5. CHINESE UNDERSTANDING OF THE TWO-TRUTHS THEORY

Philosophy East and West

volume 28, no. 3 (July 1978)

Chinese Understanding of the Two-Truths Theory (502-557):

    "Ontological Gnosticism in the Thoughts of Prince Chao-ming" by Whalen W. Lai

The Maadhyamika philosophy of Naagaarjuna has been appropriately called the "central philosophy" of Mahaayaana.(1) This "Middle Path" philosophy (namely,`suunyavaada, or Emptiness school) was the means by which Mahaayaana criticized and undermined the "atomist pluralism" of the "realist" thinkers in

northern Indian, especially the Sarvaastivaadins within the general `Hinayanist' Abhidharmic circles. The Emptiness philosophy was based on the

Praj~naapaaramitaa corpus and its basic insight into the emptiness of all forms. Names and forms (naamaruupa) are empty (`suunya); emptiness is itself

the raison d'etre of all phenomenal names and forms. The articulated philosophy of Emptiness produced by Naagaarjuna became the cornerstone of subsequent

Buddhist scriptures and commentaries in the Indian Mahaayaana tradition. It is indeed the central or the pivotal philosophy of Mahaayaana.

The impact of Maadhyamika in China was equally significant. Despite the earlier familiarity with the Praj~naapaaramitaa (Emptiness) Suutra, Chinese

Buddhist truly embarked on a "Mahaayaanist" phase after the introduction of key Mahaayaana suutras and key treatises of Naagaarjuna by Kumaarajiiva, the

central Asian translator in the Chinese court during the early years of the fifth century A.D. Seng Chao(c), an aide in the translation project, is regarded as the first Chinese to master the Maadhyamika's method of dialectical negation. With him, however, also began the subtle transformation of sinification of Maadhyamika. Taking an overview of the Chinese Maadhyamika tradition, I would say tentatively that the Chinese had faithfully preserved the spirit, if not always the letter, of the Maadhyamika critique. A full study of the unfolding of the sinitic Maadhyamika tradition still awaits diligent research and analysis of the nuances involved in the transmission of this philosophy into Chinese. The following essay will look into one development in the Liang dynasty, through two essays by the Buddhist devotee and prince, Chao-ming.

A word on the "fate" of the Maadhyamika transmission is necessary to put the present study into the proper historical context and to correct some commonly held misconceptions about the Maadhyamika lineage in China. Soon after the introduction of the writings of Naagaarjuna by Kumaarajiiva, the Chinese San-lun(d) (Three Treatise, namely, Maadhyamika) tradition was evershadowed by a treatise by Harivarman, the Ch'eng-shih-lun(e) (Treatise to establish the real). The value of this work and the actual role it played in the history of Chinese Buddhist thought has been overlooked by scholars, primarily because of a crucial "hindsight condemnation" of it by the San-run muster Chi-tsang(f) (549-623). The Ch'eng-shih-lun dominated southern Buddhist speculation during the fifth and the first half of the sixth century. when it was used as the philosophical companion text to the highly valued Mahaaparinirvaa.na Suutra. Harivarman was regarded at that time to he the authoritative interpreter of the Emptiness philosophy, and the Maadhyamika philosophy was interpreted through the "exegesis" of his text. By the middle of the sixth century, however, there was a revival of the "purer" Maadhyamika tradition by the San-lun masters stationed in She-shan(g), a mountain outside the southern capital. Conflict then grew out between these new defenders of Naagaarjuna's supremacy and the old Ch'eng-shih masters who held that they, in their fashion, were "faithful" to the Emptiness insight. In the end, Chi-tsang, acknowledged master of the San-lun tradition, triumphed and his polemical and critical condemnation of the Ch'eng-shih tradition became dogma for all subsequent times. It can be shown that Chi-tsang intentionally misrepresented the intention of the Ch'eng-shih school, and I believe that Kumaarjiiva was even instrumental in actually popularizing Ch'eng-shih's "noumenal Realism" (the term "ch'eng-shih" was probably created by Kumaarajiiva to designate the treatise's attempt to establish the Real, shih-hsiang(h), as a necessary corrective to the potential "nihilism" in the Chinese appropriation of `suunyataa as k'ung(l) , voidness).(2) Current scholarship on the Chinese San-lun tradition focuses attention primarily on Seng Chao and on Chi-tsang.(3) What is over-looked often is the fact that Chi-tsang did not count Seng Chao as a member in the San-lun lineage that Chi-tsang retrojected into the Six Dynasties. To understand the philosophical roots of Chi-tsang, an appreciation of his opponents is imperative.

However, the study of Harivarman and his followers in China has hardly begun, and this article can only claim to look rather obliquely into one aspect of the missing link between Seng Chao and Chi-tsang.

Prince Chao-ming of the Liang dynasty (502-557) was by no means the leading authority on Buddhist philosophy at the time, but he was one of those gentry aristocrats famous for his layman's devotion to the Dharma. He was well informed of the basic issues in Buddhist thought. His essay "On the Two Truth(j) " has been collected in the Kuang-hung-ming-chi(k) (Taisho Tripitaka(l), vol. 52.) This essay, though brief, represents one Chinese attempt to come to terms with Naagaarjuna's two-truths theory.(4) The questions and answers following this essay further provide an insight into the frame of mind of the court Buddhist thinkers at the time.(5)

The doctrine of the two truths can be found in

the early canonical writings and is by no means the

invention of Naagaarjuna, but Naagaarjuna surely

gave it articulated expression by his writings. It

was inherited by `Sa^nkara in the later Hindu

Advaita Vedaanta tradition.(6) The two truths refers

to the higher truth, paramaartha-satya, and the

mundane or lower truth, sa^mv.rti-satya. The former

is nondiscursive and defies all conceptual

comprehension while the latter, the mundane

"everyday" truth, belongs to the realm of logical

discourse. By this distinetion, Naagaarjuna points

out the erucial characteristic of dharmataa.

Reality-as-it-is cannot be grasped by the egoistic

framework of human concepts.

All discursive thought and expression, including

even the four noble truths that Gautama taught,

belong to the lower level of truth. Naagaarjuna,

however, did not simply assign the higher truth to

the AAryan (noble) silence. He believed that the

higher truth can he pointed to by recourse to the

lower truth. His own dialectical negation of his

opponents' obsession with the "necessary"

ontological correspondence between words and reality

which words refer to is perhaps the classic example

of how logic can he used to destroy logic and reveal

directly the doctrine of Emptiness (of

self-existents) .(7) The Chinese Ch'an (Zen(m) )

masters might be less patient with all the

dialectical proofs Naagaarjuna perfected, but their

method of "using words to destroy words" would be

another example, mote romantic perhaps, of how to

point beyond the very limits of conceptualization.

Says the Ch'an tradition: The finger that points out

the moon is, after all, not the moon itself.(8)

Naagaarjuna's negative philosophy is like a

chameleon. The moment one thinks one has a grasp of

it, it not only slips away but it also makes one

feel uneasy about the "grasping-of-it" itself. I

would, therefore, not go into what Maadhyamika

means, for it seems that consensus was lacking in

Naagaarjuna's followings as it is lacking among

modern scholars.(9) The fact that Naagaarjuna is

hard to grasp should alert us to the fact that it

was no easy task for the Chinese in the fifth and

sixth centuries to come up with the "definitive"

understanding of his philosophy. The Chinese

language then was even more ineffective than our

present-day English as a tool to convey all the

nuances of the Sanskrit original, and it is not

surprising that some of the intricate Indian logic

was lost to the Chinese.(10) Nevertheless, if the

Chinese learned anything, it was the technique of

prasa^nga, the art of exposing the antinomies

involved in any philosophical position. In their

way, the Chinese adopted the technique to their own

milieu or problems. The Chinese were interested more

in the totalistic issues of being (yu) and nonbeing

(wu(n)), activity and inactivity, the one and the

many, the concrete (shih) and the vacuous (hsu(o)).

These issues are more Taoist than Indian. If we

stand back and look at the general Chinese results

after they have exercised their dialectical

reasonings, we would find that, for certain strange

reasons, the Chinese would allocate being,

inactivity, concreteness and the one to the

so-called higher truth, assigning their opposites,

the "unreal" nonbeing, the actively "responding,"

the vacuously delusive and the Many to the Lower

Truth. This Chinese conclusion is somewhat ironic,

considering the fact that Indian Buddhism as a whole

and Maadhyamika especially would hardly associate

itself with such ontological absolutes like being,

reality, and the one changeless essence. The whole

intention in Maadhyamika was to affirm emptiness,

impermanence, selflessness, and

nonsubstantiality.(11) This is not to say that there

were no Indian traditions leaning toward the Chinese

view; scholars now recognize the role played by the

Tathaagatagarbha tradition, in both Indian and

Chinese Buddhist history. Nevertheless, keeping a

purist stand, one can still legitimately wonder how

the Chinese often came up with such numenal realism

as the "higher truth"!

This is where a basic Chinese misappropriation

of the two truths theory occurred, and this is where

the significance lies of the Ch'eng-shih school in

the historical development of Chinese Maadhyamika

sophistication. Although Seng Chao might be an

ardent interpreter of Naagaarjuna and has received

supposedly the seal of approval from Kumaarajiiva

himself, it should be noted that Seng Chao barely

just touched on the two truths. The "attractiveness"

of the Ch'eng-shih-lun for the Chinese, I think, was

due to its exploration of this theory. These

Ch'eng-shih masters mediating Seng Chao and

Chi-tsang developed various theories of the two

truths. Without these speculations, the mature

San-lun tradition in Sui would not be possible. (In

fact, Chi-tsang himself built his unique "Fourfold

Two Truths" upon the shoulders of the Cheng-shih

master he vehemently and justly attacked.) The basic

mistake among the masters in the Six Dynasties who

interpreted the Two Truths theory is confusing what

originally was an epistemic issue with the native

Chinese concern for ontological matters. The Two

Truths (that is, two ways of discourse) became in

China two realities, that is, a higher reality and a

lower reality. With the hangovers of a "Hinayana"

outlook, the Chinese Buddhist in the Six Dynasties

then aligned the higher reality with nirvaa.na and

the unborn, and the lower reality with life and

death or sa.msaara. This basic misunderstanding was

well noted by Chi-tsang. Chi-tsang is right in

insisting that the "Two Truths" pertains to chiao(p)

(teaching, discourse) and not--emphatically not--to

li(q) (principle, reality).(12) However, Chi-tsang

was virtually the only Chinese master who harped on

this issue and his warning, for all practical

purposes went, unheeded in his time and beyond.

The Chinese mistake was natural, and they were

hardly the last Maadhyamika scholars (in the world)

to follow that misguided interpretation. When a

person hears that Naagaarjuna had discovered that

words do not describe reality, the person can easily

draw the conclusion that the words do not describe

an Ultimate Reality beyond phenomenal realities. The

Chinese having learned from the I Ching(r) (Book of

Changes) and Wang Pi(s) (who commented on it) that

"Language cannot exhaust the (ultimate) Meanings...

and one can forget the Forms (hsiang(t)) when the

Meaning is attained." would naturally assume that

there is an ultimate reality--the Tao(u), the One,

Real--behind the phenomenal realities of the many

and the illusory. By so "assuming" the existence of

an ultimate reality behind phenomena, the Chinese

disrupted the original Maadhyamika intent to show

that all is phenomenal, all is empty, all is

insubstantial.(13) `Suunyavaada does not subscribe

to any subsisting ultimate reality beyond the

phenomena. Name-and-form (naamaruupa) is emptiness

itself. Tathataa or the "real nature of Reality"

(Chinese; chu-fa shih-shiang(v)) is none other than

Emptiness.

It is necessary to add that Chinese were not

always ignorant of the fact

that "Emptiness itself is name-and-form." Prince

Chao-ming and his con-temporaries all knew this

basic dictum from the Praj~naapaaramitaa corpus.

However, their inability to be consistent and their

repeated relapse into the ontological framework is

responsible for the tangles in their thoughts.

Chi-tsang and, to a certain extent, the T'ang

masters were more sophisticated in this regard. The

following analysis of an essay of the prince will

show both his venture beyond Seng Chao and his

shortcomings.

The term paramaartha-satya is given by the

Chinese then as ch'en-ti(w) or real truth or as

ti-i-i-ti(x) or highest truth (literally, truth of

the number one/highest significance) . The term

sa.mv.rti-satya rendered as su-ti(y) or common truth

or as shih-ti(z) or worldly truth. The prince

regards the first of these two set to pertain to the

"substantive realm" (that is, as the two realities)

and the second of the two pairs to pertain to

"evaluative judgment" (that is, two forms of

knowledge that correlate with the status of the sage

wisdom(aa) and the common man without wisdom). These

distinctions by the prince are based on the Chinese

words used in the two alternative translations of

the one term in Sanskrit. In that sense, he

exercised poetic license not possible in the

original Sanskrit. Furthermore, by splitting up the

words, the prince speculated on the word "i"(ab)

(meaning, significance) in the Chinese compound,

ti-i-i-ti, for paramaarthasatya.

             Translation of ON THE TWO TRUTHS (ERH-TI)

The principle of the two truths is indeed profound

and mysterious. Unless one has reflected upon it

deeply and with reverence, one cannot comprehend its

breadth. There is, indeed, not one single way to

appreciate the Tao. Essentially (there are two

ways): one can approach it either by way of the

(objective) ream (ching(ac) ) or by way of

(subjective) wisdom (chih(ad)). At times, one can

understand the meaning by way of the realm (aspect).

At times, one lets the actions manifest by way of

the wisdom (aspect).

Concerning the theory of the Two Truths, it is

the tool to understand the meaning by way of the

realm (aspect). If this point is missed (by the

reader), then the person would be lost forever in

(wrongly) thinking that there are Three Truths.

However, if he sees the point, the myriad problems

will disappear.

The two truths refer to the real truth (chen-ti)

and the common truth (su-ti). The real truth is

called also the truth of the highest meaning

(ti-i-i-ti). The common truth is also known as the

worldly truth (shih-ti-). The (terms) "real)" and

"common" are established to refer to substance (that

is, reality). The (terms) "highest meaning" and

"worldly" are chosen to refer to attributes of

praise and depreciation.

Firstly, we should say that the one corresponds

to the real truth and the two (dualities) to the

common truth. When the one and the two are added

together, there will be three. However, there are

really only two truths [not three truths]. In

nominal designations the terms "higher" and "lower"

are used, but they often create confusion concerning

the meanings intended. [Therefore they are explained

later.]

The real exists (as the real) not becuase of the

common. The common is born (as common) not becuase

of the real. Precisely so can one be designated as

the real and the other as the common. By the real is

meant the concrete

(shih), where all things attain the same-ness and

where differentiations dividing them would not be.

By the common is meant the compounded (realities of

the world) that gives rise to fleeting illusions and

activities.

The (term) "highest meaning" is additional

appreciation heaped onto the reality of the unborn.

(The term) "worldly" describes that which has

differentiations, life and death (samsaric

characteristics), flow and movements, where nothing

is ever permanent. The Mahaaparinirvaa.na suutra

says: "The knowledge of those people who have

transcended the world is known as the truth of the

highest meaning; the opinion of those men who are

still in the mundane realm is known as the worldly

truth." This is the scriptural basis for regarding

"highest meaning'' and "worldly'' to be terms of

appraisal.

These terms used to render the two truths are

chosen for specific reasons. "real," "common."

"worldly" share one intention, but the term "truth

of the highest meaning" has another meaning. The

principle is this: Insofar that the te(af) (virtue,

power, [pertaining to the higher truth]) is the

highest, its "meaning" is also the highest. The

(mundane) world is but a fleeting illusion--it

cannot claim to have any "meaning." Therefore we

only say "truth of the world" [never "truth of the

world's meaning."]

Truth is that which comprehends the concrete

(shih). The real truth examines the concrete and

finds it to be real. The common truth examines the

same and finds only the common. The real truth is

beyond being and nonbeing. The common truth sees

(that there are) being and nonbeing. (The

distinctions between) Being and nonbeing constitute

false names (subjective ideas). Neither being nor

nonbeing reveals the middle path. The real is the

middle path and has the unborn as its substance. The

common is false names and has the born realities as

its substance.(14)

In the preceding essay, the prince explicitly

defined the two truths to be pertaining to the

objective realm, that is, as two realities. However,

the two realities are, in one sense, epistemic

realities since they are correlated with the

subjective wisdom and opinions of the sage and the

commoner. In this way, the Prince did solve the

paradox of the two truth-realities by suggesting

that there is ultimately one reality with two

perspectives. However, his solution was not always

perfect and in the questions and answers collected

after the essay (the prince solicited these

responses), the problem emerged of how the two

"substances" of the two "realms" can be related to

one another. It is a problem that plagued the

Ch'eng-shih masters who tried to use the (Taoist)

paradigm of "substance" and "function" to analyze

the relationships between the two realities (sic).

The following exchange shows the awareness of this

thorny issue.

Q: The rising (of the fleeting nonreality is the

common while that which is beyond being and

nonbeing is the Real. Now, are the fleeting

nonreality and the Real one in substance or are

they two (in substance)?

A: The people of the world regard the horn realities

to be the substance. The people who have

transcended the world regard the unborn as

substance. These opinions are due to their

different perceptions. Knowledge of the real

is the insight into Emptiness-in-Being itself.

The common people mistake the [same] emptiness to

be being. So considered, nonreality and reality

are not different in substance.

Q: If the two truths are one in substance, would not

the real truth go through life and death

(sa.msaara)...?

A: The real principle is quietistic and is never

aroused. It is only the confused consciousness of

the common men that arbitrarily sees movements

(where there is none).

Q: But is there movement that the common men

arbitrarily see? Or there being no movement and

the common people arbitrarily "see" it?

A: If there is movement as such, then we would not have

called the common people's seeing "arbitrary"....

Q: Is "arbitrary seeing" itself a thing (a reality)

or not?

A: The misconception is on the side of the

perceiver.... The (real) dharma is passive and

therefore it cannot prevent such human faults

from arising.(15)

If the exchange is not as keen as that between

Indian logicians, it still reflects a sophistication

that goes beyond the native tradition of logical

debates. The clever distinction made between subject

and object, realm and wisdom, the perceiver and the

perceived is due clearly to Indian influence. The

naive assumption that words necessarily describe

realities (as per the ontological theory of

language) is refuted by the prince. The one weak

point in the prince's perception of the real dharma

is that it is passive and not empowered to help

misguided men toward a truer vision. In mature

sinitic Mahaayaana thought, a more active

absolute -- the omnipresent and omnipotent

tathaagatagarbha--is admitted as the agent of

enlightenment itself.(16)

The passive/active distinction is a traditional

Taoist distinction. It has been used by Seng Chao in

his thesis. The sage view is that which "seeks the

non-moving in the midst of movement" while the

common view is that which "seeks activity in the

realm of the inactive."(17) So too, the Prince said:

"The wise sees Emptiness in Being while the foolish

sees Being in Emptiness." The exchange recalled Seng

Chao's thesis again when the following question

arose:

Q: What the Sage sees (according to Seng Chao) is

that things actually do not move. What the Common

People see is that they apparently do. Movement

and non-movement are different. How can they be

one [that is, occupying the same space]?

A: It is not said that movement and non-movement

each has one substance. It is only that the

common people see movement when there is none....

Q: ... If there is only One Reality, there cannot be

Two Truths.

A: ... According to Sagehood and Commonness, there

are the two.(18)

The prince acknowledged, correctly, that there is

only one reality but two perceptions of it. He

recognized that the label "truth" is given to the

common men's knowledge because for those

people, it is "true." Truth becomes relative to the

person. This theme runs through the discussion. The

emphasis put on the subjectivity of truth and the

importance placed on the personality of the attainer

himself has been regarded by one Japanese scholar to

be a Chinese "humanistic" trait.(19) Naagaarjuna was

less interested in the personalism of truth and more

intrigued by the impersonal structure of language

and conception. But if truth is a function of

personality and not a function of different ways of

knowing, then a predictable (and amusing) question

emerged:

Q: Does the Sage (then) see the Mundane Truth or

not?

A: The Sage knows of the Common People and therefore

he knows (vicariously) the existence of the

Common Truth. (Alone) by himself, he does not see

the Common Truth.... (The Sage) speaks of the Two

Truths (only) in accordance with the feeling of

(common) men.(20)

According to this Chinese formula, the sage would

not really be functioning in the everyday world, a

world in which discursive logic and discriminated

realities are apparently "real." The sage only

lowers himself to participate in the mundane world

of affairs. The questioner pursued another avenue:

Q: The (objective) realm known to the Sage is the

Real Truth. Now is the wisdom that knows it part

of the Real or the Common Truth?

The question is whether subjective wisdom (chih)

belongs to any objective realm (ching). The prince's

answer is faithful to Maadhyamika:

A: What knows is called wisdom. What is known is

called realm. When wisdom appears, the (normal

subject-object) realm disappears. In that sense,

the wisdom can be said to be with the Real.

Praj~naa, the nondiscursive wisdom, is strictly

speaking not a "thing" in a "realm," but insofar as

the real (`suunyataa) is known nonobjectively

through praj~naa, praj~naa and `suunyataa belong to

the same company. The questioner persisted:

Q: What about the person with the wisdom. Is the

person with the wisdom in with the Real Truth or

the Common Truth.

A: As long as you say it is the "person" of wisdom,

then the "person" belongs to the common

realm.(21)

What about the mind that is beginning to comprehend

the real? Is this mind resident of some intermediate

area that can be designated the third truth (realm)?

To these questions, the prince answered with a

realistic "no."(22) The mind is on the way toward

enlightenment. On the basis of this, the prince

rejected the idea of sudden enlightenment.(23) In

this, he was only sharing the dominant view of his

time.

The prince had demonstrated, up to this point, a

high degree of clarity even if he was limited by his

vocabulary and understanding. At times, he seems to

share the misguided notion of two realities with his

questioners. However, his answers were less than

satisfactory on two other issues. It is not

accidental that mature Chinese San-lun

philosophizing was yet to come, The first issue

involves the issue of the origin of realities:

Q: The common Truth sees Being and Nonbeing,

therefore it has born realities as its substance.

Now I can see that Being-dharmas can give birth

to realities, but Nonbeing-dharmas implies an

absence of dharmas (realities). How can the

latter give birth to realities?

A: In the realm of Common Truth, Being and Nonbeing

are relative (interdependent). Becuase they are

interdependent, they both can give birth to

realities(24).

P347

One suspects the prince was equating being and

nonbeing with yin-yang(ag). The Buddhist notion of

relativity is turned into the Chinese yin-yang

complementation. From the "interdependence" of

yin-nonbeing and yang-being, things are born.(25)

In another similarly unconscious adoption of

Chinese cosmological outlook, the prince permitted a

strange notion of a "dependent absolute" to be. This

is in sharp contrast with Chi-tsang's idea of an

absolute Void as the "nondependent Void."(26) The

Prince was very probably misled into his strange

theory by the I Ching's distinction between "above

form" (hsing-erh-shang) and "below form"

(hsing-erh-hsia(ah)). For him, the higher truth as

hsing-erh-shang is relative to and dependent upon

the lower truth of physical forms, hsing-erh-hsia.

Q: Is the term i (Meaning) in the term ti-i-i-ti

(Truth of the Highest Meaning) dependent on form

(hsing(ai)) or not?

A: It is dependent on form.

Q: It is without hsiang(aj) (phenomenal

characteristic). How can it be dependent on any

form?

A: Since it is called the Highest (literally, Number

One), how can it not be dependent on (relative

to) other (lower) things?(27)

Apparently for the prince, the higher truth was

defined in part by its cosmogonic sequence. It is

prior to hsing (form). Although it is above hsiang

(lak.sa.na in Sanskrit, it can also refer to the

"emblems" in the I Ching which are "below form"), it

is not truly free from being related to hsing as

such.

The prince's philosophy represents the view of a

well-informed gentry Buddhist of sixth-century A.D.

China. The prince had digested an admirable amount

of the Maadhyamika logic. He was not totally free

from an ontological understanding of the two truths,

but he had recognized the perspectival nature of

the two realities. Like most gentry Buddhists in the

southern courts, there was a "gnostic" bias in his

thinking, a trust in wisdom of a quietistic type, a

lack of sensitivity to the more dynamic aspect of

compassion (karu.naa) and an infatuation with the

"formless". Anything less than this abstract

absolute would be a betrayal of the vision of

Mahaayaana. This "ontological gnosticism" prevented

the southerners, their piety and Buddha-worship

notwithstanding, to develop the faith side of

Mahaayaana. I will support this observation with a

translation of another even shorter essay by the

prince on the dharmakaaya. In this essay we can see

a "colorless" absolute, a god of the philosophers,

giving little comfort except to the cerebral

pietists or philosophers.

Translation of ON DHARMAKAAYA(ak)

The dharmakaaya is empty and quiet, far away

from the world of being and nonbeing, being alone

liberated from the forces of karman. It cannot be

known by wisdom or cognized by consciousness, being

beyond all discourses. However, I cannot remain

silent in showing its principle. Because we have to

use words, therefore it is called the law-body,

dharmasariira in Sanskrit and fa-hsin

P348

in Chinese. In substance, it is its own self-nature.

It only becomes relative in verbal discourse. The

word fa (dharma) has as its Principle the conformity

to the rule. The word hsin (body) means that it has

a physical body. The body that adheres to the rule

or norm is the fa-hsin. Briefly to explain its

substance: It is called the eternal body, the

diamond body, but upon scrutiny, it is shown to be

invariable. To call it "diamond is to give it name

and form; to label it "eternal" is to assign to it a

space. Invariability or permanence is only a

description; diamond is only a metaphor. Its real

substance is union with the unborn. Thus it is said

that the body of the Buddha is wu-wei(al) and that

it never (truly) falls into the worldly realm. The

Nirvaa.na suutra says: "The Body of the tathaagata

is a Non-body, without limits, quantity, trace,

knowledge or form, being totally pure and

unknowing." Since it has the positive attribute of

purity, it cannot be said to be (simply) nonbeing.

It is said to be subtly existent and yet not

existent. Beyond being and nonbeing, that is the

Dharmakaaya.(28)

The prince's description of the Dharmakaaya is

not incorrect by Mahaayaana standard. The

Dharmakaaya is indeed formless and eternal, pure and

cannot be catalogued as being or nonbeing. However,

in the following exchange we can see the danger of

such abstractions.

Q: ... I do not know if the Dharmakaaya responds (to

mankind) or not.

A: The Dharmakaaya does not respond.

Q: I thought that the Dharmakaaya is Dharmakaaya by

virtue of its ability to respond to changes.

A: The nature of the Dharmakaaya is to follow the

dharma's substance. (The dharma being

changeless,) any talk about it responding or

changing would not be following the proper

"tracks."(29)

Doctrinally correct, the prince allows little leeway

for the active role of the saving Buddha. In this

regard, one should be grateful for the later

articulation of the trikaaya (three bodies) theory

by Asa^nga, for the second body (sambhogakaaya) can

fill this conceptual vacumn.

Q: If there is no response and no change, how can

the Dharmalaaya follow the "tracks"? By "tracks"

we must mean the tracks of the world. If so, how

can it not respond to things in the world?

A: Sentient beings hope and look for blessings,

therefore the Dharmakaaya can go along with

things and transform the karman of man. Thy is

not (really) response and change.

Q: But if it can bless sentient beings, it must be

responding and changing.

A: (No,) if the hopes and expectations are born,

then the track (rhythm) of things will take care

of these hopes and expectations. Why bother the

In this last line (italies mine), we see surfacing

the Confucian "agnosticism" --

why drag the spirits into the ethical affairs of

men? Why bother the Dharmakaaya, the impersonal

absolute, with matters for which we are ultimately

responsible ourselves? Like heaven, the Dharmakaaya

will "respond" but only through the ethical

symbiosis of what the Han Confucians called

kan-yin(am), "stimulus and response." The hopes and

the expectations initiated on the person's part will

effortless of the Dharmakaaya qua Heaven. This is

the minimal intervention the prince would allow for

the

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Dharmakaaya-Buddha. It would appear would appear

that the sentiment here is similar to the Neo-Taoist

fascination with the Tao.

Q: If the Dharmakaaya gives hope and expectation,

how can it not be responding and changing? If

there is no response and change from the

Dharmakaaya, then all hopes will be in vain.

A: (No.) The World Honoured One (the Buddha) is

extremely numinous, such that he can evoke the

hopes which will then self-fulfil. If there can

only be a result after he (actively) reacts (to

man) then why would (the Classics) say: "The

Ultimate Gods never respond and yet the greatest

beauty is accomplished." If you still insist that

the Buddha (i.e. Dharmakaaya) must respond, then

the Dharmakaaya would hardly be any different

from the bodhisattva (as ruupakaaya).

Thus the prince's "two-bodies" theory (basic to

Naagaarjuna too) awaits the trikaaya theory to come

for a more faithful articulation of the fuller

Mahaayaana ideal.(30)

NOTES

1. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of

Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955).

2. On the fate of the Ch'eng-shih school, see

Takakusu Junjiro, Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy

(Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1947), pp. 74-75

and my manuscript, "The intended Meaning of the Term

`Ch'eng-shih,' A Hypothesis."

3. See Takakusu, Essentials, pp. 99-110 and

translations from Chi-tsang in W. T. de Bary, et

al., ed. The Buddhist Tradition (New York: Random

House, 1972), pp. 143-150. On Seng Chao, see Waiter

Libenthal, The Book of Chao (Peking: Catholic

University, 1948) , and Richard Robinson, Early

Madhyamika in India and China (Madison: University

of Wisconsin, 1961).

4. Chi-tsang reviewed and criticized those

theories concerning two truths proposed by thinkers

that came before him in his work San-lun hsuan-i(an)

(Taisho Tripitaka, 45, pp. 1-11, 19); see also his

Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun(ao) (T. 45, p. 25).

5. Taisho, 52, pp, 247c-250b.

6. `Sankara is known to have adopted the

"four-cornered dialectics" of the Madhyaamika

philosophy as well as the distinction between the

discursive and the nondiscursive (two) truths.

7. Dharmataa, "reality as it is, " or

dharma-ness, implying a "common" characteristic of

all phenomena, the "whole" as over against the

parts, figured often as the absolute in

Naagaarjuna's philosophy; see Murti, The Central

Philosophy.

8. The moon is the Zen symbol of enlightenment.

Another analogy used is the act of shouting

"Silence!" to secure silence--the word "Silence" is

then the instrument effecting the wordless quiet.

9. Among Western scholars, three studies on

Madhyamika are available, each giving a slightly

different slant to the phenomenon studied. Beside

Murti's work, there are Stcherbatsky's The Conception

of Buddhist Nirvana (Leningrad: The Academy of Science

of the USSR, 1927) and Frederick Streng's Emptiness

(Nashville: Abington, 1967).

10. See my analysis of the Chinese understanding

of the Buddhist theory of pratitya-samutpaada in

"Chinese Buddhist Causation Theories" Philosophy

East and West 27, no.3 (1977).

11. The development in China of a

counter-emptiness philosophy, underlining the

positive doctrine of A`suunya (not-empty) as

developed by the `Srimaalaa suutra and the

Ratnagotravibhaaga, is touched upon in my thesis

"The Awakening of Faith in Mahayana: A Study of the

Unfolding of Sinitic Motifs," (Harvard University,

Ph. D. dissertation, 1975).

12. Among Chinese Buddhist schools, only San-lun

so regarded the two truths; see Bukkyo gakkai(ap),

ed., Hasshuu Kovo koi(aq) (Kyoto: Bukkyo gakkai,

1927), p. 300.

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13. It should be added that the Buddhists do

recognize something (nirvaa.na) which is "unborn,"

"uncreated," and so on.

14. Taisho, 52, p.247c.

15. Taisho, 52, pp. 247c-248a.

16. In the thoughts of Fa-tsang, the Hua-yen(ar)

patriarch, the Absolute (Suchness, chen-ju) is both

unchanging (pu-pien) and changing (sui-yuan(as) ,

following the conditioning factors that create the

phenomenal world, that is, participating in the

world of change); see Whalen Lai, "The Awakening of

Faith." Fa-tsang actually incorporated the Taoist

concept of wu-wei, active-inactivity, into his

interpretation of the nature of chen-ju.

17. The categories of the sage and the commoner,

strictly speaking a pair of Chinese concepts, can be

found in all the Chinese Buddhist schools and are

especially crucial to the Pure Land tradition. Seng

Chao utilized this distinction in his writings, The

Immutability of Things (Taisho, 45, p. 151).

18. Taisho, 52, p. 248ab.

19. See essay on Hui-yuan and Lao-Chuang

philosophy in Kimura E'ichi(at), ed., Eon kenkyuu

(Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1962) , II, Kenkyuu

hen(au) . According to this interpretation, the

Chinese Buddhists placed more emphasis on the role

of the person, the bodhisattva in the form of the

Chinese notion of the sage. The shen-jen(av), man of

spirit, can abide with the eternal Tao and yet be a

citizen of the world.

20. Taisho, 52, p. 248b. The next two quotations

are continuations of this.

21. Taisho, p. 249c.

22. Taisho, 52, p. 250a.

23. The "suddenism versus gradualism" debate,

which began among the southerners with Tao-sheng and

Hui-kuan in the fifth century, had ended with the

victory going to the latter. The prince followed in

this realist tradition. However, in the Ch'en

dynasty (557-589) the suddenists made a "comeback"

and eventually dominated the scene in the T'ang

period, especially among the Zen circles.

24. Taisho, 52, p. 249bc.

25. This yin-yang logic recurred later in

Hui-yuan (523-592) and found its way into Fa-tsang's

philosophy.

26. The Chinese term used then was

chueh-shih(aw) and not the present Chinese term of

chueh-tui(ax) (without opposition). The concept of

the nondependent void was apparently drawn from the

notion of atyanta-`suunyataa, pu-ching kung(ay),

"utter void." Of the so-called twenty Emptinesses,

the Chinese seemed to have selectively underlined

atyanta-`suunyataa and `suunyataa-`suunyataa for

their apparent absolute and positive (sic) values.

For a listing of the twenty Emptinesses, see Garma

Chang, The Buddhist Teaching of Totality (University

Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1971), note

119. Sec note 27 herein.

27. Taisho, 52, p. 249c. I must admit that the

passage here is difficult and confusing. The passage

can be read in another way, namely, whether things

are dependent on the "Highest." However, considering

the fact that the prince admitted that the Highest

is "dependent" later, I would adhere to my

translation instead. The whole use of the word

"shih" (dependent) in this discussion is drawn more

from a usage in Chuang-tzu than from an Indian

usage. Chuang-tzu, in his discussion on the Tao and

freedom, used the term "wu-shih" (independent,

nondependent) to describe the absolute freedom of

the Great Man who roves with the Tao. Everything

else is "yu-shih(az)," that is, dependent on the

Tao. Kuo Hsiang, in his commentary on the

Chuang-tzu, was most alert to this distinction. The

Chinese Buddhists, including Chi-tsang, then

inherited this style of discourse. See Chuang-tzu,

chaps. 1 and 2.

28. Taisho, 52, p. 250bc.

29. Taisho, 52, p. 251b. The next two quotations

continue from this.

30. Indeed, in more mature Chinese thought, the

relationship between the three bodies(trikaaya) is

better understood and the role of the sambhogakaaya

(in which many bodhisattvas manifest themselves) is

intrinsiely tied up with the dharmakaaya; see, for

example. Awakening of Faith in Mahaayaana attributed

to A`svaghosa, trans, by Yoshito Hakeda (New York:

Columbia University, 1967) . In so fat that

Naagaarjuna himself also worked with a two-bodies

theory, perhaps the gnostic limitations of the

prince should not be judged to harshly.