire the knowledge of the four great truths, for the sake of their own complete Nirvâna. These one may say to be those who, coveting the vehicle of the disciple (Çrâvaka), fly from the triple world." . . . This is the definition given to the Çrâvakayâna. We proceed next to that of the Pratyekabuddhayâna: "Other beings, desirous of the science without a master, of self-restraint and tranquillity, apply themselves to the commandment of the Tathâgata to learn to understand causes and effects (i.e., the twelve chains of relation) for the sake of their own complete Nirvâna. These one may say to be those who, coveting the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddha, p. 64 fly from the triple world." Those who belong to these two classes desire to achieve only the salvation of their own, and not that of all mankind, in which respect Bodhisattvas stand far superior to them. We read in the same Sûtra to the following effect: "Others again, desirous of the knowledge of the all-knowing, the knowledge of Buddha, the knowledge of the self-born one, the science without a master, apply themselves to the commandment of the Tathâgata to learn to understand the knowledge, powers, and freedom from hesitation, of the Tathâgata, for the sake of the common weal and happiness, out of compassion to the world, for the benefit, weal, and happiness of the world at large, both gods and men, for the sake of the complete Nirvâna of all beings. These one may say to be those who, coveting the great vehicle (mahâyâna), fly from the triple world. Therefore they are called Bodhisattva Mahâsattva." (The italics are mine.)
64:1 Those who have recognised the all-prevailing Dharmakâya, but who have not as yet been able to perfectly identify themselves with it.
65:1 Consciousness, i.e., mentation or mental activity, is transient, it takes place in time, and must not be confused with soul, or suchness, or eternal wisdom.
65:2 In the older translation these passages are somewhat simplified.
65:3 The Lankâvatâra Sûtra. There are three Chinese translations of the same still extant among the Japanese Tripitaka collection: (1) by Guṇabhadra, A. D. 443, four fasciculi; (2) by Bodhiruci, A. D. 513, ten fasciculi; (3) by Çikshânanda, A. D. 700-704, seven fasciculi.
66:1 The older translation differs a little, but agrees in the main.
66:2 The older translation reads: "The four states of mentation are simultaneous [they belong together in time, i.e., they are in uninterrupted succession], but have no self-existence, because enlightenment a priori always remains in its sameness."
66:3 This passage is wanting in the older translation.
66:4 The differentiation of enlightenment into two distinct qualities, wisdom and action, or, according to the terminology of later Mahâyânists, wisdom and love, constitutes one of the principal thoughts of the Mahâyâna Buddhism and shows a striking similarity to the Christian conception of God who is considered to be full of infinite love and wisdom.
67:1 This term will be explained later on. See p. 84.
67:2 For the explanation see below, p. 76.
67:3 Note that the Dharmakâya is not the "Body of the Law," but suchness (bhûtatathatâ) itself, which transcends the limits of time and space as well as the law of causation.
67:4 Literally, "neither identical nor not-identical."
67:5 Literally, "neither identical nor not-identical."
68:1 That is, they are one in one sense, but different in the other sense.
68:2 In the older translation the last two paragraphs read:
"Likewise the mind of all beings though clean and pure in its own nature is disturbed [or awakened] through the wind of ignorance. Neither the mind nor ignorance has any form and attribute (of its own]. They condition each other. But the mind itself not being the principle of disturbance its movability will cease when ignorance is gone, though its essence, wisdom, remains unmolested."
68:3 Or the Tathâgatagarbha.
70:1 Max Müller renders the term by "stock of merit," but I think "stock" is not very fitly adopted to denote the sense usually attached to it by Buddhists. According to them, karma, be it meritorious or not-meritorious, has an efficient power to bear the fruit; therefore every act done by us like the root of a plant has a regenerative force potentially reserved within itself, and does not, like a stock of things which are not necessarily alive, remain dormant lacking productive powers in it.
70:2 According to the older translation, the first significance is called the "mirror of transcendental (or empty) trueness"; the second, the "mirror of the perfuming principle"; the third, the "mirror of the dharma of liberation"; and the fourth, the "mirror of the perfuming cause."
71:1 Rather "carelessness." This is missing in the older translation.
71:2 The term "ignorant action" reminds us of Schopenhauer's "blind will" and we might translate the Chinese terms pu chiao ignorant or unconscious, by "blind." On the other hand, the expression reminds one of Goethe's words in Faust: Im Anfang war die That," i.e., in the beginning there was karma; and this karma starting in an unenlightened condition was blind or ignorant, it was as yet unconscious of its goal which is the attainment of the eternal truth, the discovery of enlightenment a priori. Cf. also the Chândogya Upanisad, VI, 2.
71:3 By "disturbance" is meant that the mind or soul, awaking from a state of perfect sameness and tranquillity, discriminates the subject and the object, me and not-me. The "disturbance" itself, however, is neither good nor bad; the fault lies in clinging to this dual aspect of existence as absolute, utterly ignoring their fundamental identity. Efface the clinging from your mind, and you are purified and saved.
72:1 This is the idealistic phase of the Mahâyâna Buddhism. Berkeley says: "Take away the perceiving mind and you take away the objective world."
73:1 Here is again a strange agreement with Western philosophy. The nominalists speak of names as mere flatus vocis and the things-in-themselves (i.e., what is conceived by names) are declared to be unknowable by Kant. Dr. Paul Carus goes one step further by declaring that there are no things-in-themselves, but forms-in-themselves, viz., the eternal types of beings or Plato's ideas. The clinging to names is based on the metaphysical error of interpreting names as entities or things-in-themselves, which exhibits the nominalistic phase of Buddhism. On the other hand, the strong emphasis laid on the reality of suchness, or what Dr. Carus calls the purely formal, shows the realistic phase of Buddhism. The word "hypostasises" used in the next passage means literally in the younger translation "firmly builds a basis for," in the older one we read literally "one sets separately forth what is unreal, i.e., names and words."
74:1 A dharma not subject to the transformation of birth and death is called wu lou in Chinese and anâçrava in Sanskrit. It is commonly used in contrast to yu lou and sâçrava, which means "defiled" or "conditional."
74:2 This teaching is set forth in the fourth chapter of the Vimalakîrtinirdeça Sûtra, one of the most popular Mahâyâna texts in China as well as in Japan. There are several Chinese translations still extant, the earliest of which was produced during the first half of the third century of the Christian era.
74:3 Observe that Nirvâna is here used as a synonym of suchness (bhûtatathatâ).
74:4 That is to say, being mixed up in the material world. "Defilement" does not necessarily mean evil or immorality. Anything that does not come directly from the fountain-head of suchness, but is in some way or other "perfumed" by ignorance, the principle of individuation, is called defiled or impure. From the ethical point of view it may be good or bad, according to our subjective attitude towards it. All that should be avoided is a clinging to the phenomenal existence.
75:1 Manovijñâna in the older translation. Now vijñâna (or manovijñâna), manas and citta are to a certain extent synonymous and interchangeable, as all designating that which feels, thinks and wills, or what is commonly called mind. According to a general interpretation of Mahâyânists, the following distinction is made among them: citta, mind, is more fundamental, somehow corresponding to the conception of the soul, for it has the inherent capacity for ideation as well as for the power of storing up within itself the results of experience; the most characteristic feature of the manas, the ego, is to constantly reflect on itself and to unconsciously assert the existence of the ego; the vijñâna, consciousness, is principally the faculty of feeling, perceiving, discriminating, judging, etc., in short, general mental activity or consciousness.
77:1 They are: (1) Domain of feeling (kâmaloka); (2) Domain of bodily existence (rûpaloka); (3) Domain of incorporeality (arûpaloka).
77:2 The mind or âlaya-vijñâna is suchness (or, as Dr. Carus would say, "purely formal thought,") in its operation, where it may be called the rational principle in nature or the Gesetzmässigkeit of the cosmos. It manifests itself not only in human reason, but appears also as the principle of individuation, determining all particular forms of existence, as will be explained in the following lines.
77:3 Compare Schopenhauer's conception of the world as Vorstellung.
78:1 The term will be explained later.
78:2 The same idea is expressed in the Crîmâlâ Sûtra as well as in the Lankâvatara Sûtra where Buddha preaches the unfathomableness p. 79 of the nature of suchness which, though pure in its essence, is yet subject to defilement or conditionality,--the mystery that can be comprehended only by a fully enlightened mind. Referring to this incomprehensibility of the relation of suchness and ignorance, let me quote what Herbert Spencer says in his First Principles (American ed., p. 45): "For every religion, setting out though it does with tacit assertion of a mystery, forthwith proceeds to give some solution of this mystery; and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human comprehension. But an examination of the solutions they severally propose, shows them to be uniformly invalid. The analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus the mystery which all religions recognise, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suppose--not a relative, but an absolute mystery." Is not the relation of suchness and ignorance the very mystery to which Spencer makes the allusion here? Açvaghosha's solution is that only Buddha can grasp it.
80:1 The defilement which is the product of the evolution of the âlaya-vijñâna, is of two kinds, primary and secondary. The primary defilement is a priori, originating with the birth of the mind. There is as yet no distinct consciousness in it of the duality of the subject and the object, though this is of course tacitly asserted. Açvaghosha calls the primary defilement "non-interrelated," meaning that there is no deliberate reflexion in the ego to assert itself. The secondary defilement called "interrelated" on the other hand explicitly assumes the ego in contradistinction to the non-ego and firmly clings to this conception, which brings forth all selfish desires and actions on the part of the defiled mind. The former being more fundamental than the latter is completely effaced from the mind only after going through all different stages of religious discipline.
83:1 The older translation adds: The most refined of the refined is the spiritual state of a Buddha.
85:1 The older translation has "subjectivity" instead of "particularisation." These two terms are synonymous and frequently interchanged in the later translation as well as in the older one.
86:1 Birth and death do not necessarily refer to our life only, but in their widest sense to the phenomenal world.
87:1 Literally, countless ages, but it has a technical meaning. Childer's Pali Dictionary, sub voce: "The term kalpa is given to certain vast periods or cycles of time, of which there are three, Mahâkalpa, Asamkhyeyakalpa and Antarakalpa. All the Cakravâtas are subject to an alternate process of destruction and renovation, and a Mahâkalpa is a period which elapses from the commencement of a cakravâta to its complete destruction. Each Mahâkalpa is subdivided into four Asamkhyeyakalpâs. . . . Each Asamkhyeyakalpa contains twenty Antarakalpas, an Antarakalpa being the interval that elapses while the age of man increases from ten years to an asamkhyeya, and then decreases again to ten years; this period is of immense duration." See also the third Koçathâna (chapter) of the Abhidharmakoça by Vasubandhu.
87:2 Notice that Nirvâna is not inactivity or nothingness as commonly supposed. It is, according to Açvaghosha, the annihilation p. 88 of the ego-conception, freedom from subjectivity, insight into the essence of suchness, or the recognition of the oneness of existence.
88:1 The older translation: "(1) Embracing from all eternity things spotless and possessing in full some inconceivable activity and (2) being capable to objectify itself, suchness through these two attributes constantly and eternally exercises its perfuming power."
89:1 This has a technical sense and is explained below.
89:2 The view here set forth is illustrated in the fifth chapter of the Saddharma-pundarîka Sûtra by the relation of the rain and plants. "Then, Kâçyapa, the grasses, shrubs, herbs, and wild trees in this universe, such as have young and tender stalks, twigs, leaves, and foliage, and such as have middle-sized stalks, twigs, leaves, and foliage, and such as have the same fully developed, all those grasses, shrubs, herbs, and wild trees, smaller and greater p. 90 (other) trees will each, according to its faculty and power, suck the humid element from the water emitted by that great cloud, and by that water which, all of one essence, has been abundantly poured down by the cloud, they will each, according to its germ [i.e., karma], acquire a regular development, growth, shooting up, and bigness; and they will produce blossoms and fruits, and will receive, each severally, their names. Rooted in one and the same soil, all those [different] families of plants and germs are drenched and vivified by water of one essence throughout." (Kern's English Translation, p. 119. The italics and words in brackets are by the present translator.)
92:1 Catvâri-sangrahavastûni in Sanskrit. They are (1) dâna, charity; (2) priyavacana, endearing speech; (3) arthacaryâ, beneficial action; (4) samânârthâ, co-operation.
c. The Threefold Significance of the Mahâyâna Explained.
Again the quintessence and the attributes of suchness (bhûtatathatâ) know no diminution or addition, but remain the same in common people (prthagjana), Çrâvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas. It was not created in the past, nor is it to be annihilated in the future; it is eternal, permanent, absolute; and from all eternity it sufficingly embraces in its essence all possible merits (punya).
That is to say, suchness has such characteristics as follows: the effulgence of great wisdom; the universal illumination of the dharmadhâtu [universe]; the true and adequate knowledge; the mind pure and
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clean in its self-nature; the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the pure; 1 the tranquil, the immutable, and the free. And there is no heterogeneity in all those Buddha-dharmas which, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, can be neither identical (ekârtha) nor not-identical (nânârtha) [with the essence of suchness], and which therefore are out of the range of our comprehension. Accordingly suchness is called the Tathâgata's womb (tathâgatagarbha) or the Dharmakâya. 2
It may be questioned: While it was stated before that suchness is devoid of all characteristics (lakshana), how can it now be said without contradiction that it embraces in full all such merits?
In reply it would be said that though suchness in truth abundantly embraces all merits, yet it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction; because all objects in the world are of one and the same taste, are of one reality, have nothing to do with the modes of particularisation, and are not of dualistic character. Depending on the principle of birth-and-death, such as the activity-consciousness (karmavijñâna?), etc., however, all signs of difference and individuation appear.
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How are those qualifications to be assigned to suchness?
Though all things in their [metaphysical] origin come from the soul alone and in truth free from particularisation, yet on account of non-enlightenment there originates a subjective mind [i.e., âlaya-vijñâna] that becomes conscious of an external world (vishaya). This we call ignorance (avidya). Nevertheless the essence of the mind [or the soul] is perfectly pure, and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Thence we assign to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom.
If the mind being awakened perceive an external world, then there will be something that cannot be perceived by it. But the essence of the mind has nothing to do with perception [which presupposes the dual existence of a perceiving subject and an object perceived]; so there is nothing that cannot be perceived by it, [that is, the world of relativity is submerged in the oneness of suchness]. Thence we assign to suchness this quality, the universal illumination of the universe (dharmadhâtu).
When the mind is disturbed, it fails to be a true and adequate knowledge; it fails to be a pure, clean essence; it fails to be eternal, blissful, self-regulating, and pure; it fails to be tranquil, etc. On the contrary, it will become transient, changeable, unfree, and therefore the source of falsity and defilement, while its modifications outnumber the sands of the
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[paragraph continues] Ganges. But when there is no disturbance in the essence of the mind, we speak of suchness as being the true, adequate knowledge, etc., and as possessing pure and clean merits that outnumber the sands of the Ganges.
When the mind is disturbed it will strive to become conscious of the existence of an external world and will thus betray the imperfection of its inner condition. But as all infinite merits in fact constitute the one mind which, perfect in itself, has no need of seeking after any external things other than itself, so suchness never fails to actualise all those Buddha-dharmas, that, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, can be said to be neither identical nor non-identical with the essence of the mind, and that therefore are utterly out of the range of our comprehension. On that account suchness is designated the Tathâgata's womb (tathâgatagarbha) or the Tathâgata's Dharmakâya.
What is meant by the activity of suchness is this: all Buddhas, while at the stage of discipline, feel a deep compassion (mahâkarunâ) [for all beings], practise all pâramitâs, the four methods of entertainment (catvâri-sangrahavastûni), and many other meritorious deeds-treat others as their own self, wish to work out a universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless numbers of kalpas; recognise truthfully and adequately the principle of equality (samatâ)
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among people; and do not cling to the individual existence of a sentient being. 1
By virtue of such a great wisdom that works means of emancipation (upâyâjñâ?), 2 they annihilate ignorance that knows no beginning; recognise the Dharmakâya in its original purity; spontaneously perform incomprehensible karma 3 as well as various unfettered moral activities; manifest themselves throughout the universe (dharmadhâtu), identify themselves with suchness, and leave no traces of compulsion. 4
And how is this?
Because all Tathâgatas are the Dharmakâya itself, 5 are the highest truth (paramârthasatya) itself,
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and have nothing to do with conditionality (samvrittisatya) and compulsory actions; whereas the seeing, hearing, etc. [i.e., the particularising senses] of the sentient being diversify [on its own account] the activity of Tathâgatas.
Now this activity [in another word, the Dharmakâya] has a twofold aspect. The first one depends on the phenomena-particularising-consciousness, by means of which the activity is conceived by the minds of common people (prthagjana), Çrâvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas. This aspect is called the Body of Transformation (nirmânakâya).
But as the beings of this class do not know that the Body of Transformation is merely the shadow [or reflection] of their own evolving-consciousness (pravrtti-vijñâna), they imagine that it comes from some external sources, and so they give it a corporeal limitation. But the Body of Transformation [or what amounts to the same thing, the Dharmakâya] has nothing to do with limitation and measurement. 1
The second aspect [of the Dharmakâya] depends on the activity-consciousness (karmavijñâna) by means of which the activity is conceived by the minds of
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[paragraph continues] Bodhisattvas while passing from their first aspiration (cittotpâda) stage up to the height of Bodhisattvahood. This is called the Body of Bliss (sambhogakâya).
The body has infinite forms. The form has infinite attributes. The attribute has infinite excellencies. And the accompanying rewards 1 of Bodhisattvas, that is, the region where they are predestined to be born [by their previous karma], also has infinite merits and ornamentations. Manifesting itself everywhere, the Body of Bliss is infinite, boundless, limitless, unintermittent [in its action], directly coming forth from the mind. 2
All these merits being actualised through the perfuming of such spotless deeds as the pâramitâs 3, etc., as well as through the incomprehensible perfuming power [of enlightenment a priori], the Sambhogakâya
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embraces infinite attributes of bliss and merit. Therefore it is also called the Body of Reward.
What is recognised by common people (prthagjana), etc., is the coarsest form of the activity of the Dharmakâya. There is a variety of it according to the six different states of creation. 1 It has no attributes of infinite merits and blessings.
What is recognised by Bodhisattvas at the first stage is a finer form of the activity of the Dharmakâya. As they firmly believe in suchness, they can have a partial insight into it, and understand that the Body of the Tathâgata is not departing, is not coming, is free from arrest 2 [i.e., the Tathâgata's work is eternal and constant], that every thing is but a reflected shadow of the mind, not independent of suchness. But these Bodhisattvas have not yet freed themselves from the finest form of particularisation, because they have not yet entered into the order of the Dharmakâya.
Bodhisattvas at the stage of pure-heartedness are able to recognise the finer form of the activity [of the Dharmakâya]. Their insight is more penetrating than the former. When they reach the height of Bodhisattvahood their insight becomes perfect.
By the finer form of the activity we understand
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the Body of Bliss (sambhogakâya). As long as they are possessed by the activity-consciousness, they would conceive the Body of Bliss. 1 But when they are liberated from it, all traces of individuation would become obliterated. Because all Tathâgatas come from [one and the same] Dharmakâya, have no distinction of this-ness and that-ness, have no corporeal forms that are characterised by reciprocal limitation.
A question arises here: If the Dharmakâya of Buddhas is devoid of variously differentiated corporeal forms, how is it that it can manifest itself in various corporeal forms at all?
In reply we say: The Dharmakâya can manifest itself in various corporeal forms just because it is the real essence of them. Matter (rûpa) and mind (citta) from the very beginning are not a duality. So we speak of [the universe as] a system of rationality (prajñakâya), seeing that the real nature of matter just constitutes the norm of mind. Again we speak of [the universe as] a system of materiality (dharmakâya), seeing that the true nature of mind just constitutes the norm of matter. 2
Now depending on the Dharmakâya, all Tathâgatas manifest themselves in bodily forms and are incessantly
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present at all points of space. 1 And Bodhisattvas in the ten quarters, according to their capabilities and wishes, are able to manifest infinite Bodies of Bliss and infinite lands of ornamentation, each one of which, though stamped with the marks of individuality, does not hinder the others from being fused into it, and this [mutual fusion] has no interruption.
But the manifestation of the Dharmakâya in [infinite] bodily forms is not comprehensible to the thought and understanding of common-people; because it is the free and subtlest activity of suchness. 2
Again, in order that all beings might be induced to step forward from the gate of birth-and-death to that of suchness, we endeavor to let them understand that those modes of existence such as matter (rûpa), etc. [i.e., the five skandhas] 3 are imperfect.
Why are they imperfect?
When we divide some gross [or composite] matter, we can reduce it to atoms (anu). But as the atom will also be subject to further division, all forms of material existence, whether gross or fine, are nothing but the shadow of particularisation produced by a subjective mind, and we cannot ascribe any degree of [absolute, or independent] reality to them.
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Let us next go over to and examine the other skandhas [that have temporal existence]. We find there too that we can gradually reduce them to kshanas [i.e., infinitesimal divisions of time], whose nature, however closely scrutinised, does not give any sign of [indivisible] oneness.
It is even the same with the objects of non-aggregate (asamskrta-dharma). 1 They cannot have their own existence independent of the universe (dharmadhâtu). Be it therefore understood that the same may be said in regard to all objects without exception in the ten quarters of space. 2
As a lost man who takes the east for the west,
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while the quarter is not changed on account of his confusion, so all beings, because of their misleading ignorance, imagine that the mind is being disturbed, while in reality it is not.
But when they understand that the disturbance of the mind [i.e., birth-and-death] is [at the same time] immortality [viz., suchness], they would then enter into the gate of suchness.
Footnotes
96:1 These four qualities are usually considered by Mahâyânists to be those of Nirvâna as well.
96:2 Observe here again that Dharmakâya is used in a sense quite different from its ordinary interpretation as the "Body of the Law."
99:1 The older translation reads: "For they consider all sentient beings as their own self and do not cling to their individual forms. How is this? Because they know truthfully that all sentient beings as well as their own self come from one and the same suchness, and no distinction can be established among them."
99:2 Cf. the second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh chapter of the Saddharma-pundarîka Sûtra, in which Buddha preaches about the means of salvation.
99:3 That is, "action in inaction and inaction in action."
99:4 Açvaghosha's conception of religious life as identical in its essence with poetry or fine art, I think, closely resembles that of Kant who says in his Critique of judgment that the production of fine art should appear as if the work of nature. To quote his own words: "Als Natur aber erscheint ein Produkt der Kunst dadurch, dass zwar alle Pünktlichkeit in der Uebereinkunft mit Regeln, nach denen allein das Produkt das werden kann, was es sein soll, angetroffen wird, aber ohne Peinlichkeit, d. i., ohne eine Spur zu zeigen, dass die Regel dem Künstler vor Augen geschwebt und seinen Gemüthskräften Fesseln angelegt habe." (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Kirchmann's edition, p. 169.)
99:5 Cf. Vajracchedikâ, Chap. XVII: "And why, O Subhûti, the p. 100 name of Tathâgata? It expresses true suchness (bhûtatathatâ). . . . It expresses that he had no origin. . . . It expresses the destruction of all qualities (dharma). . . . It expresses one who had no origin whatever. . . . Because, O Subhûti, no-origin is the highest goal,"
100:1 The older translation reads simply: "They cannot thoroughly understand it [i.e., the true nature of the Nirmânakâya.]"
101:1 Buddhists distinguish two kinds of the retribution which we receive as the fruit of karma previously accumulated by ourselves: the first one called "principal" is our bodily existence; the second called "accompanying" is the region where we are destined to be born.
101:2 The older translation has: "It is boundless, cannot be exhausted, is free from the signs of limitation. Manifesting itself wherever it should manifest itself, it always exists by itself and is never destroyed or lost."
101:3 The six Pâramitâs are commonly enumerated: (1) charity (dâna); (2) morality (çîla); (3) patience (ksânti); (4) energy (vîrya); (5) meditation (dhyâna); (6) wisdom (prajñâ). When we speak of the ten Pâramitâs, the following four are to be added: expediency (upâya); prayer or vow (pranidhâna); strength (bala); knowledge (jñâna). An explanation of the six Pâramitâs is given below.
102:1 The six states of creation (gati) are: (1) Deva (gods); (2) Manushya (men); (3) Asura (demons); (4) Preta (ghosts); (5) Tiryagryoni (animals); (6) Nâraka (inhabitants of hell).
102:2 Cf. the Vajracchedikâ Sûtra, Chap. XXIX (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLIX., p. 142).
103:1 The last two sentences are missing in the older translation.
103:2 Cf. the following passages from the Prajñâ-pâramitâ-hrdaya Sûtra: "Form (rûpa) is emptiness (çûnyatâ), and emptiness is indeed form. Emptiness is not different from form, form is not different from emptiness. What is form that is emptiness, what is emptiness that is form."
104:1 The older translation: "Therefore it is preached that the Dharmakâya is omnipresent. The corporeal forms by which it manifests itself have no limitation."
104:2 This passage is missing in the older translation.
104:3 They are matter (rûpa); sensation (vedanâ); idea (samjñâ); action (samskâra); and consciousness (vijñâna).
105:1 All phenomena in the world, physical as well as mental, are divided into two great classes: (1) Samskrtadharma, i.e., that which consists of parts temporal or spatial; (2) Asamskrtadharma, i.e., that which does not consist of parts. The first class is subdivided into four principal departments which are also subject to a further subdivision, seventy-two in the Hînayâna system (according to the Abhidharmakoça-çâstra), and ninety-four in the Mahâyâna (according to the Vijñânamâtrasiddhi-çâstra). The four principal departments are: (1) Rûpa (physical phenomena); (2) Citta (thought or understanding); (3) Caittadharma or Cittasamprayuktasamskâra (mental phenomena); (4) Cittaviprayuktasamskâra (that which does not belong to the former, namely, relation that obtains among things). As for the second class, Asamskrtadharma, Mahâyânists subdivide it into six while Hînayânists subdivide it into three. For details see the two Çâstras above mentioned.
105:2 The last five paragraphs are missing in the older translation which has simply this instead: "The external world which consists in the six objects of sense does not exist independently of our mind, and the mind having no forms and attributes cannot be grasped even if we search for it throughout the ten quarters."
2. The Refutation of False Doctrines.
All false doctrines invariably come out of the âtman-conception. If we were liberated from it, the existence of false doctrines would be impossible.
There are two kinds of the âtman-conception:
(1) Belief in the existence of a personal atman [or ego-soul];
(2) Belief in the existence of âtman in things.
(This denial of the existence of things-in-themselves is one of the principal features of the Mahâyâna as distinguished from the Hînayâna Buddhism.)
a. Five False Views Held by Those Who Believe in a Personal Atman.
There are five different views springing from it [belief in the ego], which are held by common people (prthagjana).
First, hearing that it is said in the Sûtra that the Dharmakâya of the Tathâgata is perfectly tranquil and may be likened unto space (âkâsa), yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people cling to the view that the nature of the Tathâgata is eternal and omnipresent in the same sense as space is.
In order that this clinging to the false doctrine may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that space is nothing but a mode of particularisation and that it has no real existence of its own. Where there is a perception of space, there is side by side a perception of a variety of things, in contradistinction to which space is spoken of as if existing independently. Space therefore exists only in relation to our particularising consciousness.
Further since matter (rûpa) as stated before, is merely a particularisation of the confused mind, it is clear enough that space cannot have any independent existence. In a word all modes of relative existence, our phenomenal world as a whole, are created simply by the particularisation of the confused mind. If we become dissociated from the latter, then all modes of relative existence vanish away by themselves; while the soul alone, in its truth and suchness, pervades the whole universe. The soul, therefore, that constitutes the essential nature of the Tathâgata, cannot be compared with space, though the latter may be said to be in a certain limited sense eternal and real.
Secondly, hearing that it is said in the Sûtras that all things in the world without exception are perfect emptiness (atyantaçûnyatâ), that even Nirvâna 1 or suchness is also perfect emptiness, is devoid in its true nature of all characteristics (lakshanâ), yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people cling to the view that Nirvâna or suchness is a nothing, devoid of contents.
In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that suchness or Dharmakâya in its self-nature (svabhâva) is not a nothing (çûnyatâ) but envelopes in full immeasurable merits (guna) which make up its true nature.
Thirdly, hearing that it is said in the Sûtras that the Tathâgata's womb (tathâgatagarbha) envelopes in full all kinds of merits which constituting its true nature do neither suffer augmentation nor diminution, yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people cling to the view that there is in the Tathâgata's womb itself an inherent and fundamental distinction between the two objects, matter (rûpa) and mind (citta).
In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that suchness (bhûtatathatâ) has nothing to do with any form of distinction produced by defilement, and that even in case we speak of its possessing innumerable meritorious characteristics, they are free from the traces of defilement.
Fourthly, hearing that it is said in the Sûtras that even all impure and defiled things in the world are produced through the Tathâgata's womb (tathâgatagarbha), and that all things in the world are not at variance with suchness, yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people imagine that the Tathâgata's womb all-containingly envelopes all objects of defilement in the world.
In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that the Tathâgata's womb all-containingly envelopes pure and spotless merits (guna) which, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, are not at variance with suchness; that the prejudices (âçrava or kleça) and defiled objects, which also outnumber the sands of the Ganges are nothing but non-entity, have from the first no self-existence (svabhâva), have never been in correspondence with the Tathâgata's womb; that there is no reason to suppose that the Tathâgata's womb had been corresponding with defiled objects, but has now by virtue of intellectual intuition been freed from falsity and defilement.
Fifthly, hearing that it is said in the Sûtras 1 that depending on the Tathâgata's womb, there is birth-and-death (samsâra) as well as the attainment of Nirvâna, yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people imagine that depending on the Tathâgata's womb there is a beginning for birth-and-death, and that since there is the beginning, Nirvâna is in turn subject to extinction.
In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that as the Tathâgata's womb has no beginning, ignorance and birth-and-death depending on it have also no beginning; that it is a view held by the tîrthaka 2 [i.e., the followers of the Vaiçesika]and not taught by the Buddha, to say that there are outside of the three worlds 1 (triloka) some other beings coming into existence; that the Tathâgata's womb has no future [i.e., time of extinction]; and that those who have an insight into it, will eternally destroy the seeds of birth-and-death and attain to Nirvâna which has also no future [i.e., time of extinction].
These four 2 erroneous views have thus arisen from the conception of a personal âtman, and so we have laid down the four refutations as above mentioned. 3
Footnotes
2 It is not exactly known to what Sûtra or Sûtras this refers, but the analogy of this kind is frequently met with in most of the Mahâyâna texts.
108:1 Fa-tsang, a commentator of the present Discourse, quotes the Mahâprajñâ-pâramitâ-Sûtra as here referred to. The Sûtra says: "Even Nirvâna is like a mirage, like a dream. Nay, if there be something superior to Nirvâna, I declare it is also like a mirage, like a dream."
108:2 For instance, we read in the second volume of the Lankâvatara Sûtra (translated into Chinese by Çiksânanda): "The Tathâgatagarbha is in its intrinsic nature pure, clean, eternal, permanent, unintermittent, and immutable; it embraces the thirty-two excellent qualities, and abides within the body of all sentient beings," etc.
109:1 Though not exactly known to what Sûtra or Sûtras the reference is made here, we can easily find similar passages in the Mahâyâna texts, such as the Lankâvatara, the Çrîmâlâ, etc.
110:1 These are not also exactly known.
110:2 It is not precisely known bow many philosophical schools, called tîrthakas by Buddhists, were flourishing just at the time of Açvaghosha. The Nirvâna Sûtra and the Vimalakîrtinirdeça Sûtra mention six of them which were existing at the time of Buddha: (1) Pûrana Kâçyapa; (2) Maskarin Goçâliputra; (3) Sañjayin Vairaṭṭîputra; (4) Ajita Keçakambala; (5) Kakuda Kâtyâyana; (6) Nirgrantha Jñâtiputra. In a commentary on the Vimânamâtrâ-çâstra, however, which is a later production than this Discourse, twelve different tîrthaka schools are enumerated. They are: (1) the Samkhya school; (2) the Vaiçesika school; (3) the school which believes in Maheçvara as the creator; (4) the school which believes in Mahâbrahma as the creator; (5) the school which maintains that Time is the creator; (6) the school which maintains that Space is the creator; (7) the school which maintains that Water is the creator; (8) the school which says that the world exists by itself; (9) the school which says that the creation comes from Quarters; (10) the school which maintains that the Ego is the principle of existence; (11) the school which maintains the immortality of articulate sounds, i.e., the Mîmamsâ school; (12) the Lokâyatika school, an Indian materialism. For further references p. 111 see Dr. Enryô Inouye's Gedô Tetsugaku (Philosophical Systems of the Tîrthakas), 1897, Tokyo, Japan.
111:1 They are the world of desire (kâmaloka), the world of form (rûpaloka), the world of formlessness (arûpaloka). The kâmaloka is divided into hells (naraka), region of ghosts (preta), animal life (tiryagyoni), human life (manushyaloka), and region of gods (deva); the rûpaloka into 17 heavenly abodes corresponding to the three stages of Dhyâna; the arûpaloka into four heavenly abodes. For details see the second chapter of the Abhidharmakoça-Çâstra, by Vasubandhu.
111:2 The number "four" in this paragraph should be "five," for the author enumerates five misunderstandings and their refutations, as we have seen.
111:3 The whole passage is missing in the older translation.
b. Belief in the Existence of Atman in Things.
As the World-honored One (Bhagavat), considering the inferior intellectual calibre of Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, taught them only the doctrine of non-personal âtman, [and did not make any further
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demonstration of the doctrine], the people have in the meantime formed a fixed idea on the transitoriness of the five skandhas, 1 and, being terrified at the thought of birth and death, have fanatically craved for Nirvâna.
In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that the essence of the five skandhas is uncreate, there is no annihilation of them; that since there is no annihilation of them, they are in their [metaphysical] origin Nirvâna itself; that if one be absolutely freed from particularisation and attachment, one will understand that all things both pure and defiled have only relative existence.
Be it therefore known that all things in the world from the beginning are neither matter (rûpa), nor mind (citta), nor intelligence (prajñâ), nor consciousness (vijñâna), nor non-being (abhâva), nor being (bhâva); they are after all inexplicable. The reason why the Tathâgata nevertheless endeavors to instruct by means of words and definitions is through his good and excellent skilfulness [or expediency, upâya-kauçalya]. 2 He only provisionally makes use of words and definitions to lead all beings, while his real object is to make them abandon symbolism and directly enter
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into the real reality (tattva). Because if they indulge themselves in reasonings, attach themselves to sophistry, and thus foster their subjective particularisation, how could they have the true wisdom (tattvajñâna) and attain to Nirvâna?
Footnotes
112:2 See the second chapter of the Saddharmapundarîka Sûtra, in which Buddha teaches how the only one yâna (vehicle) is split through his transcendental upâya (skilfulness or expediency) into three yânas: Çrâvakayâna, Pratyekabuddhayâna, and Bodhisattvayâna.
3. Ways of Practising the Right Path.
By this we mean that all Bodhisattvas, by their aspiration (cittotpâda) 1 and discipline (caryâcarana), will be able to attain to the reason that made all Tathâgatas perceive the path (mârga).
Briefly stated, there are three kinds of aspiration: (1) Aspiration through the perfection of faith; (2) Aspiration through knowledge and practice; (3) Aspiration through intellectual intuition.
By whom, and by which deeds, can faith (çraddhâ) be perfected and can the aspiration be awakened?
Now the people who belong to the group of inconstancy
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[paragraph continues] (aniyatarâçi), 1 by virtue of their root of merit (kuçalamûla), which has a perfuming power, firmly believe in the retribution of karma, practise the ten virtues (daçakuçalâni), 2 loathe the sufferings of birth and death, seek after the most excellent enlightenment (Samyaksambodhi), and seeing Buddhas and Bodhisattvas they wait on them, make offerings to them, discipline themselves in many [meritorious] deeds; and after the lapse of ten thousand kalpas (eons), their faith will finally be perfected.
Since then either by virtue of the instruction received from Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, or on account of their deep compassion (mahâkarunâ), or from their desire to preserve the right doctrine (saddharma) against its corruption, their aspiration [to the highest truth] will be awakened.
After having awakened the aspiration they will enter into the group of constant truth (samyaktvaniyata-râçi) and never relapse, always abiding in the essence of the Buddha-seed and identifying themselves with its excellent principle.
There is, however, a certain class of people whose root of merit (kuçalamûla) from time immemorial is poor, and whose prejudices (kleça or âçrava) are intense, deeply veiling their minds. Such people, even if they see Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, wait on them, and make offerings to them, will sow merely the seeds of men (manushya) and gods (deva) [i.e., they will be born in the future as men or gods], or the seeds of the enlightenment of Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas [i.e., their attainment would not be higher than that of Çrâvakas or Pratyekabuddhas].
Some of them may even aspire to seek after the Mahâbodhi, 1 but owing to the instability of their character, they will ever oscillate between progress and retrogression.
Some of them, happening to see Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, may make offerings to them, wait on them, practise many [meritorious] deeds, and, while ten thousand mahâkalpas (æons) are not yet elapsed, may meantime come into some favorable circumstances and thereby awake aspiration. What are those favorable circumstances? For instance, they may witness the personal figure of a Buddha, or may make some offerings to the congregation of priests (samgha), or may be instructed by Çrâvakas or Pratyekabuddhas, or may be moved by seeing others aspire [to the highest truth].
But this kind of aspiration as a rule is not constant. In case they come into unfavorable circumstances, they may happen to fall down to the stage of Çrâvakahood or Pratyekabuddhahood.
Now, briefly speaking, three faculties of the kernal which will be awakened by the perfection of faith: (1) rightness of comprehension [lit., right, straight mind], for it truthfully and intuitively contemplates suchness (bhûtalathatâ); (2) profundity of virtue [lit., deep, heavy mind], for it rejoices in accumulating all good deeds; (3) greatness of compassion (mahâkarunâ), for it desires to uproot the miseries (duhkha) of all beings.
It may be asked whether there is ever any need for one to discipline oneself in all good deeds and to try to save mankind, since all sentient beings (sarvasattva) as well as all things (sarvadharma) in the world, abiding in the oneness of the universe (dharmadhâtu) that has no second, will, as can be logically inferred, have nothing to do but calmly to contemplate suchness.
In reply we say, yes. Because the mind may be likened unto a precious jewel which is pure and bright in its essence but buried in a gross veinstone. Now there is no reason to suppose that one can make it clean and pure only by contemplating it, and without applying any means [of purification] or a degree of workmanship.
It is even the same with suchness. Though it is pure and bright in its essence and sufficiently envelopes all merits (guna), yet it is deeply buried in infinite external defilements. And there is no reason to suppose that a man can make it pure and clean only by earnest contemplation on it, and without trying any means [of emancipation] or of discipline.
It is therefore an urgent necessity that all good deeds should be accumulated, that all beings should be delivered, that those infinite external defilements and impurities should be cast off, that the true doctrine should be revealed.
With regard to "means" [or "skilfulness," upâya] there are, briefly stated, four kinds.
The first one is called the means of practising the fundamental [truth, mûla]. That is to say, by contemplating the true essence of all dharmas, which, being uncreate and free from imagination, is not concerned with the metempsychosis of birth and death, and by contemplating the truth that all things originate from the co-operation of the principle (hetu) and the causes (pratyaya), and that the retribution of karma is irrevocable, one will evoke deep compassion, discipline oneself in all good deeds, embrace and convert all beings, and not dwell in Nirvâna, since suchness [in its absolute aspect] has nothing to do with Nirvâna or with birth-and-death. As this attitude
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[paragraph continues] [towards all objects] is in accord [with the nature of suchness], it is called the means of practising the [fundamental] truth.
The second one is called the means of abeyance. That is, by feeling shame and remorse, one may put an end to all evils and not let them grow, since suchness is free from all marks of imperfection. Thus to be in accord with suchness and to put an end to all evils is called the means of abeyance.
The third one is called the means of strengthening the root of merits (kuçalamûla). By raising reverential feelings toward the Triple Treasure (triratna), one will revere, make offerings to, pay homage to, praise, rejoice in, and beseech the Triple Treasure; and there upon one's orthodox faith being strengthened, one will at last awake a desire for the most excellent knowledge (bodhiparinishpatti). Through the protection of the majestic power of the Buddha, Dharma, and Sam gha, one's karma-hindrances (karmâvarana) will now get purified and one's root of merit firmly established; because suchness is free from all hindrances and envelopes all merits. Thus to be in accord with such ness and to practise good deeds is called the means of strengthening the root of merits.
The fourth one is called the universal means of great vows (mahâpranidhâna). That is, one may make the vow that in ages to come all beings should universally be delivered and take refuge at ease in the
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[paragraph continues] Anupadhiçesa Nirvâna, 1 because the true nature of all objects is free from relativity, is one and the same, making no distinction between this and that, and is absolutely calm and tranquil. Thus to be in accord with the three attributes [i.e., non-relativity, sameness, tranquillity] of suchness and to make such a great vow is called the universal means of great vows.
[Now to return to the former subject], when the Bodhisattva thus aspires to the highest truth, he is able to have a partial insight into the Dharmakâya of the Buddha; and according to the power of the vow (pranâdhânavaça), he performs eight things, to wit, his descent from the palace in the Tushita heaven 2
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[to this world], his entrance into the human womb, his stay therein, his birth, his renunciation, his attainment of Buddhahood, his revolution of the Dharma-wheel (dharmacakra), and lastly his Parinirvâna.
He is not, however, as yet to be called absolute Dharmakâya, for he has not yet completely destroyed the impure 1 karma that has been accumulated during his numberless existences in the past; perchance by the influence of the evil karma he may suffer a little amount of misery. But he suffers it only for a short time, and this not because of his being fettered by the evil karma, but because of his own vow-power (pranidhânavaça) [which he made for the universal emancipation of mankind].
It is sometimes said in the Sûtra 2 that even those Bodhisattvas who aspired [to the highest truth] through the perfection of their faith might relapse and fall down to the evil creation (apâyagati). 3 But this was
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only said to encourage those novices who are apt to give themselves up to indulgence and so may fail to enter into the right order [i.e., samyaktvaniyata], though they may not really fall down [into the evil path].
Further the Bodhisattva has since his first aspiration disciplined himself in those deeds which are beneficial both to himself and others, and thereby his heart has become free from timidity, inasmuch as he would not shudder even at the thought of falling down to the stage of Çrâvakahood or Pratyekabuddhahood, any more than to the evil creation (apâyagati).
If he learn that he is able to attain to Buddhahood only after an assiduous observance of various rules of austerity and mortification during immeasurable asamkheya-kalpas, 1 he will never be frightened nor will he falter. How then could he ever raise such thoughts as cherished by Çrâvakas or Pratyekabuddhas? How then could be fall down to the evil creation (apâyagati)? He has a firm faith in the truth that all things (sarvadharma) from. the beginning are in their nature Nirvâna itself. 2
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This sort of aspiration (cittotpâda) is more excellent than the former, because the first asamkheyakalpa of Bodhisattvas of this class is approaching to an end, because they have attained a thorough knowledge of suchness, because all their acts are performed without any stain of attachment.
As they know that the nature of the Dharma, being free from the trace of covetousness, is the perfection of pure and stainless charity (dânapâramitâ), they in conformity to it practise charity (dânapâramitâ).
As they know that the nature of the Dharma, being free from the influence of the five sensual passions, and, having nothing. to do with immorality, is the perfection of pure and stainless morality (çilapâramitâ), they in conformity to it practise morality (çilapâramitâ).
As they know that the nature of the Dharma, having nothing to do with grievance and being free from malice, is the perfection of pure and stainless patience (kshântipâramitâ), they in conformity to it practise patience (kshântipâramitâ).
As they know that the nature of the Dharma, being free from physical and mental limitations and having nothing to do with indolence, is the perfection of pure and stainless energy (vîryapâramitâ), they in conformity to it practise energy (vîryapâramitâ).
As they know that the nature of the Dharma, having nothing to do with disturbance or confusion, is the perfection of pure and stainless tranquilisation
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[paragraph continues] (dhyânapâramitâ), they in conformity to it practise tranquilisation (dhyânapâramitâ).
As they know that the nature of the Dharma, being free from the darkness of ignorance, is the perfection of pure and stainless wisdom (prajñâpâramitâ), they in conformity to it practise wisdom (prajñâpâramitâ).
What is the object of which the Bodhisattva from the stage of pure-heartedness up to the height of Bodhisattvahood has attained an intellectual intuition? The object is no less than suchness itself. We call it an object on account of the evolving-consciousness (pravrtti-vijñâna). But in truth there is no object in perfect intellectual intuition, neither is there a subject in it; because the Bodhisattva by means of his wisdom of non-particularisation intuitively perceives suchness (bhûtatathatâ) or Dharmakâya, which is beyond the range of demonstration and argumentation.
Thus he is able in a moment to go over all the worlds in the ten quarters and to make offerings to all Buddhas and to beseech them to revolve the Wheel of the Dharma (darmacakrapravartana). His sole desire being to benefit all beings, he does not care for any melodious sounds or words [which he can enjoy in his heavenly abode]. 1 In order to encourage weak-hearted people, he shows great energy and
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attains to perfect enlightenment (anuttarasamyaksambodhi), all at once annihilating the lapse of immeasurable asamkheyakalpas. Or in order to instigate indolent people, he sometimes attains to Buddhahood only after long discipline and mortification through the period of immeasurable asamkheyakalpas. The reason why he achieves in this wise infinite methods (upâya) [of salvation] is that he wishes thereby to benefit all beings. 1
But in fact the intrinsic nature, the faculties, the aspiration, and the intellectual attainment of all Bodhisattvas are equal [in value] and there is not any scale of gradation in them. Because they will all equally and assuredly attain to the most perfect enlightenment, only after the elapsing of three asamkheyakalpas. Yet as there are differences in various states of existence regarding their objects of seeing, hearing, etc., as well as regarding their faculties, their desires, and their character; so there are correspondingly many different forms of religious discipline [destined to] them.
Three different operations of the mind are revealed in this aspiration by means of intellectual intuition: (1) Pure consciousness originating in the mind as it becomes free from particularisation; (2) moral consciousness [lit., upâya-citta?] originating in the mind as it spontaneously performs those deeds which are beneficent to others; (3) unconscious activity (karma-vijñânacitta) originating in the mind as it achieves a most hidden mode of activity.
Again the Bodhisattva, having attained to the perfection of bliss and wisdom, which are his two marks of adornment, has in reaching the height of evolution (akanishtha) also obtained the most venerable and excellent body in the whole universe. By means of that knowledge which intuitively identifies itself [with enlightenment a priori], he has all at once uprooted ignorance; and thus obtaining omniscience (sarvâkârajñâna), 1 he spontaneously achieves incomprehensible [or divine] deeds (acintyakarma), reveals himself in immeasurable worlds in the ten quarters, and works out the universal emancipation of mankind.
A question arises here. As space is infinite, worlds are infinite. As worlds are infinite, beings are infinite. As beings are infinite, the modes of mentation are also infinitely diversified. And as all these objects and conditions (vishaya) have no limits, they can hardly be known or understood [in all their multitudinousness]. If, now, ignorance being destroyed, all modes
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of mentation are entirely annihilated as well, how can the Bodhisattva understand all things and complete his omniscience (sarvâkârajñâna)?
In reply we say: All so-called illusory phenomena are in truth from the beginning what they are; and their essence is nothing but the one soul [or mind]. Though ignorant minds that cling to illusory objects cannot understand that all things are in their nature the highest reality (paramârtha), all Buddha-Tathâgatas being free from clinging [or particularising] are able to have an insight into the true nature of things. And by virtue of their great wisdom they illuminate all distinctions between the defiled and the pure-through their immeasurable and inexhaustible sources of expediency (upâyakauçalya), which is good and excellent, they benefit and gladden all beings according to the latter's various necessities and capabilities. Therefore the mind that is saturated with subjectivity is annihilated, while all things are understood and omniscience (sarvâkârajñâna) is attained. 1
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Another question presents itself here: If all Buddhas who are in possession of infinite expediencies (upâya) can spontaneously benefit all beings in the ten quarters, why is it that the latter cannot always see Buddhas in person, or witness their divine transformations, or hear their instructions in the Doctrine?
The reply is: Tathâgatas are really in possession of those expediencies, and they are only waiting to reveal themselves to all beings as soon as the latter can purify their own minds. 1
When a mirror is covered with dust, it cannot reflect images. It can do so only when it is free from stain. It is even the same with all beings. If their minds are not clear of stain, the Dharmakâya cannot reveal itself in them. But if they be freed from stain, then it will reveal itself.
Footnotes
113:1 Aspiration which does not exactly correspond to the Chinese fah hsin and Sanskrit cittotpâda, has been retained for lack of a fitter term. It has a technical sense in Buddhism. Literally, fah or utpâda means producing, raising, or awakening, while hsin or citta as noticed elsewhere is mind, thought, or consciousness. Cittotpâda, however, is more than the raising of one's thought to a higher religious life; it means the recognition of the truth that one is in possession within oneself of the highest perfect knowledge (samyaksambodhi); it is the birth within oneself of a higher ethical impulse constituting the essence of religion. A fuller form of fah hsin is fah bodhi hsin or fah anuttarasamyaksambodhi hsin. See the Mahâyâna Sûtras such as the Saddharma Pundarîka, Vajracchedikâ, Sukhâvati Vyuha, Lankâvatara, Avatamsaka, etc.
114:1 There are three groups of people: (1) Those who are constantly abiding in absolute truth (samyaktvaniyata-râçi); (2) Those who are constantly abiding in falsehood (mithyâtvaniyatarâçi); (3) Those who are inconstant (aniyata-râçi).
114:2 The ten virtues (daçakuçalâni) consist in not committing the ten evils (daçâkuçalâni) which are as follows: (1) Killing a living being (prânâtipâda); (2) Stealing (adattâdâna); (3) Committing adultery (kâmamithyâçâra); (4) Lying (mrshâvâda); (5) Slander (paiçunya); (6) Insulting speech (pârushya); (7) Frivolous talk (sambhinnapralâpa); (8) Avarice (abhidhya); (9) Evil intent (vyâpâda); (10) False view (mithyâdrshthi). The ten evils here enumerated should be avoided by the lay members of Buddhism. For the Çramaneras there is a different set of precepts specially intended for them, called the Daçaçikshapada, with which the ten virtues must not be confused as they are by some.
115:1 The older translation reads "Mahâyâna."
119:1 Mahâyânists in general distinguish four aspects of Nirvâna; (1) Nirvâna that is pure and spotless in its self-nature, i.e., absolute suchness, possessed equally by all beings; (2) Nirvâna that has remnant (upadhiçesa), i.e., a state of relative suchness, which, though freed from the affectional hindrance (kleçâvarana), is still under the fetter of materiality, which causes suffering and misery; (3) Nirvâna that has no remnant (anupadhiçesha) and full of love and wisdom, believes neither in birth-and-death nor in Nirvâna, but eternally abiding in the suchness of things benefits all sentient beings. Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas can recognise the first three aspects of Nirvâna, but the last one is known only to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. For further details see the tenth volume of the Vijñânamâtrasiddhi Çâstra, translated into Chinese by Hüan-tsang.
119:2 One of the six heavenly abodes of the Kâmaloka (world of desire). The heavenly abodes are: (1) Region of the four kings of the cardinal points (mahârâjakâyika); (2) that of the thirty p. 120 three gods (trâyastrinça); (3) the Yâmâ; (4) the Tushita; (5) the Nirmânatis: (6) the Paranirmita-vaçavatins. See also the note to Triloka, p. 77.
120:1 The term impure does not mean immoral, but relative, conditional, dualistic or material, in contradistinction to pure, absolute, unconditional, spiritual, etc.
120:2 For instance, it is stated in the second fasciculus of the Bodhisattva-kusumamâlâ-pûrvakarma Sûtra (? P‘u-sa ying-lo, pên-yeh Ching, in Chinese, translated by Fo-nien towards the end of the third century) that those Bodhisattvas who have not yet entered on the eighth stage (there are ten stages) of Bodhisattvahood may happen to relapse in his religious course, if not be able to receive instruction in the Dharma from some fully enlightened teachers.
120:3 Three of the six gatis are the apâyagati (evil path): Hell p. 121 (nâraka); ghost (preta); and animal life (tiryagyoni). Sometimes demon (asura) is added to make the fourth.
121:1 For an explanation see p. 87, footnote.
121:2 The same monistic idea is expressed also in the following famous phrases: "Âçrâvas (desires or prejudices) are nothing but Bodhi (enlightenment), and birth-and-death (or this world of transformation) is nothing but Nirvâna." Individuation is the product of subjectivity; the universe in reality is one great whole.
123:1 In the older translation we read: "Having in view only the emancipation and beneficence of all beings, he [Bodhisattva] does not rely on words and characters."
124:1 The older translation reads: "It is out of [human] comprehension that he [Bodhisattva] can achieve such innumerable methods [of salvation]."
125:1 A distinction is sometimes made between Sarvâkârajñâna, Sarvajnâna and Mârgajnâna: Sarvâkârajñâna is the knowledge by which we are enabled to know all forms and manifestations in their fundamental oneness; Sarvajnâna is simply the knowledge of all things, or omniscience; Mârgajnâna is the knowledge by which we can recognise the path leading to final emancipation. But they are practically the same.
126:1 The older translation reads: "In reply we say: All phenomenal objects (vishaya) are from the beginning for in their metaphysical origin] of the one mind which is free from imagination and subjectivity. As all beings illusively perceive the existence of the phenomenal world (vishaya), they impose limitations on the mind. As they thus illusively cherish imagination and subjectivity, which are not in accordance with the nature of the Dharma, they cannot thoroughly understand it. All Buddha-Tathâgatas are, however, free from illusive perception, and [therefore their knowledge is] omniscient, because the mind constituting the principle of all things is true and valid. The self-essence [of all Buddhas] illuminates all illusive phenomena, possesses a great wisdom-activity and innumerable p. 127 means [of salvation], whereby, according to the intellectual capacity of all beings, they can reveal to them various significances of the Doctrine. Therefore it is called the Sarvâkârajñâna."
127:1 In the older translation we read: The Dharmakâya of all Buddha-Tathâgatas is universal (samatâ) and pervades every thing; it is free from compulsion and therefore spontaneous, manifesting itself through the minds of all beings."
IV. PRACTICE OF FAITH.
In what does the practice of faith (çraddhâ) consist?
This part of the Discourse is intended for those beings who have not yet entered into the order of constant truth (samyaktvaniyata-râçi).
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What is meant by faith? How should one practise faith?
There are four aspects of faith. [As to faith in general]: (1) To believe in the fundamental [truth], that is, to think joyfully of suchness (bhûtatathatâ). [As to particular faiths:] (2) To believe in the Buddha as sufficingly enveloping infinite merits, that is, to rejoice in worshipping him, in paying homage to him, in making offerings to him, in hearing the good doctrine (saddharma), in disciplining oneself according to the doctrine, and in aspiring after omniscience (sarvajñâna). (3) To believe in the Dharma as having great benefits, that is, to rejoice always in practising all pâramitâs. (4) To believe in the Samgha as observing true morality, that is, to be ready to make offerings to the congregation of Bodhisattvas, and to practise truthfully all those deeds which are beneficial at once to oneself and others.
Faith will be perfected by practising the following five deeds: (1) charity (dâna); (2) morality (çîla),(3) patience (kshânti); (4) energy (vîrya); (5) cessation [or tranquilisation, çamatha] and intellectual insight (vidarçana or vipaçyana).
How should people practise charity (dâna)?
(1) If persons come and ask them for something, they should, as far as their means allow, supply it ungrudgingly and make them rejoice in it. (2) If they see people threatened with danger, they should try every means of rescuing them and impart to them a
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feeling of fearlessness (vaiçâradya). (3) If they have people who come to them desiring instruction in the Doctrine, they should, so far as they are acquainted with it, and, according to their own discretion, deliver speeches on religious discipline.
And when they are performing those three acts of charity, let them not cherish any desire for fame or advantages, nor covet any worldly rewards. Only thinking of those benefits and blessings that are at once for themselves and others, let them aspire to the most excellent, most perfect knowledge (anuttarasamyaksambodhi).
How should they practise morality (çîla)?
Those Bodhisattvas who have families [i.e., lay members of Buddhism] should abstain from killing, stealing, adultery, lying, duplicity, slander, frivolous talk, covetousness, malice, currying favor, and false doctrines. 1
In the case of Çramanas, they should, in order to vanquish all prejudices (kleça or âçrava), retire from the boisterousness of worldly life, and, abiding in solitude (aranya), should practise those deeds which lead to moderation and contentment as well as those of the Dhûtaguna. 2 Even at the violation of minor
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rules (çila) they should deeply feel fear, shame, and remorse. Strictly observing all those precepts given by the Tathâgata, they should not call forth the blame or disgust of the outsider, but they should endeavor to induce all beings to abandon the evil and to practise the good. 1
How should they practise patience (kshânti)?
If they meet with the ills of life they should not
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shun them. If they suffer sufferings, they should not feel afflicted. But they should always rejoice in contemplating the deepest significance of the Dharma. 1
How should they practise energy (vîrya)?
Practising all good deeds, they should never indulge in indolence (kausîdya). They should think of all their great mental and physical sufferings, which they are now vainly suffering on account of their having coveted worldly objects during their existences in innumerable former ages (kalpa), and which do not give the least nourishment to their spiritual life. They should, therefore, in order to be emancipated from those sufferings in the future, be indefatigably energetic, and never raise the thought of indolence, but endeavor, out of deep compassion (mahâkaruna), to benefit all beings. Though disciplining themselves in faith, all novice Bodhisattvas, on account of the hindrances of their evil karma (karmâvarana) produced by the violation of many important precepts in their previous existences, may sometimes be annoyed by evil Mâras, sometimes entangled in worldly engagements, sometimes threatened by various diseases. As these things will severally disturb their religious course and make them neglect practising good deeds, they should dauntlessly, energetically, unintermittently, all
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six watches, day and night, pay homage to all Buddhas, make offerings (pûjâ) to them, praise them, repent and confess (kshamâ) to them, aspire to the most excellent knowledge (samyaksambodhi), make great vows (mahâpranidhâna); and thereby annihilate the hindrances of evils and increase the root of merit (kuçalamûla).
How should they practise cessation [or tranquilisation, çamatha] and intellectual insight (vidarçana or vipaçyana)?
To bring all mental states that produce frivolous sophistries to a stand is called cessation. To understand adequately the law of causality and transformation is called intellectual insight. Each of them should be practised separately by the beginner. But when by degrees he obtains facility and finally attains to perfection, the two will naturally become harmonised. 1
Those who practise cessation should dwell in solitude (âranyaka) and, sitting cross-legged 2 rectify the
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attitude and pacify the mind. 1 Do not fix the thoughts on the breath (ânâpânasmrti) 2; do not fix the thoughts on the forms (samjñâ) 3 and colors; do not fix the
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thoughts on space (âkâça); 1 do not fix the thoughts on earth, water, fire, and ether; 1 do not fix the thoughts on what you see, hear, learn, or memorise (vijñânakrtsnâyatana) 1. All particularisations, imaginations and recollections should be excluded from consciousness, even the idea of exclusion being excluded; because [the suchness of] all things is uncreate, eternal, and devoid of all attributes (alakshana).
[Now in the constant flux of thoughts,] that which precedes [i.e., a sensation] has been awakened by an external object; so the next [step to be taken by the practiser] is to abandon the idea of an external world. Then that which succeeds [in that constant flux of thoughts] is elaborated in his own mind; so he should in turn abandon reflexion [or thought]. In short, as his attention is distracted by the external world [outer vishaya], he is warned to turn it to inner consciousness [inner citta]; while as his retrospection in turn calls forth a succession of thoughts [or ideal associations], he is again warned not to attach himself to the latter; because, independent of suchness, they [thoughts] have no existence of their own.
At all times, while moving, standing, sitting, or
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lying, the practiser should constantly discipline himself as above stated. Gradually entering the samâdhi of suchness, 1 he will finally vanquish all prejudices (kleça or âçrava), be strengthened in faith (çraddhâ),--and immediately attain to the state of never-returning (avaivartikatva). But those who are sceptical, sacrilegious, destitute of faith, encumbered with the hindrances (âvarana) of karma, arrogant, or indolent, are not entitled to enter therein.
And again when the practiser by virtue of his samâdhi 2 attains an immediate insight into the nature of the universe (dharmadhâtu), he will recognise that the Dharmakâya of all Tathâgatas and the body of all beings are one and the same (samatâ), are consubstantial (ekalakshana). On that account it is also called the samâdhi of oneness (ekalakshanasamâdhi). By disciplining oneself in this samâdhi, one can obtain infinite
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samâdhis, because suchness is the source of all samâdhis.
Some people scantily supplied with the root of merit (kuçalamûla) may yield to the temptation of Mâras, tîrthakas, or evil spirits. [For instance] those evil ones sometimes assuming horrible forms may frighten the practiser; sometimes manifesting themselves in beautiful figures, they may fascinate him; 1 sometimes appearing in form of a deva, or of a Boddhisattva, or even of a Buddha with all his excellent and magnified features, 2 they may speak about dhârani 3 or the pâramitâ, or may give instructions about various means of emancipation (mukti), declaring that there is no hatred, no friendship, no causation, no
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retribution, or declaring that all things in the world are absolute nothingness (atyantaçûnyatâ), that they are in their essence Nirvâna itself. Or they may reveal to the practiser his own past and future states of existence, they may teach him to read the thoughts of others, 1 may grant him incomparable power of eloquence, may induce him to crave covetously for worldly fame and advantages.
Further, through the influence of those evil ones the practiser may sometimes be inordinately susceptible to dissatisfaction or delight; he may sometimes be too misanthropic or too philanthropic; he may sometimes be inclined to enjoy drowsiness; he may sometimes not sleep for a long time; he may sometimes be affected by diseases; be may sometimes remain discouraged and indolent; he may sometimes rise all on a sudden with full energy, but only to sink down again into languor; he may sometimes, being over-sceptical, not believe in anything; he may sometimes, abandoning the excellent religious observance, enjoy himself in frivolous occupations, indulge in worldly affairs, gratify his desires and inclinations;
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he may sometimes attain to the samâdhi of heretics [i.e., tîrthaka] and, remaining in a state of trance a day or two, or even seven, and being supplied imaginarily with some palatable food and drink, and feeling very comfortable mentally and physically, he may have no sensation of hunger or thirst; 1 he may sometimes be induced to enjoy female fascinations; he may sometimes be very irregular in taking meals, either too much or too little; he may sometimes look either very handsome or very ugly in appearance.
If the practiser get enraptured by those visions and prejudices (kleça), he will lose his root of merit (kuçalamûla) accumulated in his previous existences. Therefore he should exercise a deep and thorough contemplation, thinking that all those [heretical states of samâdhi] are the temptations of Mâras or evil spirits that take advantage of his deficiency in merits and his intensity of karma-hindrances (karmâvarana).
After this thought he should make another thought, viz., that all these are nothing but mental hallucinations. When he makes these thoughts, the visions and imaginations will instantly disappear, and, becoming free from all attributes [of limitation], be will enter into the true samâdhi. He has then not only liberated himself from all modes of subjectivity, he has also effaced the idea of suchness. Even when
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he rises up from a deep meditation, no visionary images, no prejudices will take possession of in his mind, since he has destroyed the root of illusion through the power of the samâdhi. On the contrary, all the excellent and virtuous deeds which are in conformity with suchness will be constantly performed by him, while all hindrances without exception will be removed by him, who now exhibiting great spiritual energy will never become exhausted. 1
Those who do not practise this kind of samâdhi will not be able to enter into the essence of the Tathâgata, for all other samâdhis practised in common with the tîrthakas have invariably some attributes [of imperfection] and do not enable one to come into the presence of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Therefore let Bodhisattvas [who aspire to the highest knowledge] assiduously apply themselves to the discipline and attain to the perfection of this samâdhi.
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Those who practise this samâdhi will procure in their present life ten beneficial results:
1. They will always be remembered and guarded by all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in all quarters.
2. They will not be molested by Mâras or evil spirits.
3. They will not be led astray by false doctrines. 1
4. They will be free from disparaging the deepest Doctrine (gambhîradharma). Their serious misdemeanors as well as their karma-hindrances will be attenuated.
5 . They will destroy all doubts, sinful recollections, and contemplations.
6. They will be strengthened in their belief in the spiritual state of Tathâgata.
7. They will be liberated from gloomy remorse; they will be courageous and unflinching in the face of birth and death.
8. Being free from arrogance and presumptuousness, they will be meek and patient and will be revered by all the world.
9. If not practising deep meditation, those prejudices (âçrava) which are now getting weaker, will not assert themselves in them.
10. While practising meditation, they will not be disturbed by any external objects, such as voices, sounds, etc.
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But mind: when the practiser is trained only in cessation (çamatha), his mind will sink down into stupidity, and acquiring a habit of indolence, cannot rejoice in doing good acts, as he will estrange himself from deep compassion (mahâkaruna). Accordingly he should discipline himself in intellectual insight (vidarçana) as well.
In what does this discipline consist?
The practiser should contemplate that all things in the world are subject to a constant transformation, that since they are transient they are misery, that since they are misery they are not things-in-themselves [i.e., atman]. 1
He should contemplate that all things in the past are like a dream, those in the present are like the lightning, those in the future are like clouds that spontaneously come into existence.
He should contemplate that all that has a body is impure, being a lodging place of obnoxious vermin and the intermixture of prejudices (âçrava).
Contemplate that ignorant minds, on account of their groundless imagination, take the unreal as they see it, for reality.
Contemplate that all objects which come into existence by a combination of various causes (pratyaya)
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are like a chimera, having [only a transitory existence and] no [genuine] realness at all.
Contemplate that the highest truth (paramârthasatya) is not a production of mind [or subjectivity], cannot be [fully] illustrated by analogy, cannot be [exhaustively] treated by reasoning. 1
Contemplate that on account of the perfuming power of ignorance (avidya) all beings from eternity suffer great mental and physical sufferings in immeasurable ways; that those immeasurable and innumerable sufferings are suffered in the present and will be suffered in the future that while it is extremely difficult to disentangle, to emancipate themselves from those sufferings, all beings always abiding in the midst of them are not conscious of the fact, and this makes them the more pitiable.
After these contemplations the practiser should awake positive knowledge [or unerring understanding], feel the highest and deepest compassion (karunâ) for all suffering beings, rouse dauntless energy, and make great vows (mahâpranidhâna) as follows:
"May my mind be freed from all contradictions; may I abandon particularisation; may I personally attend on all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, whom I shall pay homage to, make offerings to, revere and praise, and to whose instructions in the good Doctrine (saddharma) I shall listen; may I truthfully discipline myself according to their teachings, and to the end of
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the future never be negligent in self-discipline; may I with innumerable expediencies (upâya) [of salvation] deliver all beings who are drowned in the sea of misery, and bring them to the highest bliss of Nirvâna."
After these vows the practiser should at all times, so far as his energy permits, practise those deeds which are beneficial both to himself and others. While moving, standing, sitting, or lying, he should assiduously meditate what should be done and what should be avoided. This is called the practising of intellectual insight (vidarçana or vipaçyana).
And again when the practiser disciplines himself only in intellectual insight his mind may lack tranquilisation, and becoming too susceptible to scepticism, may not be in accord with the highest truth, may not attain to the wisdom of non-particularisation. Therefore cessation and intellectual insight should be practised side by side. He should consider that nothing is self-existent (svabhâva), and things [in their essence] are uncreate, eternally tranquil, and Nirvâna itself. But at the same time let him not forget to reflect that karma and its retribution, both good and evil, being produced by a co-operation of principle and conditions, will neither be lost nor destroyed. He should thus ponder on the law of causation, both in its good and evil karma and retribution, but at the same time lei him not forget to perceive that all things, though in their essence uncreate, have no self-existence, etc., they are Nirvâna.
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By practising cessation, common people (prthagjana) will be cured of finding pleasures in worldliness, while Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas will be cured of feeling intimidation at the thought of birth and death.
By practising intellectual insight common people will be cured of not cultivating their root of merit (kuçalamûla), while Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas will be cured of narrow-mindedness whereby they cannot raise deep compassion [for mankind].
Therefore, cessation and-intellectual insight are supplementary to, not independent of, each other. If one of the two is wanting, the practiser will surely be unable to attain to the most excellent knowledge (bodhiparinishpatti).
And again when those novice Bodhisattvas who are living in this present life [sahâlokadhâtu, i.e., the enduring world of actual existence], may sometimes suffer misfortunes that are caused by climate, weather, unforeseen famine, or what not; and when they witness those people who are immoral, fearful, infatuated with the three venomous passions (akuçalamûla), cling to false and self-contradictory doctrines, desert the good law and acquire evil habits; they [that is, novice Bodhisattvas], living in the midst of them, may feel so discouraged that they may come to doubt whether they can see Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, whether they can actualise their pure and spotless faith (çraddhâ).
Therefore, it is advisable for those novices to cherish
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this thought: All Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in the ten quarters having great, unimpeded supernatural powers (abhijñâ), are able to emancipate all suffering beings by means of various expediencies that are good and excellent (upâyakauçalya).
After this reflexion, they should make great vows (mahâpranidhâna), and with full concentration of spiritual powers think of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas When they have such a firm conviction, free from all doubts, they will assuredly be able to be born in the Buddha-country beyond (buddha-kshetra), when they pass away from this present life, and seeing there Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, to complete their faith and to eternally escape from all evil creations (apâya). 1
Therefore, it is said in the Sûtra 2 that if devoted
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men and women would be filled with concentration of thought, think of Amitâbha Buddha in the world of highest happiness (sukhâvatî) in the Western region, and direct (parinâma) all the root of their good work toward being born there, they would assuredly be born there.
Thus always seeing Buddhas there, their faith will be strengthened, and they will never relapse therefrom. Receiving instruction in the doctrine, and recognising the Dharmakâya of the Buddha, they will by gradual discipline be able to enter upon the state of truth [i.e., Buddhahood] (samyaktva-râçi).
Footnotes
129:1 Açvaghosha evidently refers to the ten virtues (daçakuçalâni), for which see p. 114, though this list counts more than ten.
129:2 There are twelve dhûtagunas or dhûtagangas to be observed by Bhikshus; dhûta means shaking off, that is, shaking off the dust of evil passions: (1) Paindapâtika, the rule to live on whatever food they can get by begging from door to door, that they p. 130 may become free from egotism. (2) Traicîvarika, the rule allowing the possession of three clothings: Samghâti, dress made of scraps; Uttarasamghâti, outer robe; Antaravâsaka, something like skirt. (3) Khalupaçcâdbhahtika, the prohibition of taking any food or beverage when the proper time is over, lest their attention should be disturbed. (4) Naishadhyika, to be in a sitting attitude while sleeping, that they may not become over-indolent. (5) Yathâsamstarika, spreading a night-couch where they happen to be. (6) Vrkshamûlika, sitting under a tree. (7) Ekâsanika, taking one meal in a day, that their mental energy may not be weakened by eating too often. (8) Abhyavakâçika, living in an unsheltered place. (9) Aranyaka, leading a solitary, retired life in the wood. (10) Cmâçânaka, abiding in or by a cemetery, that they may constantly ponder on the transiency and uncleanliness of bodily existence. (11) Pâmskûlika, the wearing of the dress made of rags or remnants, that they may have no attachment to luxury. (12) Nâmatika, wearing cloth made of hair. There is a Sûtra named Twelve Dhûtagunas among the Chinese collection of the Tripitaka. The list in that book is a little different from what we have here; the fifth and twelfth are dropped and instead of them we have the rule of begging in due order, corresponding to Sâpadâna-cârikâ in the Pâli list, and the rule of prohibiting taking too much food at one time, which overtaxing the stomach will obscure the clearness of mind.
130:1 The reference is to the threefold precept (trividhaçîla) which is (1) the precept of good behavior (sambhâraçîla); (2) the precept of accumulating virtues (kuçalasamgrâhaçîla); (3) the precept of being benevolent towards all beings (sattvârthakriyâçîla).
131:1 The older translation reads: "Patiently bearing evils inflicted by others, they should not cherish any idea of revenge. They should also bear such [worldly vicissitudes] as prosperity and decline, reprehension and commendation, renown and defamation, worry and ease, etc."
132:1 Observe that cessation should be practised by the beginner, and for a time only, for the purpose of affording the mind an appreciation of suchness in its purity; the conception of this state of abstraction should then be harmonised with intellectual insight. Observe also that the methods of Indian recluses, such as fixing the breath and going into trances by fixing the thoughts on objects, are rejected as improper. The practice should assist a beginner to understand that suchness, though all particulars are dependent on it, is in its purity a reality.
132:2 Those who practise this have to place the left leg above the right with both close to the body, so that the toes of the left foot shall rest on the right thigh, and those of the right foot on the left thigh, while the soles are turned upwards. This posture is considered to be the best adapted for meditation or for obtaining mental equilibrium.
133:1 Among the followers of the Dhyâna sect both in Japan and China, it is customary, while sitting cross-legged and meditating on religious subjects, to expand the abdomen outwards and to breathe very slowly, by which they can, in their opinion, most effectively concentrate their attention and gain perfect mental equilibrium. Prof. J. M. Baldwin in his Mental Development says in connexion with bashfulness and modesty, p. 205 footnote: ''The only way that I, for one, can undo this distressing outgo of energy, and relieve these uncomfortable inhibitions, is to expand the abdomen by a strong muscular effort and at the same time breathe in as deeply as I can. . . . The comparative relief found in expanding the abdominal muscles is probably due to the fact that it allows the contents of the body to fall, and so relieves the heart from any artificial pressure which may be upon it from the surrounding organs. Further the increased heart-action which is itself a part of shyness requires all the space it can get."
133:2 One of the eight subjects of recollection (anusmrti), or of the five methods of mental pacification. The eight subjects are: (1) Buddha; (2) dharma; (3) samgha; (4) çîla, morality; (5) câga or tyâga, liberality; (6) deva, gods; (7) ânâpâna, regulation of inspiration and respiration; (8) marana, death. The five methods are: (1) Açubhabhâvanâ, contemplation on the impurity of the body; (2) maitrîkarunâ, love and compassion; (3) ânâpânasmrti, the regulation of inspiration and respiration; (4) nidâna, law of transformation; (5) buddhasmrti, recollection on Buddha.
133:3 There are nine Açbhasamjnâs, notions arising from the contemplation of the impurity of a dead body, which is intended to convince one of the fact that our body is not worth while clinging to: (1) Swelling (vyâdhmataka); (2) fissuring from decay (vipayaka); (3) bloody (vilohita); (4) festering (vipadumaka); (5) blackish (vinîlaka); (6) being devoured by animals (vikhâditaka); (7) scattering (vikshiptaka); (8) bone (asthi); (9) burned up (vidagdhaka). The Pâli Açubhas count one more.
134:1 These constitute the ten Krtsâyatanas which are: (1) Blue (nîla); (2) yellow (pîta); (3) red (lohita); (4) white (avadâta); (5) earth (prtivî); (6) water (ap); (7) fire (tejas); (8) air (vâyu); (9) space (âkâsa); (10) consciousness (vijñâna). The term Krtsâyâtana means an universal object or element on which the attention of a samâdhi-practiser is to be fixed.
135:1 That is, perfect identification of oneself with suchness.
135:2 Samâdhi is commonly rendered by ecstasy, trance, concentration, or meditation, all of which are misleading. The term means mental equilibrium, and the reasons why Buddhism recommends the practising of it are, that it helps us in keeping our minds free from disturbance, that it prepares us for a right comprehension of the nature of things, that it subjugates momentary impulses, giving us time for deliberation. Ecstasy or trance, instead of producing those benefits, will lead us to a series of hallucinations, and this is the very opposite of mental quietude. Rhys Davids thinks samâdhi corresponds to faith in Christianity (S. B. E., XI., p. 145), and S. Beal agrees with him in his translation of Açvaghosha's Buddhacarita; but I doubt its correctness for the above-stated reasons.
136:1 The older translation has the following passage inserted here. "If he [the practiser] remembers that these are merely subjective, the phenomena will disappear by themselves and will no more trouble him."
136:2 Buddha is supposed to have thirty-two general and eighty minor marks of bodily perfection. For particulars see the Dharmasamgraha, pp. 18, 19, 51 et seq., edited by Kasawara Kenjiu.
136:3 Dhârani, which comes from the root dhr, meaning to bold, to maintain, to retain, to support, etc., is the name given to any concise statement describing Buddha's virtue, or stating some essential points of Buddhist teachings, or expressing supplication, or containing the exclamations of a vehement feeling; and it implies many significances in a few words, it is a kind of epigram. But later Buddhists came to use the term in quite a different sense; they called a dhârani any tantric expression which was considered to have some mysterious, supernatural powers to bring wealth to destroy enemies, to keep away calamities, etc., etc. Here dhârani means simply any epigrammatic proposition which will serve as a key to the deep significance of the Doctrine.
137:1 Some of these miraculous powers here mentioned are considered to be possessed by the Arhat. Six supernatural faculties (abhijnâ) are commonly enumerated: (1) divine eyes (divyacakshu) by which the Arhat perceives all that is occurring in the world; (2) the divine hearing (divyaçrotra), by which he hears all sounds in the world; (3) reading the thoughts of others (paracittajnâna); (4) memory of his former lives (pûrvanivâsânu-smrti); (5) miraculous powers (rddhi); (6) knowledge how to destroy evil passions (âçravakshaya).
138:1 This apparently alludes to the Yoga-praxis, by which man is said to be able to perform several sorts of miracles beside those mentioned here.
139:1 The two preceding paragraphs read in the older translation as follows: "On this account, the practiser, always exercising intellectual insight, should save his mind from being entangled in the netting of falsity; he should, dwelling in right contemplation, not cling or attach [to any object], and thereby he will be able to liberate himself from all kinds of karma-hindrance. It should be known that all samâdhis practised by heretics [i.e., tîrthaka] are invariably the production of the (egoistic] conception and desire and self-assumption, that they are hankering after worldly renown advantages, and reverence. The samâdhi of suchness [on the other hand] has nothing to do with subjectivity and attachment. If one is free from indolence even when rising from meditation one's prejudices will by degrees get attenuated."
140:1 The older translation reads: "the ninety-five heretical doctrines."
141:1 The idea is: that which is transient is dependent, conditional and not self-regulating; and that which is without freedom is necessarily miserable, that is to say, it has no self-regulating Atman within itself.
142:1 The last three clauses are missing in the older translation.
145:1 The same idea of salvation is expressed in the Bhagavadgîtâ, Chap. VIII., p. 78: "And he who leaves this body and departs (from this world) remembering me in (his) last moment, comes into my essence. There is no doubt of that. . . . Therefore at all times remember me. . . . Fixing your mind and understanding on me you will come to me, there is no doubt He who thinks of the supreme divine being, O son of Prithâ! with the mind not (running) to other (objects), and possessed of abstraction in the shape of continuous meditation (about the Supreme) goes to him.'
145:2 It is not exactly known from what Sûtra this passage is taken, but it is not difficult to discover similar passages in the Sûtras which constitute the canonical books of the Sukhâvatî sect, i.e., in the larger or smaller Sukhâvatî-vyûha, or in the Amitâyurdhyâna. I here quote such a passage from Max Müller's English translation of the larger Sukhâvatî-vyûha-Sûtra, Sec. XXVII.: "And if, O Ânanda, any son or daughter of a good family should wish--What?--How then may I see that Tathâgata Amitâbha visibly, then he must raise his thought on to the highest perfect knowledge, he must direct his thought with perseverance and excessive p. 146 desire towards that Buddha country, and direct the stock of his good works towards being born there." As I noticed elsewhere, if those Mahâyâna texts had been considered at the time of Açvaghosha, that is, in the first century after or before Christ, as a genuine teaching of Buddha, then it would have to be admitted, it seems to me, that the Mahâyâna system existed at an early stage of the development of Buddhism, most probably side by side with Hînayânism, which is generally supposed by Pâli scholars to be more primitive. But the history of Buddhism in India as a whole is still veiled with dark clouds of uncertainty, in spite of the fact that quite a few original Sanskrit texts have been recovered.
V. BENEFITS.
In what does this part [treating] of the benefits consist?
Such as above presented is the spiritual significance of the Mahayana, and I have finished elucidating it.
Those who, desiring to produce pure and spotless faith in, and knowledge of, the deepest spiritual condition
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and the greatest Dharma of the Tathâgata, so that they have no hindrances in entering upon the Mahayana path (mârga), will diligently pursue this brief discourse, contemplate it, discipline themselves in it, and thus they can surely and unhesitatingly attain to the knowledge of all forms and manifestations (sarvâkârajñâna).
And if they do not awake a feeling of fear in hearing this Doctrine, they will surely be qualified to inherit the Buddha-seeds and immediately receive the prophecy (vijâkarana) 1 from the Buddha. Even if there be a person who could convert all beings in three thousand great chiliocosms (trisâhasramahâsâhasra), 2 and could induce them to observe the ten precepts of morality (daçakuçalamârga), his merits will not be superior
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to those of the person who will truthfully comprehend this Doctrine even for a second; because the merits of the latter immeasurably and infinitely surpass those of the former.
If one practise this doctrine as it is instructed for one whole day and night, the merits thereby produced will be so immeasurable, infinite, inconceivable that all Buddhas in the ten quarters could not exhaust them, even if each of them continued to praise them for innumerable asamkheyakalpas. 1 As the merits of suchness have no limits, so the merits of the discipline are also without limit.
Those who slander this doctrine, on the other hand, commit immeasurable faults and suffer great sufferings for asamkheyakalpas. Accordingly all beings should cherish a firm faith in the Doctrine and never slander it, for this will lead to the destruction of oneself as well as others, nay, even to the destruction of the seeds of the Triple Treasure (triratna).
By practising this Doctrine all Buddhas have attained the most excellent knowledge (anuttarajñânâ). By practising this Doctrine all Bodhisattvas have obtained an insight into the Dharmakâya of the Tathâgata.
By practising this Doctrine Bodhisattvas in the past consummated, Bodhisattvas in the future will consummate, pure and spotless faith (çraddhâ) in the Mahâyâna. Therefore those who desire to practise
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those excellent virtues that are beneficial at once to themselves and others should diligently study this Discourse.
I have now finished elucidating
The deepest and greatest significance [of the Dharma].
May its merit be distributed among all creatures,
And make them understand the Doctrine of Suchness.
Footnotes
147:1 This is not a mere prophecy of one's destiny, but Buddha's assurance for those Bodhisattvas who, having accumulated sufficient amount of merits, are qualified to attain in the future the most excellent, perfect knowledge and to achieve final salvation both for themselves and for all other beings. See how five hundred disciples received this assurance from Buddha in the Saddharmapundarîka Sûtra, Chap. VIII.
147:2 Our earth which was supposed by ancient Indians to be flat, infinitely extending in space, is not the only region inhabited by sentient beings; but there are innumerable worlds outside of this Manushyalokadhâtu, which exist above as well as below us. Now according to the Abhidharmakoça-çâstra by Vasubandhu, a small chiliocosm (sâhasralokadhâtu) consists of one thousand of Rûpalokas and of the first Dhyâna heavens, and one thousand of small chiliocosms make a middling chiliocosm, a thousand of which in turn making a great chiliocosm. So we may take the great chiliocosm (mahâsâhasralokadhâtu) as including all possible heavenly bodies which fill up this boundless space.
148:1 For an explanation see the footnote to kalpa, p. 87.